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PART 35.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

47

October to December 1907.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

PART 35.

[32684] No. 1.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 478. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 30, 1907.

I WENT to see the President of the Council this evening to ask him if he had any message for you, as I was going to London to-morrow.

M. Clemenceau said that he wished me to tell you that he is furious with the Spaniards, for they refuse to concur in the proposal for the search of vessels suspected of conveying contraband to Morocco, notwithstanding that the British, Austrian, and German Governments have given their consent to it.

I told his Excellency that you had done what you could to persuade the Spanish Government to co-operate with the French Government, and I mentioned the instructions which you sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid on the 27th instant (telegram No. 74). M. Clemenceau said that nothing could be better than the way in which His Majesty's Government had supported France throughout, but the Spaniards were impossible to deal with. The principal smugglers of contraband being of Spanish nationality accounted no doubt for the unwillingness of the Spanish Government to take measures which would make that fact evident.

M. Clemenceau mentioned, as an instance of the pretensions of the Spanish Government, that they desire to have a voice in the discussion of the terms to be made between General Drude and the tribes round Casa Blanca though none of the fighting had been done by the Spanish troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[32800] No. 2.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 2.)

(No. 146.)

Sir, *Madrid, September* 27, 1907.

SEÑOR MAURA, President of the Spanish Council of Ministers, intending to leave Madrid in a few days for a Spanish health resort, I called on him on the 24th instant to ask if he had anything to add to what he had already told me with regard to Spanish policy in Morocco.

He said his aims and intentions remained the same. The sooner normal conditions could be restored in Morocco the better. He would be very glad to see the end of the Casa Blanca expedition, and he entirely agreed with the present disinclination of the French to land armed detachments in the other ports within their sphere. Every landing of troops increased, in his opinion, the difficulties of the situation. Such

measures were only justifiable under the most dire necessity, for they could not fail to arouse the fanaticism of the tribes and to embarrass the Sultan in his efforts to reassert his authority.

France, his Excellency said, was not easy to follow in this affair. At one moment she urged Spain to occupy and fortify all the ports within the Spanish sphere; at the next she was all for a more patient policy. Now, again, she was making proposals which Señor Maura was very reluctant to accept. France wanted Spain to lend her assistance in putting down contraband in munitions of war. Each Power was to provide ships of war to patrol in the name of the Sultan the coast of Morocco, search suspected vessels, and take those having arms or munitions on board to the nearest open port, as provided by Article 91 of the Algeciras Act. The Sultan would be easily persuaded to consent, and foreign Powers would probably agree to their merchant-ships being searched. I here remarked that His Majesty's Government, as I learned from your telegram No. 60 of the 2nd September, would raise no objection provided other Powers concurred as regarded their ships.

His Excellency disliked the French suggestion on the grounds, first, that the Algeciras Act gives no countenance to the proposed substitution of the action of the French and Spanish ships for that of the Moorish customs; secondly, that, in view of the extent of coast to be patrolled, the difficulty of approaching it in winter season by sea, and the facilities for smuggling afforded by the long Algerian frontier, the intended measure would fail to reduce contraband to any appreciable extent; and thirdly, that it would inevitably cause great irritation to shippers, whatever their Governments would say. He did not include the further reason which I do not doubt is in the mind of the Spanish Government, namely, the reduced and inefficient condition of the Spanish navy at the present time.

I certainly doubt if the naval co-operation of Spain in a task of the kind which is contemplated would be of any great assistance to the French. Señor Allendesalazar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has since told me that he thinks M. Révoil, the French Ambassador, has gone further than his Government intended in urging Spain to adopt an immediate decision in this matter of a joint patrol of the seas. Inquiries made at Berlin, he added, had elicited the information that, in M. Jules Cambon's absence from Berlin, the consent of Germany to the proposed action under Article 91 of the Algeciras Act was not being pressed for at present, as M. Révoil had led the Spanish Government to think was being done.

Señor Maura told me the German Ambassador, M. de Radowitz, who has returned to Spain from leave of absence, had asked him rather pointedly what was the attitude of Spain with regard to events in Northern Morocco, and whether she claimed any special position there. The Prime Minister had replied that assuredly Spain did claim, and always must claim, such a special position on the coast which lay opposite her own. In other parts of Morocco she desired to play a very modest part, in proportion to her limited resources. But in the north her interest outweighed those even of the most powerful nations.

M. de Radowitz, in conversation with me, has since admitted that he thinks this contention is a very proper and natural one. His Excellency is not at present, so far as I know, placing any difficulties at Madrid in the way of the French and Spanish proceedings in Morocco.

Señor Maura assured me that his desire to continue to act in concert with France was in no wise abated. He thought co-operation could be maintained if France would only consent to limit her intervention to what was strictly necessary to the preservation of order along the coast.

I need not say that I again emphasized the necessity of such co-operation, in the interest of Spain herself quite as much as in that of the other Powers concerned, and I repeated that His Majesty's Government were satisfied that France harboured no aggressive designs on Morocco. Señor Maura agreed, but thought the French Government were sometimes tempted to do something to restore the prestige of the army in view of the anti-militarist movement in France.

His Excellency spoke to me again about Melilla. It was impossible, he said, for Spain to tolerate indefinitely the obstruction by contending "mehallas" of the one road of communication between Melilla and the interior. The Spanish Minister at Tangier would be directed to call the Sultan's attention to this urgent matter at his first interview.

The situation at Tetuan, his Excellency added, was far from satisfactory. The Pasha's troops had clamoured in vain for their pay. The Spanish Consul had taken upon himself to pay them for two days. The Pasha had at once returned the

money, and had since disbanded the troops, Tetuan remaining in an absolutely unguarded state. The Spanish Minister at Tangier had protested to Mohammed Torres against the continuance of this dangerous situation, which might compel Spain herself to garrison Tetuan from Ceuta. This of all things she desired to avoid doing. She was quite ready to advance money for the payment of the native troops.

Señor Allendesalazar informed me on the 26th instant that the Council of Ministers held on the previous day had decided to send the "Pelayo" from Cadiz to Tangier without loss of time with orders to convey Señor Llaberia, the Spanish Minister, to Rabat. Señor Llaberia is to deliver his letters of credence to the Sultan, presenting at the same time the usual gifts, in the form of carpets from the Government factory at Madrid, and a personal present of silver plate from King Alfonso. He will call special attention to the state of affairs at Melilla and Tetuan, and press for the immediate formation of the native police force which is to be placed under Spanish and French protection.

The Spanish Government, as I have gathered from my conversations with some of its members, have fixed their hopes on the power of the Sultan, now that he has made his way to Rabat, to assist materially in the restoration of order.

The Madrid press continues to support the policy of the Spanish Government, favouring always the most cautious line of action. There is no newspaper which counsels a more forward policy. The only opposition arises from the Socialist and Republican organs, which protest against "a single man or a single peseta" being sacrificed in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[32882] No. 3.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October 2, 1907.*

MOROCCO: Your telegram No. 74 of the 27th ultimo.

The King of Spain, to whom I spoke on the matter yesterday, fully realizes the importance of co-operation with France, and says he will do his best to produce a more cordial understanding between the two Governments. He complains, however, hat France sometimes adopts measures without previously consulting Spain, expecting her to follow, and that this renders joint action difficult.

[32872] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October 2, 1907.*

RELEASE of Sir H. Maclean: Your telegram No. 107 of the 30th ultimo.

There is, as far as I can see, no hope of the 5,000*l.* being accepted by Raisuli, and little hope of his being satisfied with the 10,000*l.*

His agent was with much difficulty persuaded to reduce his demands to 30,000*l.*, while adhering to all the other conditions which I reported in my telegram No. 122 of the 27th ultimo. During the endless arguments necessary to arrive at this, a rupture of negotiations nearly ensued.

His Majesty's Consul at Bilbao, the Kaïd's brother, leaves by my instructions for Rabat as soon as possible. He is to press Moorish Government to send somebody to Tangier with full powers to agree to any terms which may appear to me acceptable.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[32897] No. 5.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 148. Confidential.)

Madrid, September 29, 1907.

Sir,

THE President of the Council being away from Madrid, I have endeavoured to convey to the Spanish Government the sense of your telegram No. 74 of the 27th instant in the private letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of which a copy is inclosed.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, who saw Señor Allendesalazar yesterday, is not very hopeful of obtaining the concurrence of this Government in the suppression of contraband by means of a joint patrol of the Morocco coast. I am giving M. Daeschner my best assistance, but cannot say that the Spanish Government show as yet, any indication of a change in their view of the inexpediency of adopting course which they think likely to result in more harm than good. They continue however, to profess a great desire to keep up the understanding with France.

Some irritation has been caused by the steps taken by France to secure the concurrence of the Powers in the proposed method of suppressing the arms traffic without previous consultation with Spain. The Spanish Government is very sensitive in this respect, as I have before pointed out, and I think the French Government could do more with them by taking them more fully into their confidence when a fresh step is in contemplation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 5.

Sir M. de Bunsen to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Particulière.)

Madrid, le 29 Septembre, 1907.

Mon cher Ministre,

J'AI reçu encore un télégramme de Sir Edward Grey—il m'est arrivé avant-hier—me donnant l'instruction d'insister de nouveau sur la très grande importance qu'il attache à ce que l'Espagne trouve le moyen de se concerter avec la France en ce qui concerne la contrebande. Vous avez bien voulu m'indiquer, ainsi que M. le Président du Conseil, les difficultés que le Gouvernement Espagnol éprouve à accepter les propositions françaises à ce sujet. Mais je me demande s'il n'y a pas moyen de faire quelque chose dans le sens indiqué, pour montrer bien au monde que l'entente sur le Maroc continue. En tout cas, comme dernier mot avant de partir, je me permets de vous recommender beaucoup l'étude de cette question. Elle préoccupe Sir Edward Grey, qui ne désire autre chose que l'accomplissement des Accords de 1904, et qui croit qu'un manque d'entente sur le Maroc avec la France pourrait mettre en danger la position gagnée par l'Espagne en vertu de ces Accords. En ceci je ne fais que transcrire son télégramme. Je crois, du reste, que le Gouvernement Espagnol désire toujours continuer dans la voie de coopération avec la France. J'en ai assuré Sir Edward Grey, et il doit en être bien convaincu. Tout de même, il a télégraphié dans le sens que je viens de vous exposer, et je ne peux pas m'empêcher de vous le dire. C'est dans l'intérêt même de l'Espagne que le Gouvernement Anglais aimerait à voir un peu plus d'empressement dans ces négociations pour arriver avec la France aux accords que les circonstances imposent.

Du reste, vous ne pouvez pas douter de l'esprit d'amitié qui inspire ces observations.

Votre très dévoué,
(Signé) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[32891] No. 6.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 483.)

Paris, October 2, 1907.

Sir,

I FOUND M. Pichon this morning in a state of considerable irritation at the action of the Spanish Government in connection with Moroccan affairs. Their attitude, he said, had throughout been one of uncompromising hostility. At the outset they had made all sorts of difficulties with regard to the landing of troops at Casa Blanca, they then wished to interfere in the negotiations with the tribes, and now the limit had been reached when Spain, alone of all the Powers, refused to join in the execution of the measures for preventing the contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Morocco. Not only, said M. Pichon, was the Spanish action excessively embarrassing for France, but he also considered it to be fraught with considerable danger for the peace of Europe. If Germany once got wind of the serious divergence of opinion which existed between France and Spain, she would not be slow to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered to her to introduce a wedge between them and widen the split.

M. Pichon is of opinion that the President of the Council, M. Maura, is entirely responsible for the present policy of Spain. He is, his Excellency said, interested only in internal questions, and ignorant of foreign affairs; he is, however, a man of a very strong will, and imposes his views on his colleagues. The King, M. Pichon feels sure, must disapprove the attitude adopted by his Government.

M. Pichon once more expressed to me his appreciation of the loyal support which he had received throughout from His Majesty's Government. He is to see the Spanish Ambassador this evening, and he said that he intended to tell him with regard to the question of the contraband trade in arms that if the Spanish Government maintained their refusal to join in the measures proposed by France, he intended to act without them ("passer outre"). He told me that should any special point be raised in their conversation which he wished brought to your knowledge, he would ask me to call upon him to-morrow. The representations made on several occasions by Sir M. de Bunsen had undoubtedly been most useful, and he might very possibly be obliged to have recourse once more to your good offices. In connection with M. Pichon's remarks with regard to the contraband trade in arms and ammunition, I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "Temps" of to-day's date, which bears the stamp of official inspiration, announcing that all the Powers, with the exception of Spain, are in agreement with regard to the measures to be taken for its prevention, and that should Spain persist in refusing to join in the execution of these measures, the rest of the Powers would act without her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[32943] No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 156.)

Foreign Office, October 3, 1907.

Sir,

THE Spanish Minister stated, when calling at this Office on the 30th ultimo, that the German Government have now agreed to the measures proposed by the French Government for the prevention of the introduction of arms and ammunition into Morocco.

The Marquis de Villalobar said that the German Government had attached certain conditions to their acceptance of the French proposals, but he was unaware of their nature.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[32413] No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 157.) *Foreign Office, October* 3, 1907.

Sir,

THE Spanish Minister, when calling at this Office on the 29th ultimo, mentioned that some difficulties had arisen at Tetuan owing to the non-payment of the Moorish troops there, 200 of whom had come to the Spanish Consul asking for his intervention. The Spanish Government had offered to find an advance, but this had been refused, and the troops had left the town.

The Spanish Government had caused representations to be made at Tangier, and a promise had been received that measures would be taken for the protection of the inhabitants of Tetuan.

The Marquis of Villalobar considered that the above information might be of interest to His Majesty's Government, as it concerned the safety of the British subjects resident at Tetuan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[32988] No. 9.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 485.) *Paris, October* 3, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Temps" of to-day's date,* the account of an interview between M. Tardieu ("Georges Villiers") and Si Mohammed Tazi, a member of the Makhzen, now in Paris on a financial mission from the Sultan.

The following are the principal points in Si Mohammed Tazi's declaration :—

The Sultan is convinced of the necessity of reforms in his country, but he has to reckon with the resistance of the more ignorant elements both in the towns and in the country. The strength of Moulai Hafid rests on a precarious basis. Most of the tribes have only joined him through fear, and as soon as the Sultan has sufficient pecuniary resources to bribe them to desert, Moulai Hafid's power will be at an end. France has an interest in supporting the Sultan against his brother, for in the first place he is more intelligent than Moulai Hafid, and he has profited by the experience of the past four years. Moulai Hafid is, moreover, accessible to German influence; a Herr Holtzmann is in touch with him, and he has nominated two agents to go to Berlin. Si Mohammed Tazi did not know whether they had started or not. The most urgent measure in the interest of public order is the repression of the contraband trade in arms and ammunition. If the tribes are prevented from obtaining Spanish and Belgian cartridges, a great step will have been taken towards a pacification.

Si Mohammed Tazi then gave his views as to the manner of organizing the native police in the ports. In his opinion it is quite feasible if proper precautions are taken to avoid rousing the susceptibilities and fears of the population by precipitate measures.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[32872] No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 109.) *Foreign Office, October* 4, 1907.

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 124 of the 2nd instant: Capture of Sir H. Maclean.

We cannot press Moorish Government to pay so large a sum as 30,000*l.*, which is beyond all precedents, but you might, in communicating to them Raisuli's terms, ascertain whether they would be prepared to make any advance on the sum of 10,000*l.*, mentioned as a maximum figure in my telegram No. 107.

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* Not printed.

[33188] No. 11.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to state that the Italian Government have informed the French Ambassador at Rome that they have no objection to raise against the right of visit provided for in the General Act of Algeciras being exercised in Moroccan ports and waters by French and Spanish ships, since they are convinced that it is a question of a purely temporary measure, and that the right of visit will be exercised with circumspection, avoiding all damage to commercial interests.

Italian Embassy, London, October 4, 1907.

[33198] No. 12.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, October* 5, 1907.

MOROCCO: Contraband trade in arms.

The withdrawal of Spanish opposition appears to have greatly gratified the French Government. They attribute it partly to the effect produced at Madrid by the communiqué in the "Temps" forwarded to you in my despatch No. 483 of the 2nd instant, and partly to Sir M. de Bunsen's conversation with the King of Spain.

[33295] No. 13.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 379.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 25, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mulai Hafid, informing me that he has ordered Raisuli to give up Kaïd Maclean on pain of incurring his displeasure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Mulai Hafid to Sir G. Lowther.

(After compliments.) 27 *Rajab*, 1325 (*September* 6, 1907).

WE would inform you that since Allah (may He be exalted) has appointed us to take charge of the affairs of the glorious Moroccan Empire the case of the intelligent Maclean has caused us the utmost concern, even although you have not written to us about it. Still we have a great desire and intention to establish good relations with your glorious Government especially (in particular), and with all the other respected Powers in general, and we have written to Raisuli commanding him to release the intelligent Maclean from captivity, and to deliver him over to your Excellency through the hand of Hadj-el-Mehedi-el-Menebhi, and that if he obeys this it will be a good action, and if he does not do so he will immediately experience from us that which will not please him, and we will attend to him before anything else, and this to establish friendly sincere relations with your respected Government. We would wish you to inform them of this.

May God, &c.

[33296] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 380. Confidential.)

Tangier, September 25, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 116 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that, after some delay and an exchange of views with the French Minister and others, Hadj Mohammed Tazzi decided to place himself in the hands of the State Bank, with a view to obtaining an advance on the jewellery valued by the Court at 200,000*l.*, and that official, accompanied by Dr. Vardon, left for Paris yesterday.

The other jewellery to be deposited at Coutts was to be dispatched from Gibraltar yesterday for England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33298] No. 15.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 383.)

Tangier, September 27, 1907.

Sir,

ABOUT a week ago M. Regnault, the French Minister, informed me that he had been requested by His Majesty the Sultan to proceed to Rabat, and he proposed to accept the invitation with as little delay as possible.

Yesterday my Spanish colleague, M. Llaberia, told me he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Makhzen that he proposed going to Rabat to present his credentials to the Sultan. No date has yet been decided upon for his departure.

I have not heard that it is the intention of any other of my colleagues to go to Rabat, but the Portuguese, Austrian, Italian, Netherland, and Russian Ministers have not yet presented their letters of credence to His Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33299] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 384.)

Tangier, September 27, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Vice-Consul Neroutsos reports the arrival of the Sultan at Rabat on the 23rd instant. The reception of His Majesty appears to have been very cool. Mr. Neroutsos estimates the strength of his forces at 2,000 fighting men, of whom many are deserting, as they have not received their pay. The Sultan himself appeared very fatigued.

The town of Rabat is quiet, in spite of the presence of the large rabble which has accompanied the Sultan. Mr. Neroutsos is of opinion that the attitude of the tribes depends on what they hear in regard to the relations of His Majesty with the French, and that, if the tribes are convinced that he has come to an arrangement with the French, there will be serious trouble.

I believe that there is little or no disposition on the part of His Majesty to leave Rabat with a view to attacking any of the tribes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33300] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 385.)

Tangier, September 27, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, forwarding a translation of a letter which he has received from Kaïd Si Aissa-ben-Omar, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mulai Hafid.

It will be seen that Kaïd Aissa states that the army is proceeding to Shawia with a view to restoring order in that district.

From another source I hear that the instructions given to the fanatical Commander of their army, Mulai Raschid, are to proceed to Shawia, but not to fight without receiving special instructions from Marakesh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 262.)

Dar-al-Baida, September 26, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. Vice-Consul Hunot has transmitted to me, under date the 22nd instant, a letter from Kaïd Si Aissa-ben-Omar, which he received from the Khalifa of Saffi, with a request to forward the same to me.

I beg to inclose translation of this communication herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar to Consul Madden.

(In the name of the merciful God.)

(Translation.) *Shaaban 9, 1325 (September 18, 1907).*

TO the Consul of the English nation at Dar-al-Baida. Compliments.

I have to inform you in the first place that our lord the puissant Sultan, Moulay Abd-el-Hafid, God assist him! has appointed me to the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs, and we have taken up the duties thereof.

His Majesty has commanded us to inform you that the intentions of the M'halla (army) which has been appointed to march to your parts, are to endeavour to pacify and to quench the fires of strife, also to prevent the tribes from all acts which may cause fighting between the two parties, and to keep them (the tribes) in tranquillity and perfect rest. God complete the work!

Finished.

(Signed) AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

[33301] No. 18.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 386.)

Tangier, September 28, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting on a proposal to institute an International Municipal Council for the control of hygienic arrangements and the service of the streets of that port.

You will observe that besides this project, the French, according to M. Malpertuy, wish to make still further improvements during their enforced occupation of the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 264.)

Dar-al-Baida, September 27, 1907.

Sir,

THE French Consul informs me that he proposes shortly to call a Consular meeting to consider the question of setting up an International Municipality in Casa Blanca for the control of the hygiene of the town, and the service of the streets. The outline of his proposal is that the four Consuls of France, Great Britain, Spain, and Germany should appoint one Delegate each, the remaining unofficial Consuls nominating one Delegate more to represent them collectively. These five Delegates would act with four Moorish Commissioners to represent the Moorish authority.

Further proposals are, M. Malpertuy said, on foot to improve the town by erecting on the site of the burnt huts more suitable dwellings, properly intersected by streets. The French, he said, would be willing to light the town by electricity, but their hands were tied in this case, since under the Act of Algeciras, the contract for such a work would have to be put out to public tender.

The Consul stated that when the troops retire from Casa Blanca, the French Government intend to present the valuable distilling plant set up at Sidi Billiot to the town. In his opinion, however, a sufficient force of troops must be kept here until the port works are finished, since the Arabs are not to be trusted. These works he considered would take quite two years to complete.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[33302] No. 19.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 387. Confidential.)

Tangier, September 29, 1907.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram of yesterday's date, M. Regnault proposes, if possible, to leave next week for Rabat, to present his letters of credence to His Majesty the Sultan.

He is to be accompanied by General Lyautey, who commands the troops in Algeria, and by Admiral Phillibert, now commanding the vessels in these waters. A precedent is created by officers of such high rank being attached to the mission to the Sultan.

I asked M. Regnault, who gave me the information, whether in matters in general connected with the mission he proposed to create other precedents. As far as offering gifts to His Majesty, he proposes to adhere to custom, and intended to present the Cross of the Legion of Honour set in brilliants. This decoration had already made a journey to Fez, as it was intended that M. Saint-René Taillandier should present it to His Majesty, but no favourable opportunity ever occurred during the sojourn at Fez of that somewhat unfortunate mission to make the presentation, and it was brought back to Tangier. A few other gifts would be made to His Majesty, but M. Regnault was indisposed to follow the custom of presenting gifts to the Viziers now in power. They had done nothing in the administration of their various offices to deserve any mark of appreciation, indeed, all their labours had been rather devoted to bringing the country to ruin. M. Regnault was anxious also to establish a new custom of the mission relying upon its own resources, and to abolish the system of "monna" (daily provisions supplied by the Makhzen). It would be easy to supply the mission at Rabat by sea, and it would be carrying out the sentiments expressed at the Conference at Algeciras. He fully realized that it would be an unpopular move amongst those who had always benefited by this abuse, but the charge could no longer be brought, that the presence of a foreign mission at Court entailed heavy

expenses on His Majesty. He proposed to offer to accept "monna" for a week, and then to rely entirely upon his own resources.

This question was discussed at Algeciras at the third sitting of the Committee on the 27th January, and Article 62 of the Act expresses the opinion that the suppression of "monna" should become general.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33303] No. 20.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 388.)

Tangier, September 29, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 362 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note addressed to me by Mulai Abd-el Hafid as Sultan, notifying the appointment of Mehedi-el-Menebhi as Commissioner in the place of Hadj Mohammed Torres.

I understand that letters have also been addressed by Mulai Hafid to all my colleagues, but these have not been delivered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Mulai Abd-el-Hafid to Sir G. Lowther.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

THE attention shown by you to our common friend Hadj-el-Mehedi-el-Menebhi has caused Us pleasure, and we count it most meritorious of your respected Government, as it is as though you had shown that attention to the whole Islamic nation. He (Menebhi) is not one of the men from whom Makhzen appointments are withheld, but one of the most deserving to fill its most important posts, and We therefore see good to appoint him Islamic Deputy at Tangier in the place of Hadj Mohammed Torres, because of the great age and weakness of the latter and his incapacity to attend to the duties of the post, and Hadj-el-Mehedi is most deserving of it in consideration of his abundant intelligence, &c. We therefore write to you to inform you of this, and so that you may send notification thereof to the esteemed and glorious head (His Majesty the King?) of your Government, that he (compliments) may likewise be aware thereof. May God cause your nation to be strengthened in him, and may he remain in peace and security. And We are on terms of sincerity and truth with all the foreign nations (the respected). Finished 18th Rajab 1325 (28th August, 1907).

Great Seal of Mulai Abd-el-Hafid.

[33304] No. 21.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 389. Confidential.)

Tangier, September 29, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Wilkinson, His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador, giving certain information in regard to the intentions of Mulai Hafid, which had kindly been communicated to him by his Spanish colleague.

These details have been obtained from the Spanish renegade who is in command of the artillery of Mulai Hafid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.

(Confidential.)

Mogador, September 21, 1907.

Dear Sir Gerard,

MY Spanish colleague was kind enough to communicate to me a letter, dated Marrakesh, 9th instant, which he received from the Spanish renegade who is in command of the artillery of Mulai Hafid, and he allowed me to take some notes, asking me, however, to treat the matter confidentially. I thanked him for his courtesy, and told him I would only write to you privately on the subject.

The man, who writes as an educated person, mentions in a strain of great optimism the chances of his master to be eventually recognized by the whole population and by Europe, and he adds that these chances have been greatly enhanced by the junction of the powerful Kaïds Si Aissa-ben-Omar and M'toogi.

As for the intentions of Mulai Hafid, they can be summarized as follows: He will try and arrange matters with the Powers signatories of the Algeciras Act; will offer adequate indemnities to France for the murder of Dr. Mauchamp and the massacres at Casa Blanca; and will especially endeavour to obtain the evacuation of Moroccan territory by the French troops.

The army Mulai Hafid will soon have under his orders will number 15,000 combatants, and the artillery, under the orders of the writer, is as follows: 2 field batteries of 87 millim. Krupp and Canet guns, 2 mountain batteries of 75 millim. quick-firing guns, and about 14 quick-firing Maxim and other machine guns. As for ammunition, they had large quantities. The writer goes on to say that what he calls an advance column will leave shortly Marrakesh for the district of Shawia, under the command of the son of Mulai Mohammed-ben-Raschid, the uncle of the Sultan, and he, the writer, fears that the pacific intentions might be set at nought, owing to the column being placed under the orders of this hot-headed and fanatical youth.

M. Buigas gave me to understand that he had instructions from his Minister to offer some pecuniary assistance to the renegade, of which he is badly in need, notwithstanding his high position at Mulai Hafid's Court, on the condition that he would continue to send information.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

[33305] No. 22.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 7.)

(No. 390.)

Tangier, September 29, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 373 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum containing items of news from Dar-al-Baida and the southern ports, which has been compiled from a number of despatches received from His Majesty's Consular officers during the past week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Memorandum respecting Events of the Week in Morocco.

SHORTLY after the arrival at Marakesh of Kaïds Aissa and Mtoogi, a long-standing dispute between the latter and Mulai Hafid was settled, through the mediation of Kaïd Aissa, who has been nominated Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vice-Consul Hunot, who is usually well-informed, does not believe in the existence of a secret understanding between Mulai Hafid and Abdul Aziz. He learns that when the news of the Sultan's arrival at Rabat reached Marakesh, the arrangements for the equipment of a powerful army were energetically pushed forward, while all the important Kaïds who had declared for Mulai Hafid showed great zeal in assisting him. Mr. Hunot is of opinion, however, that there will be no fighting between the two Sultans, but rather that they will come to terms.

Strong letters have been sent by Mulai Hafid and Ma-el-Aineen to Kaïd Bargash, Governor of Mogador, ordering him at once to proclaim the new Sultan. This, however, he appears to have not yet done, in spite of his having told the Consular Body on the 19th that the Proclamation could no longer be delayed. It is stated that Kaïd Anflus, who has been to Marakesh, has now returned to Mogador in order to compel the Governor to throw in his lot with the new Sultan.

It is believed that the M'halla, commanded by Mulai Raschid, is to encamp at El Kaf, in Rehamna, until joined by Mulai Hafid's grand army, and they will then both proceed to Rabat. At the Court of Mulai Hafid there is little doubt that Kaïd Aissa enjoys the greatest influence. In addition to his appointment as Foreign Minister, he has also been made Prime Minister.

From Dar-al-Baida Mr. Madden reports that all but four of the neighbouring tribes have now submitted. These four are the Oolad Saïd, Oolad-ben-Daoud, M'zab, and M'dakra, all outer tribes, who naturally have less to fear from the French. The terms of submission are, Mr. Madden learns, as follows:—

1. Payment of 2,000,000 fr.
2. An indemnity to the port works.
3. Two hostages. (Probably this means two from each tribe.)
4. Delivery of murderers, whose property will be sold.
5. An engagement to keep the district clear of hostile groups.
6. The right of General Drude to go through the district in any way he desires.

It is thought that these tribes will have no difficulty in finding the money, as they have for years paid no taxes, and have lately been trading heavily in grain.

M. Malpertuy, the French Consul at Dar-al-Baida, considers that Mulai Hafid's M'halla should now be at Settat in Shawia, but there is every reason to believe that its intentions as regards the French are of a peaceable nature. As far as the French are concerned it is believed that fighting is practically over, but it is anticipated that there will be a struggle for supremacy between Mulai Hafid and Abdul Aziz.

The Shereefian Representative at Dar-al-Baida, Mulai-el-Amin, stated in conversation with a representative of Mr. Madden, that the two Sultans will now have to fight it out, as Mulai Hafid and his powerful adherents have gone too far to draw back. In his opinion, Mulai Hafid has a good chance of obtaining the supremacy, supported as he is by all the most powerful Kaïds of the south.

Sultan Abdul Aziz arrived at Rabat on the 23rd instant.

[33877] No. 23.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 391.)

Sir,

Tangier, September 30, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida describing the actual condition of the town.

It will be seen that Mr. Madden estimates the total claims for losses at not far short of 1,000,000*l.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 266.)

Sir,

Dar-al-Baida, September 28, 1907.

I HAVE observed that visitors to Casa Blanca with one consent agree in stating that they had been entirely unable to conceive, or indeed to have any idea of, the amount of damage done to this town by the recent bombardment and pillage. I therefore beg to give a short description of it.

Over one-third of the town is absolutely desolated and in ruins. Where before were prosperous, well-stocked, little and big shops and large stores in the business part of the town, rows of roofless blackened walls, piled up with débris, now

exist. The recent rains have only just put out the smell of smouldering. From right to left, all along the main and side streets right up to the principal gate, nothing but ruin meets the eye. In other parts every door which was not actually wrenched off its hinges or fired by the looters bears evidence of having been ruthlessly battered in.

To the west of the town, the vast Arab hut quarter, where thousands of little plaster or bamboo nouallas or huts existed, everything is utter desolation, a waste of blackened mud walls without a sign of life. Where before all the usual sounds from this thickly populated conglomeration of huts were heard, there is to-day utter silence. There are no two entire walls where a beggar can find shelter.

The Moorish houses skirting the huts, in which many of the prosperous Moors and even Umana lived, are absolutely empty, their owners having been killed, or, in more cases, having fled. This part of the town was destroyed more by shells, though the business quarter described above is thought by some to have been fired by Arabs.

I have seen several shelled Moorish houses where the shells entered the outside wall, making a clean hole only, exploded inside, shattering the opposite wall and killing the inhabitants.

This west part of the town is most weird, giving one the idea of a dead city. This feeling is carried with one again outside the walls, where, in place of densely populated mud villages under the very shadow of the town, a vast mass of charred skeletons of huts only remain.

Along the water front to the right, on entering the town, the Moorish battery and the saint house of Sidi Allal Kerouani were shelled to ruins; while to the left the Emsalla is badly holed and a tomb blown to pieces.

Perhaps 20,000 Arabs have lost their homes, and therefore the curious silence is not to be wondered at. Some hundreds have come back, but it can be only a small proportion, and it is a constant source of wonder to me how the returning Moors can find shelter in town.

I should say, roughly speaking, that all claims for losses caused by recent events cannot fall far short of 1,000,000*l*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[33306] No. 24.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 392.) *Tangier, September* 30, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 376 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit a list of the conditions of cessation of hostilities agreed upon on the 22nd instant between General Drude and three of the factions of the Chaouia tribe, which has been courteously furnished to me by the French Minister.

You will observe that Article 4 provides for the payment by the three factions mentioned of their share of 2½ million francs, to be paid eventually by the whole tribe for the enlarging of the port of Casa Blanca, apart from the sum to be eventually demanded as an indemnity for the damage done and for the expenses of the French Government.

As the French Government have a contract with the Makhzen for the harbour works of that port, and as under the present circumstances it is evident that the Makhzen will find some difficulty in fulfilling their part of the contract, it is quite possible that the French Government intend that their contractors should be refunded out of the sum those parts of the tribe have agreed to pay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 24.

List of Conditions respecting the Submission of the Chaouia Tribe.

LES tribus des Znata, des Ziaiada, et des Ouled-Zian (gens de la rivière), représentées par leurs délégués, le Caïd Ettahami-ben-Ali Ezznati, le Cadi Si-el-Hoséin, Bouchaib-ben-Guellab, El-Mogaddem El-Houhami, Ould Alia, Ben Dris Ezznah, le Caïd Ahmed-ben-Omar Ezziadi, Si Allal-bel-Hadj Mohammed Ezziadi, Si Ali-bel-Abbas Elqadmiri, Si Larbi Elkhayyati, Bou Habid-ben-Hammo, Si Abdelkader Elgadmiri Ezziadi, Si Mohammed-ben-Abdallah Ezziani, font appel à la générosité des chefs des troupes Françaises pour obtenir la cessation des hostilités, déclarant solliciter l'Aman et faire leur complète soumission, promettant solennellement, au nom de ceux qui ont combattu sous les murs de Casa Blanca, de respecter les conditions suivantes, qu'ils acceptent sans aucune restriction :—

Article 1er. Les hostilités cesseront à dater de ce jour sur l'étendue du territoire de Znata, de Ziaida, et des Ouled-Zian (gens de la rivière). Le Général pourra s'assurer par des reconnaissances militaires que la pacification est complète, notamment sur les points suivants :—

Tout groupement de gens armés dans des intentions hostiles sur le territoire des dites tribus devra être dispersé et châtié par les tribus elles-mêmes.

Tout indigène trouvé en possession d'une arme ou de munitions de guerre dans une zone s'étendant à deux heures et demie de Casa Blanca (15 kilom.) sera livré à l'autorité Chérifienne à Casa Blanca, qui le condamnera à une amende de 100 douros, dont la tribu originaire sera responsable.

Si un indigène fait usage de son arme pour continuer les hostilités, il sera exécuté.

Tout indigène se livrant à la contrebande des armes et munitions de guerre sera arrêté et livré au Makhzen pour être châtié.

Art. 2. Les dites tribus s'engagent à aider à l'arrestation des auteurs et instigateurs des meurtres dont ont été victimes les ouvriers du port ; elles prêteront leur concours pour l'arrestation du Caïd Ould Hadj Hammo, qui en a été le principal instigateur. Tous les biens des coupables seront saisis et vendus par les soins du Makhzen.

Les gens qui se sont enfuis et ceux qui ont été enlevés par ces tribus reviendront à Casa Blanca.

Art. 3. Le marché de Casa Blanca fonctionnera (comme avant) et sera fréquenté et approvisionné comme par le passé ; il sera ouvert Mercredi prochain.

Art. 4. Les tribus précitées s'engagent à verser au Gouvernement Français leur part des 2 millions et demi de francs, qui devront être versés aux autorités Françaises par les Chaouia dans un délai de deux mois pour l'agrandissement du port de Casa Blanca, sans préjudice de l'indemnité qui sera fixée par le Gouvernement Chérifien pour les pertes causées par les événements et de l'indemnité de guerre fixée par le Gouvernement Français.

Art. 5. En garantie de l'exécution des Articles précédents, chacune des tribus précitées donnera deux ôtages qui seront : pour Znata, Bouchaib-bel-Guellab-ben-Dris ; pour Ziaida, Si Ali et Bou Abid-ben-Hammo ; pour les Oulad-Zian (gens de la rivière), Si Mohammed-ben-Abdallah. Ces ôtages resteront entre les mains des autorités de Casa Blanca.

Les tribus précitées s'engagent à respecter désormais les personnes et les biens des étrangers et à obéir aux ordres Chérifiens. Tout fauteur de désordres par paroles ou par actes sera arrêté et livré au Makhzen.

A Casa Blanca, le 22 Septembre, 1907 (14 Chaaban, 1325).

(Signé) EL-HOSÉIN-BEL-MOUSA.
ALI-BEL-ABBAS ELGADMIRI.
AHMED-BEN-AMER EZZIADI.
MOHAMMED-BEN-ABDALLAH EZZIANI.

[33223] No. 25.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 436. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, October 3, 1907.*

M. JULES CAMBON, who has recently returned to Berlin from leave of absence, has been good enough to give me an account of the visit which he paid to Prince Bülow at Norderney. He said that nothing could exceed the amiability of Prince Bülow's reception of him, and the conversations which they had had together were marked by great cordiality. It was evident to M. Cambon that Prince Bülow attached considerable importance to receiving him at Norderney and not at Berlin, as, after M. Cambon had expressed his readiness to go to Norderney, Prince Bülow had spent some days in Berlin for the purpose of consulting his dentist. The interview might have taken place then, and M. Cambon gathered that Prince Bülow wished to give the impression that it was the French Ambassador, rather than the German Chancellor, who was the more anxious that the interview should take place. To this M. Cambon had no objection, and although Prince Bülow, as is his usual custom, indulged in vague generalities and did not say anything very definite, he gave M. Cambon to understand that the German Government had no wish or intention of raising difficulties for France in Morocco.

The recent action of the German Government had confirmed the impression which M. Cambon had received from his conversation with Prince Bülow. They had admitted the right of search of German vessels by France and Spain for the purpose of stopping the contraband traffic of arms and ammunition into Morocco. It is true that it would have been difficult for the German Government to have withheld their consent to this measure, which had been accepted by His Majesty's Government, and it would have been more satisfactory if they had not limited its operation to six months, as it was scarcely to be hoped that order would be re-established within that period. He hoped, however, that there would not be much difficulty in inducing the German Government to agree to a prolongation of the term. He feared, indeed, that much greater difficulties might be anticipated from the Spanish Government, whose action throughout the crisis had been far from satisfactory, and who might object to take strong measures against their own subjects, who, he understood, were the principal offenders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[33326] No. 26.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)

Sir, *San Sebastian, October 4, 1907.*

IN my despatch No. 148 of the 29th September I inclosed copy of a private letter to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, by which I had urged the necessity of agreement with France in the contraband question. The letter contained a warning that the force of the Secret Convention between France and Spain of October 1904 might be impaired as a consequence of the continued failure of Spain to respond to the French proposals arising out of events in Morocco.

You are aware that I have since spoken to the King of Spain in the same sense. I have also called attention to the point in other quarters, with a view to the Spanish Government being made to understand that it is clearly in their own interest to maintain a friendly attitude in their dealings with the French Government.

Señor Allendesalazar has now replied to my letter by one of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. It explains that if in the present case there has been delay in reaching an agreement, this is due to the fact that France and Spain thought it desirable first to make sure that Germany would raise no objection to the proposed exercise of the right of search over vessels suspected of carrying munitions of war to Morocco, and that the German reply on this point had as yet only been received in a telegraphic summary. The discussion of the contraband question with France will now be resumed. His Excellency reasserts the determination of Spain to co-operate

harmoniously with France, and he argues that no inconsistency with this policy is presented by the natural desire of Spain to secure a hearing for her own view of the questions that arise. His Excellency also takes note of the unity of aim, as regards the execution of the Agreements of 1904, which exists, as he gathers, between the British and Spanish Governments.

I hope this letter may be regarded as an indication that the Spanish Government, whose language on the subject of the prevention of contraband in the manner proposed was at first very discouraging, are coming round to a better comprehension of the duties which their position under the various Agreements between France, Spain, and England imposes upon them. I have heard from a Member of the Government who is in close touch with the President of the Council that your warning has produced an impression. The French Chargé d'Affaires has thanked me for helping him to press for Spanish co-operation to combat the arms traffic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Señor Allendesalazar to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Madrid, le 1er Octobre, 1907.*

EN vous accusant réception de votre aimable lettre d'avant-hier, je tiens tout d'abord à vous remercier de l'esprit de sincère amitié dont le Cabinet de Londres s'est inspiré dans les observations que vous avez bien voulu me transmettre concernant la répression de la contrebande des armes au Maroc.

Lorsque Sir Edward Grey vous a télégraphié, il n'était pas sans doute informé que, malgré les objections que vous connaissez, nous étions allés dans la voie de la conciliation assez loin pour nous concerter avec la France à l'effet de poser d'un commun accord la question devant le Cabinet de Berlin par l'intermédiaire des respectifs Représentants Diplomatiques. La démarche qui incombait à notre Ambassadeur a été faite dès le Samedi, 21 Septembre.

Pour ce qui touche à une nouvelle délibération de l'affaire entre les Cabinets de Madrid et de Paris, elle n'aurait pas été utile avant réception de la réponse d'Allemagne, et jusqu'à présent j'en connais seulement la substance par le télégraphe. L'échange de vues va donc être repris d'un instant à l'autre.

Je suis heureux de voir confirmé que Sir Edward Grey ne désire autre chose que l'accomplissement des Accords de 1904, qui est également le souci de l'Espagne. Les sentiments du Gouvernement Britannique sont trop impartiaux pour qu'il ne reconnaisse pas que les observations que nous sommes parfois obligés de présenter aux projets Français se concilient entièrement avec le désir le plus sincère d'arriver à une entente, étant donné que celle-ci ne saurait se baser sur l'avis d'une seule des deux Puissances Contractantes. Toutes les fois que l'accord ne s'est établi dès le premier instant, nous nous sommes efforcés de mener les négociations avec rapidité ainsi qu'avec la meilleure volonté; vous pouvez être assuré que nous y persisterons, dans notre propre intérêt et dans l'intérêt des Puissances qui poursuivent le même but que nous au Maroc.

Votre bien dévoué,
(Signé) MANUEL ALLENDESALAZAR.

[33329] No. 27.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 488.)

Sir, *Paris, October 5, 1907.*

IN my despatch No. 485 of the 3rd instant I reported an interview between Si Mohammed Tazi and the foreign editor of the "Temps," in which the former mentioned the influence Germany was supposed to exercise over Mulai Hafid through the agency of Herr Holtzmann.

The "Temps" of to-day's date publishes a telegram on this subject from its correspondent at Berlin, who has it "from an authorized source" that this intelligence is incorrect. Mulai Hafid, he states, may have desired to enter into relations with

Germany, and Holtzmann, who seizes every opportunity to play a rôle, may very probably have encouraged him. But Germany will not accept Holtzmann's services, and has had no dealings, direct or indirect, with Abd-el-Aziz' brother, except on two occasions—the first in the matter of the letter received by the German Legation at Tangier (sent at the same time to two other Legations), the second in the case of an intervention by a German Consul in favour of two emissaries of Mulai Hafid who desired a safe conduct from General Drude to present themselves to him at Casa Blanca.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[33536] No. 28.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 493.)
Sir, *Paris, October* 8, 1907.

IN the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I asked the President of the Council this morning whether he would receive His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, who was spending a few days at Paris. M. Clemenceau asked us to call upon him this morning, and I have the honour to transmit a Memorandum, drawn up for you by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, reporting his conversation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Memorandum by Sir M. de Bunsen.

MR. LISTER was good enough to take me with him this morning to call on M. Clemenceau. The conversation turned on the Spanish proceedings in Morocco. I was not suprised to find that they had caused much annoyance to the French Prime Minister. His Excellency complained that at every step taken by France, Spain had hung back, and had only in the end offered her co-operation under conditions which deprived it of any real value. Major Santa Olalla, the Spanish Commander at Casa Blanca, was behaving in the most extraordinary manner. He had burst forcibly into a house belonging to members of the foreign community, and insisted on occupying it. He had forbidden all persons to move about in the French as well as in the Spanish zone without a special permit delivered by himself. He was, in fact, showing a conspicuous deficiency in all the qualities required by a chief of the police. As for his military action, it had been simply ridiculous. The Spanish troops were under no proper control, and resorted to every form of pillage and outrage. In spite of all this, M. Clemenceau saw the importance of continuing to act with Spain. He was glad to say that, except on the point of the spheres within which each country was to operate in the work of putting down the arms traffic, an Agreement had been virtually reached with Spain on this subject. An opportunity for showing his desire not to interfere with Spain more than was necessary in Northern Morocco had just been presented by the Sultan's demand for a French ship to convey some Imperial troops to the country behind Melilla for an attack on the Roghi. M. Clemenceau had not hesitated to say that this was a duty appertaining more properly to Spain.

His Excellency expressed his acknowledgments of the assistance you had rendered him by your support of his policy in Spain, of which he was well aware. I told him of your recent instruction directing me to point out at Madrid that the force of the Franco-Spanish Secret Agreement of 1904 would be in danger of being impaired if means were not found to co-operate more heartily with France. M. Clemenceau thought that this was a very salutary warning, and I was able to inform him that it had not failed to produce an effect on the Spanish Ministers, who, in spite of their slowness to act, are in reality convinced that no other policy is open to them than that of concerting their action with France.

As regards the general international situation, M. Clemenceau said that it was more favourable to France than any which had existed since 1870. But it was none the less a very delicate situation, requiring the utmost caution on the part of France.

It was for this reason that he was continually engaged in rejecting the commands of the Colonial party, who did not cease to press for a policy of more active advance in Morocco. He was determined not to be led into action of this kind. In this spirit he had refused to land troops at Mazagan in connection with the matter of the war stores demanded by Mulai Hafid. He would land troops to punish the massacre of French citizens, but for no lesser object.

(Initialled) M. DE B.

[33714] No. 29.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

(No. 497.)
Sir, *Paris, October* 9, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "Matin" of to-day's date,* giving an account of the reception of the French Minister in Morocco by the Sultan at Rabat.

General Lyautey, under whose orders the French expedition occupied the frontier town of Ujda, and Admiral Philibert were presented to the Sultan by M. Regnault, who then invested His Majesty with the insignia of Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[33878] No. 30.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 393.)
Sir, *Tangier, October* 2, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 234 of the 24th July, I have the honour to transmit a copy of the note addressed by the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps to Sid Mohammed Torres in reply to his Excellency's note asking for the assistance of the foreign Representatives in obtaining a loan, which note formed the inclosure in my above-mentioned despatch.

You will observe that the attention of the Makhzen was called to the fact that all mention of the sums due for claims for damage was omitted from his Excellency's note, and his Excellency was invited to come to an understanding regarding the amounts due with each Legation separately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 30.

Doyen of the Diplomatic Body to Sid Mohammed Torres.

Louange à Dieu seul.

(Compliments.) *Tanger, le* 15 *Août,* 1907.

J'AI donné connaissance à mes honorables collègues de votre lettre en date du 4 Jumad II, 1325, ainsi que de la liste des dettes du Makhzen qui l'accompagne.

Nous tous, les Représentants étrangers, avons remarqué que dans cette liste ne sont pas mentionnées les dettes du Makhzen provenant des réclamations par suite des dommages, vols et autres violences dont les ressortissants des diverses Puissances ont été victimes.

Le Corps Diplomatique me charge de vous dire que, s'agissant d'un emprunt de liquidation, il ne peut émettre un avis favorable au sujet de cet emprunt si le montant de toutes les indemnisations dues par le Makhzen n'est pas compris dans cette liquidation. Pour parvenir à ce résultat et arrêter exactement le chiffre à payer, le

* Not printed.

Corps Diplomatique estime que le Makhzen doit au préalable s'entendre avec les différents Chefs de Mission et tâcher d'arriver à un accord avec eux.

De plus, je dois ajouter que même dans la liste des dettes que vous m'avez envoyée, on a trouvé des inexactitudes provenant de ce que le chiffre de quelques-unes a été réduit.

[33880] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 395.)

Tangier, October 4, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 98 and 170 of the 21st June and the 24th September respectively regarding the claims against the Moorish Government for losses incurred by foreign subjects during the suspension of their business at Morocco city, I have the honour to report that no claims have been presented to the French, German, or Italian Legations by their nationals.

I do not think there were any other foreign subjects beyond these and British subjects at Morocco city at the time foreigners were obliged to leave.

I have informed Mr. Spinney that when a normal state of affairs is re-established in Morocco His Majesty's Government will consider whether any claim can be presented to the Makhzen on account of the successive interruptions of their business at Morocco city, but that they are unable to pledge themselves as to the course which will be adopted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33881] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 396.)

Tangier, October 5, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 97 of the 1st October, 1905, reporting the signature of the German loan contract for 500,000*l*., I have the honour to report that the agent of Messrs. Mendelssohn received instructions on the 25th ultimo to inform the Moorish Government that repayment became due on that day, and that as the loan had not been paid they were prepared to carry into effect the stipulations of the contract.

An answer from the Minister of Finance is, I am informed, expected daily, and Messrs. Mendelssohn's agent is of opinion that the Makhzen will ask for a renewal for a further term, as there are no funds available from which this loan can be repaid. Should this be done he thinks that the interest would be demanded in advance, as was the case when the loan was made.

By the conditions of the contract the contractors can foreclose on Government properties mortgaged as security, any deficit to be at once made good by the Government. Should this course be resorted to, it is thought that the sum realized by the sale would certainly fall short of the amount required, and the Makhzen would, in its present financial position, find a difficulty in furnishing funds to meet that deficit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33882] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 397. Confidential.)

Tangier, October 6, 1907.

Sir,

A SOMEWHAT unfortunate incident has occurred in connection with the presence here of the Spanish men-of-war.

Some suspicion having been aroused that Spanish sailors of the "Numancia" were introducing cartridges for sale, they were carefully watched, and the Customs'

officials discovered that many of them had brought ashore cartridges concealed in the baskets intended for marketing, and some had large numbers concealed about their persons. A complaint having been made at the Spanish Legation, the Moorish authorities were informed that these cartridges were not contraband, and a pass was given to enable them to be admitted. The authorities, however, declined to give them up.

I do not think any of my colleagues have questioned the Spanish Minister on the subject, but some newspaper correspondents were indiscreet enough to do so, and were met with the reply that the sailors were not attempting to smuggle, and that the Minister was prepared to give a written statement to that effect.

In defence of the Spanish Legation, it has been stated that those cartridges were intended to be deposited at the Legation for purposes of defence in case of trouble. If this is so, the mode of introduction was a clumsy one, and in any case the impression left on the public is an unfortunate one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33883] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 398.)

Tangier, October 6, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 390 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a Memorandum containing items of news from Rabat, Dar-al-Baida, and the southern ports, which has been compiled from a number of despatches received from His Majesty's Consular officers during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum.

THE Proclamation of Mulai Hafid at Mogador, though at one time imminent, was finally prevented by the receipt of the news that the Sultan had left Fez for Rabat. Kaïd Anfluz, who had already started for Marakesh, at once returned and reaffirmed his loyalty to Abdul Aziz. Mulai Hafid's position was much weakened, even at Marakesh, by the news of the Sultan's departure, and in order to strengthen himself as much as possible he appointed Kaïds Aissa, Glawi, and Mtoogi to be respectively Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Justice.

Mulai Reschid left Marakesh on the 14th, and is stated to have arrived at Settat on the 28th ultimo with a large army and twenty-five guns. The French military authorities express themselves as pleased at this news, in view of the fact that, should fighting occur, the Arabs will be hampered by these guns and lose their mobility, which has proved to be their greatest asset.

Mr. Madden reports that all the tribes have now sent in hostages except the Oolaid Saïd, Ben Dowd, Emzab, and Emzanza. Should these latter prove obdurate an expedition will be carried out to punish them. The tribes appear to be in a great state of alarm, situated as they are between three armies—that of Mulai Reschid at Settat, the tribal camp at Kasbah Bershid, and the Sultan's army at Rabat. They seem to be afraid principally of an attack from the former. The winter quarters for the French troops will shortly be ready.

From native sources Mr. Madden learns that the murderers of the French workmen come from the Mediuna and Hel Derwa tribes. The whole affair seems to have been due to the intrigues of Ben Gillali, Kaïd of the Oolad Hariz, who offered 1,200 dollars to the tribes to proclaim him Kaïd of Dar-al-Baida. The tribes came into the town and ordered the French workmen to stop work. The latter refused, and were at once attacked and killed.

It is reported from Mazagan that the Governor has been arrested by order of Mulai Hafid and sent in chains to Marakesh. He has been replaced by Ben Dagha, a leading townsman and nominee of Mulai Hafid. The new Governor at once removed

part of the warlike stores from the custom-house and dispatched it to Marakesh. The remainder will no doubt be sent later.

The British Vice-Consul at Rabat estimates the strength of the Sultan's forces at Rabat at some 3,000 fighting men. A large proportion of these troops, failing to receive their promised pay, are deserting with their rifles and fleeing into the Shawia district. With the exception of a few hundred Sherarda, no tribes joined the Sultan on his journey to Rabat, and none came to welcome him on his arrival there. The French Minister, M. Regnault, left here with the French Mission last evening, and is reported to have arrived at Rabat early this morning.

From Mogador it is reported by telegraph that a German steamer, chartered by Mulai Hafid's envoys to convey them to Gibraltar *en route* for Berlin, left Mogador on the 5th instant. It is presumed that the object of this Mission is to raise a loan for Mulai Hafid in Germany.

It is reported that the departure of Mulai Hafid from Marakesh has been postponed until the middle of the Feast of Rhamadan.

[34133] No. 35.

Memorandum communicated by Sir M. de Bunsen, October 12, 1907.

I ASKED the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to-day how he was getting on with his negotiations on the various points in which France and Spain had disagreed. He said the question of the joint repression of contraband was as good as settled; the question of the command at Tangier in the event of a landing becoming necessary had become, fortunately, an academic one, as there was every hope of a landing being avoided; but there remained the rather awkward question of the relations between General Drude and Major Santa Olalla at Casa Blanca. The two Commanders did not get on, and it was becoming every day more difficult to maintain harmony between the warlike force sent to Casa Blanca by France and the police force sent there by Spain. The February 1907 Agreement had defined the respective positions to be occupied by the native police under French and Spanish inspection. The French police were to occupy the town of Casa Blanca and the ground between the river from its mouth to its intersection with the Marrakesh road, and the road from that point to the gate of Casa Blanca; all the country outside was to be policed by the force under Spanish Inspectors. Major Santa Olalla now claimed to exercise police functions, in accordance with this Agreement, outside the walls of Casa Blanca. But difficulties had arisen as regards the district lying immediately outside the town and extending to an imaginary line (see dotted line on sketch map*) connecting the above-mentioned point of intersection between road and river with the sea coast some distance to the south of Casa Blanca. The French and Spanish encampments lie beyond the imaginary line. This district Major Santa Olalla claimed as within his zone under the February Agreement. But General Drude also claimed to exercise authority there in connection with his military operations. Neither would yield an inch to the other. The Marquis del Muni thought it was hopeless to expect that they would arrive at a compromise. He was therefore urging on the French Government that the French and Spanish Consuls at Casa Blanca should endeavour to settle the quarrel. If they failed, it must be settled between himself and M. Pichon in Paris. The great thing was to take it out of the hands of the soldiers.

I asked the Marquis del Muni if he had heard the story of Major Santa Olalla having taken forcible possession of a house belonging to a club of European merchants at Casa Blanca. He said M. Pichon had mentioned it to him, but that he knew nothing of it from Madrid. He thought both Commanders were showing a peppery temper.

The Marquis del Muni said he was doing his very best to reach an agreement on all points, and hoped England would continue to urge the necessity of such an agreement at Paris as well as at Madrid.

(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

Paris, October 10, 1907.

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* Not reproduced.

[34047] No. 36.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 399.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 6, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mulai Hafid has dispatched two Envoys—named Bubker-ben-Shintof Rabatti and Nazeini-el-Asmy—to Berlin and London, but the object of their mission is not known. They chartered a special steamer from Saffi for Gibraltar, for which they paid 200*l.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[33830] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 564.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1907.

DURING the past few weeks His Majesty's Government have been notified by various firms in this country, and by other British subjects, that they have suffered considerable losses owing to the events which occurred at Casa Blanca in the month of August last.

The parties referred to have been directed to put forward statements of their losses at His Majesty's Consulate at Casa Blanca, and have been informed that His Majesty's Government are unable at present to give any assurance as to the course which may ultimately be decided upon for dealing with the claims.

It appears to me that the moment has now arrived for settling definitely the line of action which is to be adopted in this matter, and I request that your Excellency will endeavour to ascertain the views of the French Government as to how these claims are to be met.

M. Clemenceau, in a conversation with your Excellency, which is reported in your despatch No. 439, Confidential, of the 9th ultimo, expressed the opinion that the mode of settlement might be founded on the precedent of the bombardment of Alexandria, and I should be glad to know whether the French Government are taking any steps in that direction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[33146] No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 573.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1907.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a Memorandum which was left at this Office on the 2nd instant by the French Ambassador, giving the substance of the verbal reply returned by the German Government to the proposals of the French and Spanish Governments with regard to the suppression of the contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Moorish waters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 38.

Reply of German Government to French and Spanish Propositions respecting Suppression of Arms Traffic.

EN raison de la situation au Maroc, le Gouvernement Allemand reconnaît la nécessité de prendre des mesures; il ne fait pas d'objections à nos propositions et prend acte de ce que ces mesures ne s'appliqueront pas à des navires faisant un service régulier.

D'autre part, et en vue d'assurer au commerce une protection particulière, le Gouvernement Impérial demande que—

1. Les mesures destinées à la répression de la contrebande des armes ne soient appliquées que pendant un délai à déterminer. Si, à l'expiration de ce délai, une prolongation était nécessaire, les deux Gouvernements saisiraient à nouveau les Puissances Signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

2. Si les perquisitions dont serait l'objet le navire soupçonné de contrebande n'étaient pas justifiées, le dommage résultant de cette perquisition serait à la charge du Gouvernement dont les Agents auraient saisi le navire. Le Gouvernement responsable pourrait naturellement se récupérer des dommages payés par lui sur le Maghzen.

En ce qui concerne la première restriction, M. Tchirsky estime qu'un délai de six mois serait suffisant, mais le terme est à discuter.

Au sujet de la responsabilité en cas de réquisition injustifiée, le Secrétaire d'État des Affaires Étrangères a rappelé que la demande du Gouvernement Allemand était conforme aux précédents, notamment à ceux observés par le Gouvernement Anglais en 1901, lors de la guerre du Transvaal.

Le 28 *Septembre*, 1907.

[33604] No. 39.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(No. 164. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1907.

THE Spanish Minister called at this Office on the 5th instant and had a conversation with Mr. Langley upon Morocco questions.

The Marquis of Villalobar said that the French newspapers had been incorrect in stating that the Spanish Government had refused to agree to the measures proposed by the French Government for the suppression of the contraband trade in arms. He mentioned confidentially that the French Government were desirous of extending the right of search to all contraband, and even to this the Spanish Government had not refused their consent. At the same time, they did not favour the proposal, and it was at present forming the subject of discussions at Madrid.

The Marquis of Villalobar proceeded to say that difficulties had arisen as regards the limits of the areas to be policed at Casa Blanca by the French and Spanish police forces respectively. The French Government desired to confine the Spaniards to a bare hill, while the latter claimed the limits laid down in the Algeciras Act. M. de Villalobar could not say definitely whether his Government wished the limits in question to be adhered to at the present time, or only when the French troops are withdrawn and the mixed force of police has been organized.

M. de Villalobar again mentioned the situation at Tetuan. He said that nothing fresh had occurred since he last spoke of this matter (see my despatch No. 157 of the 3rd October, 1907). The Makhzen were doing very little to remedy the situation, but the Spanish Government were still prepared to find money for the payment of the troops, and the Spanish Minister at Tangier would probably mention the matter when he went to Rabat.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[34109] No. 40.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 14, 1907.

THE Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury are doubtless aware that Kaïd Sir H. Maclean, a British subject who has for many years past been in the service of the Sultan of Morocco, was captured in July last by the brigand Raisuli, whilst carrying on negotiations with him on behalf of the Moorish Government, and still remains a prisoner.

The forces of the Sultan endeavoured for two months to secure his release, but it soon became apparent that this object could not be attained by their efforts, and that it would be necessary to have recourse to negotiations with Raisuli.

The latter refused to enter into relations with the Moorish Government, and Sir E. Grey eventually felt himself compelled, in order to save Sir H. Maclean from the hardships of a long captivity—which it was feared that his health would be unable to endure—to authorize His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to endeavour to arrange terms with the brigand.

Raisuli demanded in the first instance, as a condition of Sir H. Maclean's release, a money payment of 112,000*l.*, and made various other onerous conditions. Sir G. Lowther has, however, succeeded with considerable difficulty in obtaining a reduction of the ransom money to 30,000*l.* and an extensive modification of the remaining demands.

Even this figure is highly exorbitant, as well as being in advance of all precedents, and Sir E. Grey has therefore instructed Sir G. Lowther to regard 10,000*l.* as the maximum which he may offer unless the consent of the Moorish Government, who will of course be made responsible for the ultimate payment of the money, has been obtained to a higher figure before the terms are finally settled with Raisuli.

The Lords Commissioners will recognize that in the present disordered state of the political and financial situation of Morocco, the Sultan's Government cannot be expected to produce forthwith the amount which may be necessary to set Sir H. Maclean at liberty, and Sir E. Grey desires me therefore to ask that their Lordships will give their sanction to Sir G. Lowther being authorized to draw a bill for the sum required as soon as a settlement is arrived at. This amount would be recovered from the Moorish Government at as early a date as circumstances permitted.

Sir E. Grey considers that His Majesty's Government are under a moral obligation to do their utmost to save Sir H. Maclean from the consequences which would ensue if money were not forthcoming to pay his ransom. Sir H. Maclean has rendered very valuable services to this country during the long period of his employment by the Moorish Government, and, in view of his age, it is highly desirable that the hardships and privations to which he is being subjected should be put an end to as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) L. MALLET.

[34573] No. 41.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 156. Secret.)

Sir, *Madrid, October* 12, 1907.

IN recent despatches regarding the situation in Morocco, His Majesty's Ambassador has alluded to a Secret Agreement signed in February last between France and Spain regarding the organization of the Shereefian police under the terms of the Algeciras Act.

Before proceeding on leave, Sir Maurice de Bunsen instructed me to endeavour to obtain a copy of this Agreement from the Spanish Government, and on Monday last I asked Señor Allendesalazar whether he would have any objection to complying with the Ambassador's wish.

His Excellency replied that he did not think there was any objection, but promised to let me know in a few days.

I have now the honour to inclose a copy of Señor Allendesalazar's private letter confidentially communicating to me a copy, in Spanish, of the text of the Secret Agreement, of which I transmit a translation.

You will see from Señor Allendesalazar's letter that by the terms of the Agreement at Casa Blanca the senior Spanish Instructor is to take command of the extra-urban zone and of reinforcements furnished if required by the urban force, and at Tangier the French senior Instructor is to be in command. In practice, however, at Casa Blanca, owing to that town being situated in the French sphere of influence, the Spanish Government have acquiesced in the command being held by a French officer. Having made this concession, the Spanish Government expect that, should a similar situation arise at Tangier, which is within the Spanish sphere, the same

consideration shall be shown them by the French Government and that the chief command shall be exercised by a Spanish officer. Señor Allendesalazar adds that the view of the Spanish Government is based not on Article 2 of the inclosed Agreement, but on the spirit of that Agreement combined with the arrangement come to in 1904.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41.

Señor Allendesalazar to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

Le 10 *Octobre*, 1907.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

CONFORMÉMENT au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer à notre dernier entretien, j'ai l'avantage de vous faire parvenir, à titre strictement confidentiel, le texte de l'Accord Hispano-Français du 23 Février, 1907, concernant la police au Maroc.

Vous ne manquerez pas d'observer que, pour les opérations de la zone extra-urbaine à Tanger et le recours qu'elles comporteraient à l'effectif urbain, les Articles 1er et 2 stipulent que c'est l'officier Français le plus élevé en grade qui prêtera son concours au commandement. Une situation équivalente était assurée à Casa Blanca à l'officier instructeur supérieur Espagnol.

Les circonstances ont apporté toutefois ce changement : qu'en pratique la France a la suprématie à Casa Blanca. Le Gouvernement Royal s'y est prêté, tenant compte que cette ville est placée dans la sphère d'influence Française. Mais il se croit à son tour en mesure d'invoquer une considération du même genre, dans le cas de Tanger, sphère d'influence Espagnole.

Ce n'est pas, donc, sur l'Article 2 de l'Accord du 23 Février, 1907, mais sur l'esprit de cette Convention, combiné avec les Arrangements de 1904, que nous nous sommes basés lorsque nous avons demandé que le commandement des forces Hispano-Françaises, qui seraient éventuellement envoyées à Tanger pour y maintenir l'ordre, soit exercé par un officier Espagnol.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) MANUEL ALLENDESALAZAR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 41.

Agreement between France and Spain, signed at Paris, February 23, 1907.

THE Government of His Majesty the King of Spain and the Government of the French Republic, deeming it convenient to define the limits in which each shall assist in the organization of the Shereefian police, according to the terms laid down at the International Conference at Algeciras, have agreed on the following conditions :—

At Tangier and Casa Blanca the police force shall be divided into two sections, one in charge of the urban and the other in charge of the extra-urban zone.

At Tangier the two zones shall be respectively determinated by the line of demarcation traced in the map annexed to the present Act. The urban zone shall include—

1. The walled city and the port as far as a line which proceeds from the sea, below the slope leading to the Dar Debagh Gate and inclosing the Romea theatre.

2. The entire plateau of the Marchan from Bab-el-Fahz and the Camino del Monte (along which the urban police shall have the right to pass in order to communicate for the purposes of duty with the Marchan) as far as the Rio de los Judios. The Spanish hospital and the convent of the Spanish mission shall be considered to form part of this zone, and, in order to leave these buildings, the urban police shall have the right to pass along the road leading from the Camino del Monte to the Barriada de San Francisco.

The electric light factory shall also be considered part of this zone, and the urban police, in order to reach the said factory, shall have the right to make use of the neighbouring roads.

The zone named extra-urban shall include, inclusive of the Camino del Monte, all the territory situated without the first zone. The French hospital shall, in the same manner, be considered as forming part of this zone, and the extra-urban police shall have, in order to reach it, the right to make use of the roads leading to it.

At Casa Blanca the zone named urban shall include the gate and city as far as the intersection of the Marrakesh Road and the Oued bou Zekour. The zone named extra-urban shall include the whole of the territory situated outside the first-named zone.

At Tangier the police shall be organized in the urban zone by Spanish instructors, and in the extra-urban zone by French instructors.

At Casa Blanca the police shall be organized in the urban zone by French instructors and in the extra-urban zone by Spanish instructors.

Art. 2. At Tangier and Casa Blanca the officer instructor of the force charged with policing the extra-urban zone shall be superior in rank to the instructor of the force charged with policing the urban zone.

When the interests of public safety necessitate the co-operation of the two forces, the assistance which the instructors shall lend to the Morocco authorities (Article 4 of the Algeciras Act) shall be regulated in the following manner :—

In operations in the extra-urban zone, and as regards the assistance required from the urban force, the instructor highest in rank of the extra-urban police shall be in command.

In the case of operations in the urban zone, when it is necessary to have recourse to a portion of the extra-urban force, the instructor of the urban police shall be in command.

Except in these cases, the urban and extra-urban police, organized according to Articles 1 and 4, shall carry out their duties separately. Measures shall be adopted with a view to securing the agreement of the Regulations and Ordinances to be applied to the urban and extra-urban zones of each of the towns for the organization and working of the police.

The senior officer at Tangier and Casa Blanca shall have the rank of Commandant.

Art. 3. At Tangier and Casa Blanca the urban police will consist for the most part of infantry ; the extra-urban police will be mostly composed of cavalry.

Art. 4. The total effective strength of the police force which is to be organized in the eight Moorish ports, open to trade, will amount to 2,500 men. The number of officer instructors belonging to the two countries will be twenty ; that of the non-commissioned officer instructors, 40.

In accordance with the prescriptions of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, the police will be distributed as follows :—

At Tangier : 200 men, 2 officers and 4 non-commissioned officers in the urban zone ; 400 men with 3 officers and 6 non-commissioned officers in the extra-urban zone.

At Casa Blanca : 100 men, 1 officer and 2 non-commissioned officers in the urban zone ; 300 men, 2 officers and 4 non-commissioned officers in the extra-urban zone.

At Tetuan and Laraiche : 500 men, 4 officers and 7 non-commissioned officers.

At Rabat, Saffi, Mazagan, and Mogador : 1,000 men, 8 officers and 17 non-commissioned officers.

Art. 5. The Spanish and the French instructors of highest rank, designated by Article 4 of the Algeciras Act to determine, in conjunction with the Shereefian Minister of War or his delegate and the inspector, the regulations and arrangements necessary to ensure the recruiting, discipline, instruction and administration of the police corps will be in constant communication for this purpose, as well as in regard to the conditions of the contract to be drawn up between the instructors and the Maghzen.

Art. 6. All differences between the instructors of the two countries in regard to their reciprocal powers will be settled by the French and Spanish diplomatic Representatives at Tangier in the spirit ef cordial harmony which happily presides over the relations between France and Spain in respect to affairs in Morocco.

In faith of which the Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, &c.

Done, in duplicate, at Paris, the 23rd February, 1907.

(Signed) F. DE LEON Y CASTILLO.
S. PICHON.

Additional Article.

(Secret.)

Should circumstances arise in the urban zone to necessitate the concentration of the larger portion of both forces, the French and Spanish Ministers will have to agree upon the share which each will have to take in the command ("los Ministros de España y de Francia deberán ponerse de acuerdo acerca del concurso que haya de prestarse al mando").

[34153] No. 42.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 159.)

Madrid, October 12, 1907.

Sir,

THE Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me last night that the French and Spanish Governments had already agreed in principle with regard to the joint measures to be taken to suppress the arms traffic on the coast of Morocco.

This afternoon the French Chargé d'Affaires informed me that the following terms had been agreed upon:—

1. The French and Spanish Governments will ask for authorization from the Sultan of Morocco to carry out in His Majesty's name the provisions of Articles 24, 25, 80, and 91 of the Algeciras Act for the period of one year.

2. Vessels engaged in regular commerce with Morocco will not be searched. A list of such vessels to be furnished by the Legations of the different Powers at Tangier.

3. The French and Spanish Governments will appoint a certain number of vessels of war for the suppression of the arms traffic.

4. The above measures shall be put into execution immediately after the Sultan's authorization shall have been given.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[34221] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October 15, 1907.*

RELEASE of Sir H. Maclean.

Cid Mohammed Guebbas, Minister of War, has received full powers to agree to any terms which we may consider reasonable. He seems well disposed but is without funds, and declares he has no means of obtaining any. The limit of the ransom which the Makhzen engages to pay has been fixed at 30,000*l*. If it proves impossible to obtain the amount required in any other manner, would His Majesty's Government be prepared to advance the money? The sum advanced would be repaid out of the loan which is now expected by the Moorish Government, and would be well within the figure mentioned above.

[34221] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 111.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 15, 1907.*

YOUR telegram No. 126 of the 15th October: capture of Kaïd Maclean.

Matter now under consideration of Treasury. Will communicate result to you as soon as it is settled.

[34221] No. 45.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, October 15, 1907.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to send you herewith a paraphrase of a telegram received to-day from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier,* relative to the ransom to be paid to Raisuli for the release of Sir H. Maclean.

I am to ask that you will move the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to be good enough to reply as soon as possible to the letter from this Department of yesterday's date, in order that Sir E. Grey may be in a position to answer Sir G. Lowther's inquiry as to whether His Majesty's Government will advance the necessary money.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[34344] No. 46.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 504.)

Paris, October 16, 1907.

Sir,

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 564 of the 14th instant, I to-day inquired of the Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay how the French Government proposed to deal with claims for losses incurred by foreigners at Casa Blanca through the events which occurred there in August last, and I said that M. Clemenceau had told me sometime ago that he thought that the precedent of the bombardment of Alexandria might be a good one to follow in the case of Casa Blanca.

M. Louis informed me that the French Government had for some time past been discussing the question with the Spanish Government, and that they were agreed to propose to the Governments of the countries whose nationals were principally interested in the matter the constitution of a Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the amount of the direct losses suffered by foreigners and natives. It would be suggested that there should be a Representative for each country whose nationals had claims of any importance, including Portugal, and that there should be one Representative for the remaining countries, the claims of whose nationals were slight, and that Morocco should also be represented on the Commission. It would be further proposed that, when the total amount of the direct losses had been ascertained by the Commission, the question of what arrangements should be made for the payment of the amount by Morocco should be considered.

A communication on the subject will probably be made to His Majesty's and other Governments by the French and Spanish Representatives on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERIET.

[34318] No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 179.)

Foreign Office, October 17, 1907.

Sir,

TWO Moorish gentlemen, accompanied by an interpreter, who stated that they were envoys sent to London by Mulai Hafid, called at this Office on the 14th instant bearing a letter from Mulai Hafid for His Majesty the King.

The envoys were informed, through their interpreter, that they could not be received as they had no official status, and that the letter for His Majesty, of which they did not know the contents, could not be accepted as they had brought no copy of it with them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

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* No. 43.

[33826] No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(No. 166. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1907.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of the reply of the German Government to the proposals of the French and Spanish Governments with regard to the suppression of the contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Moorish waters, as communicated to Sir Charles Hardinge in a letter from the Spanish Minister dated the 11th instant, marked Private and Confidential.

The Marquess of Villalobar explained at the same time the procedure which the Spanish Government hoped the French Government would agree to for the purpose of carrying the proposals into effect. The procedure they contemplated was as follows :—

1. That the French and Spanish Governments should request the Sultan, in view of Articles 24 and 25 of the Act of Algeciras, to sanction measures being taken by the two Governments for the purpose of preventing the importation of warlike material into Morocco. This sanction would only extend over a limited period of time.

2. That Agents of the Moorish Government should embark on the French and Spanish warships, and on their own responsibility indicate to the officers of the two Governments the vessels which they considered to be under suspicion.

3. That the measures should be undertaken jointly and not independently by the two Governments.

Whenever the method of procedure has been finally settled by the French and Spanish Governments, I shall be glad to learn the terms of the arrangement arrived at, as it will probably be necessary to issue a notice on the subject for the information of British shipping.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Reply of the German Government to the Proposals of the French and Spanish Governments respecting Contraband Trade in Arms and Ammunition in Moorish Waters.

(Confidentiel.)

VU la situation actuelle au Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial reconnaît la nécessité de procéder d'une manière efficace à la suppression de l'importation illicite au Maroc des armes et munitions.

En même temps, il est d'avis que les mesures à prendre à cet effet devraient ménager autant que possible le commerce légitime.

S'inspirant à ce double point de vue, le Gouvernement Impérial ne fait pas d'objection aux mesures proposées, à savoir :—

1. L'exercice des droits attribués au Makhzen par les Articles 24, 25, 80, et 91 de l'Acte d'Algésiras serait transféré provisoirement, avec le consentement des Puissances Signataires, de cet Acte, aux Gouvernements Français et Espagnol.

2. Les vaisseaux de guerre Français et Espagnols auraient la faculté d'arrêter les navires suspects, se trouvant dans les eaux Marocaines, d'en vérifier le pavillon et la cargaison, de les conduire, le cas échéant, dans un port Marocain et de les soumettre à une perquisition, à laquelle assisteraient un fonctionnaire Consulaire de la Puissance à laquelle appartient le navire, un représentant de l'autorité Douanière du pays et le capitaine ou un autre représentant de l'équipage du bâtiment de guerre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial prend acte de ce que ces mesures ne seraient pas appliquées aux bâtiments de commerce faisant un service régulier dans les ports Marocains et dont la liste serait remise par chaque Légation au Doyen du Corps Diplomatique, qui la communiquerait aux Représentants des Puissances à Tanger.

D'autre part, dans le même but de sauvegarder le commerce légitime, le Gouvernement Impérial croit qu'il serait utile d'apporter certaines modifications aux pouvoirs extraordinaires qui seraient conférés aux vaisseaux de guerre Français et Espagnols. D'abord on pourrait limiter la durée de ces pouvoirs à un délai fixe, peut-être de six mois, de sorte que si, ce délai écoulé, les circonstances exigeaient la continuation de

ces pouvoirs, les deux Gouvernements pourraient s'adresser aux Puissances Signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, en vue d'obtenir une prolongation.

En outre, il paraitrait juste que, dans le cas où le résultat de la perquisition ne justifierait pas le soupçon qui avait provoqué cette mesure, le Gouvernement dont les Agents ont ordonné la perquisition, serait responsable de toute perte et dommage échus au propriétaire ou fréteur. Le Gouvernement rendu ainsi responsable serait libre de recourir après pour le remboursement au Gouvernement Marocain.

En procédant de la sorte, on se conformerait aux précédents qui prêtent une certaine analogie, par exemple, les saisies opérées par la marine Anglaise, de navires de commerce dans la guerre Sud-Africaine en 1901.

[34570] No. 49.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)

Madrid, October 5, 1907.

Sir,

SEÑOR MORET, Chief of the Spanish Liberal party now in Opposition, had the goodness to give me a few days ago his views on the policy of Spain in Morocco.

Unlike every other Spaniard to whom I have spoken on the subject, he condemned Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, for his failure to satisfy the French Government that Spain really desired to co-operate heartily with France in the task of keeping order along the coast. Señor Moret professes to think that his country may gain the character of an untrustworthy and undesirable ally unless it abandons its present hesitating attitude. He ascribes Señor Maura's reluctance to proceed hand-in-hand with France to the clerical influences which prevail with the present Spanish Government, and which discourage all contact with the irreligious Government beyond the Pyrenees. He fears also that the future of Spain in northern Morocco will be endangered if France should be provoked beyond endurance.

I asked Señor Moret to explain to me why no single Spanish newspaper has been found to reflect these wholesome sentiments, and to expound them in convincing language to a public which is evidently in no mood at present to encourage the Government to adopt a more active policy. He replied that the main organs of the Liberal press, namely, the "Imparcial," "Liberal," and "Heraldo" are the property of a Syndicate which, while professing the most advanced principles, is controlled by influences not unfavourable to the Church, and is therefore opposed to any real understanding with France.

I think myself that Señor Moret exaggerates the clerical tendencies of the press Syndicate to which he refers, and I believe that the campaign of the Radical newspapers against intervention in Morocco is rather the effect of the doctrines preached by the extreme Labour and Socialist organizations, which, as in France, discourage any expenditure of men and money in Morocco.

It is, however, quite true that Catholic Spain shrinks with dislike and apprehension from following the lead of secularized France, and I doubt whether Señor Moret will be able to persuade many of his partisans to join him in an attack upon Señor Maura, on the ground of the necessity of a closer alliance with the French Government.

Señor Maura himself professes to be actuated by a sincere desire to go as far as possible in company with France, and he and his party would not admit that they had shown any backwardness in this respect beyond what is implied by a necessary regard for Spanish interests, which France, they allege, has not always sufficiently taken into account.

The Parliamentary Session opens on the 10th October. The Opposition is too weak and disunited to constitute any danger to the Ministerial majority. Señor Moret admits that he wants at least two full years to reorganize his party, and he assures me that he will make no effort to dislodge Señor Maura from power till he is ready to take his place. He thinks Señor Maura's Government is firmly established and likely to continue in office for a long time, unless, indeed, some foreign complication like the Morocco crisis should bring it to the ground, or unless Señor Maura's strong personality should once more lead him into conflict with the King, as happened at the end of his last administration nearly three years ago.

I understood from Señor Moret that he intended to criticize in the Chamber of Deputies not only the foreign policy of the Government, but their Local Administration Bill, and especially their Navy Reorganization Bill, which is vitiated, in his opinion,

by the proposed construction of heavy armoured vessels, out of all proportion to the means possessed by the country for keeping them in a state of efficiency.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[34549] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 403.) *Tangier, October 8, 1907.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Balda, reporting that the German Consul at that port has received instructions to appoint a Commission in order to estimate the direct losses suffered by the German subjects during the recent disturbances, with a view to apportioning the sum advanced by the Imperial Government for that purpose.

You will observe that Mr. Madden has been given to understand by the German Consul that the conclusions adopted by this Commission will be final.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 273.) *Dar-al-Baida, October 7, 1907.*

Sir,

THE German Consul informs me that he has been instructed to appoint a Commission, of which he is to be the President, consisting of three local German merchants, assisted by Dr. Probster, a legal official of the German Legation at Tangier, to examine into the direct losses of the German merchants in Dar-al-Baida due to recent events.

This Commission will not enter into the claims made by German merchants not resident here, at all events for the present; nor has it instructions at present to examine indirect losses. It is to be appointed specially in order to apportion the sum of 250,000 marks advanced by the German Government, as already made public.

The German Consul gave me to understand that even if the claims for losses be ultimately submitted to another form of inquiry, the conclusions to be adopted by this German Commission will be considered as final by the German authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[34550] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 404.) *Tangier, October 9, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 387, Confidential, of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French Mission to the Sultan left here on the 5th instant in the "Jeanne d'Arc," reaching Rabat on the 6th.

Contrary to all previous customs, which required that at least three days should elapse before His Majesty received an Envoy, the Sultan intimated that he would receive M. Regnault the following day.

A copy of the French Minister's speech and the Sultan's reply are inclosed herewith.*

You will observe the reference in M. Regnault's speech to the Act of Algeciras, and to His Majesty's assurance that he desired to introduce the reforms contemplated by that Act.

* Not printed.

I am informed that M. Regnault's reception was extremely cordial, but it is doubtful whether his prompt reception was due so much to a desire to be specially courteous as to the immediate approach of Ramadan, during the first days of which an official reception of a Minister would be impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[34551] No. 52.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 405.) *Tangier, October 11, 1907.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 403 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting a visit which he paid to the French camp in company with General Drude.

Mr. Madden states that great pains are being taken to construct suitable winter quarters for the French expeditionary force, and that General Drude is still unsatisfied with the attitude of the Spanish troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 277.) *Dal-al-Baida, October 10, 1907.*

Sir,

THE French troops have gone out this morning to Ain Jemah, a place about 12½ miles distant on the Berchid road, I am told, to examine the water springs.

On returning yesterday the General's visit to me, he invited me to see the camp, which is well placed on high, flat ground in a very healthy position, and near to the town. He made the entire tour with me. We visited in turn the Goumiers, Spahis, Chasseurs d'Afrique, and Légion Etrangère camps. On every side the men were busily at work erecting their wooden barrackments with corrugated-iron roofs, the floors of which are raised off the ground. They are at present housed in temporary huts and in tents, according to their different tastes and requirements. Excellent broad raised roads have been already constructed, traversing the entire camps, and quantities of small trenches cut to drain off the rains. The camps appeared very well ordered and extraordinarily clean.

As the General passed through the camp of the Tirailleurs, his old regiment, he repeatedly accosted groups of soldiers with: "Vous êtes bien? Vous êtes toujours contents?" And the reply was invariably a hearty "Oui, mon Général."

Some of the men said they were fasting, yesterday being the first day of Ramadan.

The wooden huts in course of construction are, firstly, for the Legionaries, then for the native troops, and, when all the men have their winter quarters ready, shelters for the horses are to be erected, this being more necessary in the case of French horses, as being less hardy than those from Algeria.

The camp is lit by an illuminant of apparently an acetylene type, the lamp being suspended from a tall iron pole. The General said he had twelve sets of this installation.

He said he is in telegraphic communication with all parts of his camp, and with the cruisers by wireless.

The field hospital consists of tents erected inside a walled-in inclosure belonging to a British firm near the town. Here wounded men with slight illnesses are attended to until their cases are fully diagnosed, when any serious ones are passed on to the base hospitals in town. There are few sick, of which only twelve cases can be called serious, but a few typhoid cases have occurred. The General appeared very anxious to see his old force housed before the winter rains began in earnest. He told me that sixty-five French soldiers in all had been wounded, which he considered a very small number in proportion to the estimated 1,200 to 1,500 Arabs killed by the French.

The balloon was up all yesterday, and the General remarked that the officer in charge averred seeing as far as Berchid; but as this would be a distance of 35 kilom. —about 21 English miles—this is hardly credible, though certainly the atmosphere was extraordinarily clear.

In pointing to the construction of certain parts of the camp, the General observed that the Spaniards were "très sévères contre nous," having refused, he said, to allow the French to take stones from the vicinity of the Spanish camp; so that the relations between the two camps are evidently a little strained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[34553] No. 53.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 407.) *Tangier, October* 14, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, inclosing translation of a letter received by him from Ben Rashid, the Commander of the force which recently left Morocco city for the Showia district, in which he requests Mr. Madden's intervention with the French authorities.

I have approved the verbal reply returned by Mr. Madden to this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 280.) *Dar-al-Baida, October* 12, 1907.

Sir,

LATE yesterday afternoon a letter from Ben Rashid at Settat was handed to me by M. Heinrich Ficke, a German merchant, who stated it had been sent into town through the medium of his German semsar. I asked him if similar letters for other Consuls had also arrived, and he replied that there was only one other, and that was for the German Consul.

Briefly, the letter, of which I beg to inclose translation, is couched in very polite terms, and requests me to speak to the French authorities with a view to stopping hostilities until Mulai Hafid himself comes to arrange the dispute between the French and the people. It then refers to the elevation of Mulai Hafid as Amir, and finally asks me to appoint a time for an interview, if possible.

After I had understood the contents of this communication I sent it to the French Consul, stating I desired to act in regard to it in accordance with his wishes.

M. Malpertuy called on me shortly afterwards, and thanked me for communicating to him the letter. He said that this Ben Rashid was a man who had preached the holy war against the French, and whose father, when Governor of Tafilelt, had given them great annoyance on their southern frontier. It was therefore necessary to act very cautiously towards him. He was of opinion that I might reply to the effect that I do not recognize Mulai Hafid, and only know one Sultan, Mulai Abdul Aziz. On observing the nature of this answer, I pointed out I would prefer not to make a reply in writing, but the Consul agreed to my stating verbally to the courier that I had spoken to him, and that if Ben Rashid had anything to say he could address the French Consul.

Having been asked for a reply, I have stated verbally to the courier the affair between the French and the people is purely French, not British, and if Ben Rashid had anything to say he should appeal to the French Consul.

It appears to me quite unnecessary I should make any pronouncement calculated to annoy the people regarding Mulai Hafid, and I have accordingly not done so.

M. Malpertuy told me he had reported three days back to Tangier that the British and German Consuls were to receive letters from Ben Rashid, as it had been reported to him through his intelligence service, which, he said, is a very effective one. He had

informed the German Consul, who stated that, if he received such a letter he would not reply to it. But M. Malpertuy did not appear to me to be aware that the German Consul had actually received Ben Rashid's letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Mulai Rashid to Consul Madden.

(Translation.)

Praise be to God alone! There is neither power nor will except in God!
May He judge us and accept the servant!

MAY God keep our Lord, the victorious Mulai Abd-el-Hafid, and preserve from all evil the Consuls of the esteemed and honoured nations in Dar-al-Baida, and in particular the intelligent and honourable British Consul. Compliments.

Praise God beside whom there is no other God, and He is the High One.

With the usual friendship and affection, and notice of the times which oblige us to seek an interview with your Excellency, and to be zealous in cementing the friendship and continuing it until perfection is reached and commercial relations improved, by which, with God's help, the welfare of our Lord, Mulai Abd-el-Hafid, and also of the nations, will increase materially.

We are certain that your Excellency will speak to the French nation with regard to its present situation with the peoples, and with the view of postponing the fighting and endeavours to pacify, until our Lord, whom God assist, shall appear on the spot, when questions can be adjudicated between them, *i.e.*, the French, and between His Majesty through your intermediary, for ye are his agents.

You are doubtless aware that should the Emir be disturbed in his mind and administration, and should his councils fail with his people, all his ordinances become the play of circumstances; it then behoves the people to depose him and set him aside, as is the custom with all nations in the past. Then, by common consent, to appoint an Emir who shall set its affairs straight and improve its condition, and this Emir is our Lord, Mulai Abd-el-Hafid. May God continue his Majesty, and especially in what concerns the Conventions and Treaties established between the people and you. For lack of this, events have happened and sedition has arisen throughout the land.

Therefore, should you consider that an interview with your Excellency be feasible, please notify us of the hour and day chosen, and kindly expedite the reply.

May you continue in zeal and welfare in commencing and finishing. Peace.

Written this 1st day of Ramadan, year 1325.

(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-RASHID-BEN-MOHAMMED-BEN-ABD-RAHMAN-BEN-HISHAM.

[34554] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 408.) *Tangier, October* 14, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 398 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a Memorandum containing the principal items of news from Rabat, Dar-al-Baida, and the southern ports, which has been compiled from despatches received from His Majesty's Consular officers during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Memorandum.

THERE is little change to report in the general situation during the past week. The British Vice-Consul at Rabat has been to see the Sultan on several occasions, who received him with unusual courtesy. In Mr. Neroutsos' opinion he does not at all realize the seriousness of the situation. He spoke lightly of Mulai Hafid's pretensions, and expressed pleasure that he should have begun to levy taxes on the tribes, as this would soon make them weary of him. The Sultan appeared to think that the purpose of the French Mission is to offer another loan, and to induce His Majesty to send a small force to Casa Blanca so that the French troops may be enabled to withdraw. The Vice-Consul urged extreme watchfulness and energy. As regards feeling in Rabat, it is stated to be cold towards the Sultan, local sympathies being for Mulai Hafid. The Rabat Moors, however, have always been noted for disloyalty and opposition to authority. Dislike of the Tazzi brothers is very strong.

The French Consul at Mazagan learnt that Mulai Hafid's position was weakening, and that many desertions were taking place from Ben Raschid's army. According to the British Vice-Consul's report it consists of a "mere handful of men." The Vice-Consul at Saffi confirms this. The men complain that pay is fifteen days in arrears. There is no loyalty to Mulai Hafid among the local Kaïds. The Vice-Consul at Mazagan reported the removal of further stores from the custom-house to the amount of 50,000 cartridges and 400 rifles and their dispatch to Mulai Hafid. The head of the Customs is in a difficult position, as he does not dare oppose the new Governor, and at the same time he may later have to explain his action to Abd-el-Aziz.

His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida reports that a French force of 900 men went out on the 9th instant and marched about 9 miles in the direction of Dershid. They returned viâ Teddert, which was found deserted. The expedition is supposed to have been a reconnaissance with a view to a possible attack on the Arab camp at Sidi Aissa.

The district is said to be in a very lawless state, as is shown by the total absence of produce in the local market.

[34644] No. 55.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 19.)

Treasury Chambers, October 19, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Langley's letters of the 14th and 15th instant, with reference to the ransom of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean, a British subject in the service of the Sultan of Morocco, who was captured by the brigand Raisuli in July last.

In reply I am to state that, in the circumstances explained by Secretary Sir Edward Grey, my Lords approve the advance from public funds of such a sum not exceeding a maximum of 30,000*l.*, as may be found necessary to secure the release of the prisoner, on the following conditions, viz. :—

1. That no other means can possibly be found of obtaining the money;
2. That His Majesty's Minister at Tangier will, before terms are finally settled with Raisuli, obtain the consent of the Moorish Government to the amount of the ransom to be given;
3. That the Moorish Government undertake to give an acknowledgment that they have received the money from the British Government for the purpose of the ransom, and that the debt will be repaid as soon as money is available.

My Lords observe that while 30,000*l.* is named as the maximum amount of the ransom, it is stated by His Majesty's Minister that the sum which will actually be required will be well within this limit.

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

[34885] No. 56.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, October 19, 1907.*

A LA suite des meutres commis à Casa Blanca sur des Français, des Espagnols, et des Italiens, le Gouvernement de la République a été amené, il y a quelques semaines, à prendre, de concert avec l'Espagne, les mesures militaires que lui imposaient la répression de ces crimes et la protection des colonies étrangères menacées, depuis le massacre du 30 Juillet, par l'attitude agressive des tribus. Il s'est efforcé de maintenir son intervention dans les conditions qu'il s'était fixées dès le début et dont les Puissances ont unanimement apprécié la modération.

Grâce à la rapidité des mesures adoptées, l'existence des étrangers a été préservée ; la plupart des tribus qui avaient pris part aux assassinats des ouvriers du port, au sac de la ville, et aux hostilités contre nos troupes ont déjà fait leur soumission. Il nous paraît donc que l'heure est venue de pourvoir à une autre nécessité pressante de la situation en recherchant les moyens de réparer les graves dommages causés par l'attaque des tribus et les conséquences qu'elle a entraînées.

Le Gouvernement Chérifien est responsable de ces événements, qu'il n'a su ni prévenir ni arrêter; il n'en conteste point la gravité et reconnaîtra sans doute son obligation d'en indemniser les victimes. Nous pensons que le concours des Puissances dont les ressortissants ont subi les graves conséquences de ces désordres lui serait utile et doit lui être assuré pour lui faciliter une enquête sérieuse et impartiale et pour établir ainsi, dans des conditions irréprochables, la réalité des pertes et l'évaluation des dédommagements. Nous avons tout d'abord échangé nos vues à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement Espagnol, associé à notre action militaire à Casa Blanca et avec qui nous partageons le mandat que les Puissances nous ont attribué au Maroc. Nous nous sommes trouvés d'accord pour définir de la façon suivante les principes généraux qui devraient inspirer, dans cette circonstance, la décision du Gouvernement Chérifien.

Le Sultan instituerait une Commission dans laquelle il appellerait à siéger, avec ses Représentants, les Délégués des pays dont les nationaux ont le plus souffert des troubles.

Elle aurait pour Président le Chérif Moulay Lamin, que sa situation et son autorité personnelle désignent particulièrement pour ce rôle ; les autres membres Marocains pourraient être le Khalifa actuel du Gouverneur de Casa Blanca dont le caractère a pu être apprécié depuis ces dernières semaines, et un Cadi—ce dernier personnage serait utile pour la détermination des points de droit et des usages locaux.

La Commission comprendrait un membre désigné par le Gouvernement Français, un Anglais, un Espagnol, un Allemand, un Portugais, et un Italien, soit avec les Marocains un total de neuf membres.

Les pays qui n'y seraient point représentés pourraient cependant lui adjoindre un Agent de leur Légation au Maroc, qui participerait à l'examen et au règlement des réclamations de leurs nationaux.

Les Gouvernements seraient invités à choisir leurs Délégués en dehors du personnel Consulaire local, auquel on doit éviter les responsabilités d'une enquête ayant des conséquences pécuniaires sur les réclamations de leurs ressortissants.

La Commission désignerait un secrétaire indigène, ainsi que les interprètes dont elle jugerait avoir besoin.

Étant ainsi constituée, elle aurait à déterminer les dommages directs résultant du sac de la ville de Casa Blanca par les tribus et de l'action répressive qui a suivi. Il ne semble pas qu'on puisse admettre le principe d'indemnités pour les préjudices indirects, c'est-à-dire pour ceux qui ne résultant ni du pillage ni de l'incendie ; en accueillant des réclamations de cette nature on s'exposerait à des demandes qu'aucun principe positif d'appréciation ne permettrait de contrôler et l'on aboutirait sans aucun doute à augmenter dans de telles proportions le chiffre des indemités que leur paiement deviendrait impossible. C'est d'ailleurs ainsi qu'on a jugé lorsque les deux Gouvernements ont arrêté leur opinion au sujet de la réparation des pertes causées par les troubles et le bombardement d'Alexandrie. En ce qui concerne les meurtres, il ne paraît pas qu'une Commission Internationale ait qualité pour fixer l'indemnité qu'ils peuvent comporter. Le règlement des questions de cet ordre reviendrait plutôt à une négociation directe entre les Gouvernements intéressés et le Maghzen. De même, les demandes d'indemnité que les Gouvernements Français et Espagnol auront à présenter au Maghzen pour

* Similar communication made, *mutatis mutandis*, by the Spanish Minister, October 19, 1907.

couvrir les frais de leur intervention, ne sauraient être soumises à la Commission. Il semblerait équitable de secourir dans la plus large mesure possible les habitants indigènes de Casa Blanca, victimes, comme les étrangers, du sac de cette ville. On rappelle que ce principe a été justement admis pour les indemnités d'Alexandrie.

La Commission examinerait et jugerait les réclamations d'après l'équité et sans s'astreindre à une procédure juridique particulière. On lui laisserait toute liberté de régler comme elle l'entendrait son fonctionnement intérieur, l'ordre et le détail de ses opérations. Elle aurait d'ailleurs intérêt à s'inspirer le plus possible pour tout ce qui n'aurait point été défini par sa constitution propre, de l'œuvre accomplie par la Commission des Indemnités Égyptiennes.

La question du mode de paiement des indemnités ne peut être résolue en ce moment, et il n'est point nécessaire de la résoudre pour procéder à l'enquête urgente que nous proposons. Elle ne manquera point d'ailleurs d'être examinée en temps utile et elle se rattache à la question plus générale du paiement des dettes contractées par le Gouvernement Marocain.

Nous serions heureux d'avoir sur ces différents points l'assentiment des Puissances. Dès que l'entente aura été établie, nous nous proposons de faire recommander par les Représentants de la France et de l'Espagne à l'examen du Sultan, les suggestions qui précèdent et qui nous paraissent de nature à sauvegarder tous les intérêts en cause.

[34644]

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1907.

RELEASE of Sir H. MacLean: Your telegram No. 126 of the 15th instant.

The Treasury consent to advance a sum not exceeding 30,000*l.* for the ransom of Sir H. MacLean, with the following conditions:—

1. The consent of the Moorish Government to the amount to be given must be obtained before the terms are finally settled;

2. The Moorish Government must furnish the British Government with a receipt for the amount; and

3. They must undertake to repay it as soon as they can procure the money.

[34805]

No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 409.) *Tangier, October* 14, 1907.

Sir,

I COMMUNICATED in due course to the Moorish Government, in a note addressed on the 16th September to Cid Abd-el-Krim Ben Sliman, the demands put forward by Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean, and I requested his Excellency to be good enough to favour me with his views on the demands and to instruct the authorities to carry out such conditions as His Majesty's Government might consider reasonable.

Having received no reply to this note I addressed another to Cid Abd-el-Krim Ben Sliman on the 2nd instant informing him that the original demands had been considerably reduced by Raisuli's agent, and stating that I trusted it would be found possible to designate some one with full powers to conclude the affair.

The note, of which I inclose a copy, I sent to Rabat by Mr. Allan Maclean, who was fully informed as to the details of Raisuli's latest demands as put forward by his agent.

To this note I yesterday received a reply, copy inclosed, from Ben Sliman, who had seen Mr. Maclean. The latter was also received by His Majesty the Sultan who assured him that full instructions had been given for everything possible to be done to settle this affair.

I made a further effort to-day with Raisuli's envoy to obtain a reduction of the demands, but the latter declared that he had already incurred the displeasure of his Chief by giving way so much and urged that the terms we considered could be granted should now be sent to Raisuli direct and not through him.

I then saw Cid Mohammed Guebbas, the Minister of War, who has instructions to deal with the affair, and after a lengthy conversation it was decided that Mr. Carleton, on behalf of His Majesty's Legation, should submit an offer of terms in writing to Raisuli. A copy of his letter is annexed herewith. As regards the payment to be made to him, 100,000 dollars, Hassani is mentioned, but it is to be anticipated that this will not satisfy him, and on that point at least it may be necessary to make some further concessions.

Before leaving for Rabat I asked the French Minister to be good enough to urge Ben Sliman to some activity in appointing a responsible person to discuss terms, and I inclose a copy of a letter I have just received from M. Regnault to whom Ben Sliman appears to have undertaken to make all the necessary concessions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Cid-ben-Sliman.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, September* 16, 1907.

KAÏD MACLEAN has now been in the hands of Raisuli over eleven weeks and all the action of the Makhzen has unfortunately proved unavailing. The efforts of the Mehallas to bring pressure to bear on the tribes were as unavailing as was the mission of the Shereef Mulai Taib.

My Government, anxious to do nothing to create difficulties for the Makhzen, awaited with patience a solution to the unfortunate incident of Kaïd Maclean's capture. Much time, however, passed, but it was clear that no hope of any good result was to be expected from their action. It consequently became imperative to enter into communication with Raisuli, and this has been done through the intermediary of Mr. Carleton who is now here.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the letter written by Raisuli to Mr. Carleton inclosing the conditions he requires should be complied with before he will set his captive free.

I venture to request your Excellency to be good enough to favour me with the views of the Makhzen on these demands, and also to furnish me with a letter to the Makhzen authorities to carry out any conditions which may be arranged with Raisuli and which my Government may consider reasonable for obtaining the release of Kaïd Maclean, which, as your Excellency has informed me, the Sultan is most anxious of bringing about.

Inclosure 2 in No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Cid-ben-Sliman.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, October* 2, 1907.

ON the 16th of last month I forwarded to your Excellency a statement of the conditions demanded by Raisuli for the setting free of Kaïd Maclean, and I invited your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with your views on the subject of those demands and also requested your Excellency to provide me confidentially with a letter to the Makhzen authorities here directing them to comply with any demands which my Government might consider reasonable.

I must express my regret that I have received no reply from your Excellency to that note.

Your Excellency will remember that it is now three months since Kaïd Maclean, engaged on a service for His Majesty the Sultan, was captured by Raisuli. Such efforts as were made by the Makhzen proved unavailing and were admitted to be so by Representatives of the Makhzen. Since the troops were compelled to withdraw no assistance has been given me in the matter, and no further effort seems to have been made by the Makhzen to bring about the release of Kaïd Maclean.

When representations are made to His Majesty's Commissioner here, he replies that he is in no way interested in the negotiation and has no authority to grant any demands whatsoever. The responsibility of the Makhzen, therefore already very great,

increases day by day, and the indifference which has been exhibited on their part cannot be viewed with anything but disapproval by His Majesty's Government.

Negotiations with Raisuli have been conducted here through an agent of his with this Legation and the original demands put forward by him have been considerably modified, and have now reached a point to which the Makhzen will probably be able to agree in order to put an end to this unfortunate incident.

With the object of laying the present state of the negotiations before you, I am requesting Mr. Allan Maclean, who is well known to you, to proceed at once to Rabat, and I venture to express the hope to your Excellency that you may be able to receive him without delay, and that you will send at once to such Representative of the Makhzen as His Majesty may designate full powers to conclude this on such terms as His Majesty's Government may consider fair and reasonable.

Inclosure 3 in No. 58.

Cid-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.

(After compliments.) 2 *Ramadan*, 1325 (*October* 10, 1907).

I RECEIVED your first letter referring to the case of Kaïd Maclean and giving a list of Raisuli's terms for his release, and you asked me to give you the opinion of the Makhzen thereon. This letter reached me while still on the journey with His Imperial Majesty's forces and before our arrival at Rabat and it was impossible then to discuss or reflect upon the matter, as you will understand. On His Majesty's arrival at Rabat a Council could not be held to discuss the matter until the necessary arrangements for settling down here had been made, and it was not possible to enter upon any matter before that was done. But as soon as a Council was called to discuss important matters, we gave this case the most importance and discussed it before anything else, because of the anxiety, concern, and regret that this unfortunate case has caused His Majesty and us, and from a desire to effect the release of Kaïd Maclean as speedily as possible. And when we had prepared a reply to your said letter, in conformity with the terms which it contained—terms which caused amazement and stupefaction—your second letter, dated the 23 Shaban (2nd October), was delivered by Mr. Allan Maclean. In it you complain of the delay in answering your first letter, and you state that your exalted Government would not approve the delay in settling the case. You add that a second discussion has taken place between your Excellency and Raisuli through the intermediary of his agent, and that the demands has been brought to a point which it might be possible for the Makhzen to accept, and you request me to send full powers to such Representatives as the Makhzen may designate to accept a settlement of this case on such terms as may appear reasonable to your exalted Government.

His Imperial Majesty has attentively studied the contents of your second letter, and he has instructed me to reply to you and say that the reason of the delay in answering your first letter is that stated above, and as regards the reference to the non-approval of your respected Government, at the delay in settling this case, His Majesty instructs me to state that you are acquainted with the steps taken by the Makhzen and the display of force made by it since this incident, which has distressed His Imperial Majesty, occurred; and that His Majesty omitted to employ no means he thought likely to bring about the release of Kaïd Maclean and wasted no time in putting those means into practice, and should the Makhzen discover means of effecting a release it would not delay making use of them as is well known. You are fully aware of the firm resolution of the Makhzen not to withdraw the force in the Khamas before the release of the Kaïd, and that it only left that district because of events at Marrakesh, which rendered it obligatory to recall it to accompany His Imperial Majesty on his journey. Pending the devising by the Makhzen of a means of obtaining his liberation, and as your last discussion with Raisuli's agent resulted in the manner you state, the Sultan agrees to send Representatives he has designated to accept whatever terms the matter may be decided upon, in conformity with the suggestion made by you; and in doing this His Majesty relies on the good opinion he has of the exalted British Government and his confidence that they will have due regard for the exigencies of the times, and that they will not agree to the said person demanding anything save what is possible of acceptance and is not harmful to His Majesty, especially as Mr. A. Maclean has stated that Raisuli's demands have been

brought down to the sum of money designated the granting of English protection to him and his immediate family, and the release of some prisoners whose liberation will not be harmful, and that your Excellency still has the intention to reduce considerably the sum of money designated and arrived at by discussion, and the letter giving power to the person designated by His Majesty, viz., the Head of the Shfu army, the Fkih Cid Mohammed-el-Guebbas will reach you herewith, and because of Raisuli's condition and the shiftyness and inconstancy by which he is characterized, and if which you are not unaware His Imperial Majesty trusts you will make certain and not be deceived into conceding any of his demands before he actually liberates the Kaïd, and also he trusts you will have regard to imposing the conditions that Raisuli shall reside in the town with his family and not again mix in the affairs of any of the tribes, as it is not hidden from you the particular and general harms attaching to Raisuli will not be entirely dissipated except by the securing of this condition and its being actually carried into effect.

Inclosure 4 in No. 58.

Mr. Carleton to Raisuli.

I AM instructed by my Minister to tell you the following:—

He has endeavoured through me to come to an arrangement with Dawdi that he will be in a position to carry out and that will be agreeable to you, but the terms to which Dawdi consents are still very exaggerated.

The Minister now wishes me to propose to you the following terms, which he engages to see are carried out and he feels sure that you will accept them:—

1. The return to you of the slaves mentioned in your first demands immediately this matter is settled and you come to Tangier.
2. The restoration to you of your home in Tangier.
3. It is impossible to comply with your demand to have people imprisoned, as British law forbids the imprisonment of any person until he is found guilty, but every assistance will be given to you by the Makhzen and by the Legation in any action you may wish to bring against the persons who you may consider owe you money.
4. You are requested to send the list of the persons who you desire should be released, and all those whose release would not constitute a danger to the country will be set free.
5. The Makhzen has made a promise to the British Government that they will not hurt or interfere with you or your family on the condition that you keep quiet, live at Tangier, and do not mix in tribal affairs, and the Minister is prepared to guarantee that this will be faithfully carried out. This is what is termed British protection.
6. A sum of 100,000 dollars Hassani will be paid to you as compensation for such losses as you may have incurred.

All the above will be faithfully carried out immediately Kaïd Maclean is released.

Inclosure 5 in No. 58.

M. Regnault to Sir G. Lowther.

M. le Ministre et cher Collègue, *Rabat, le* 11 *Octobre*, 1907.

DÈS mon arrivée à Rabat, j'ai entretenu Ben Sliman de la question de la libération du Caïd Maclean, et j'ai insisté très vivement auprès du Ministre Chérifien sur la nécessité de donner à cette affaire une prompte solution.

Conformément à ce qui avait été convenu entre nous, j'ai conseillé à Ben Sliman de faire désigner par le Sultan, pour traiter en cette circonstance au nom du Makhzen, un personnage offrant des garanties suffisantes. Le Sultan a agréé le choix que je suggérai et Guebbas recevra les pouvoirs nécessaires pour souscrire, au nom du Gouvernement Chérifien, aux conditions que vous aurez à débattre avec le

Représentant de Raisuli. Ces conditions, dans l'esprit du Makhzen, devraient être les suivantes:—

1. Paiement d'une rançon variant entre 20,000*l.* et 30,000*l.* Le Gouvernement Marocain s'en remet à vous du soin d'amener de chiffre au minimum possible, et, étant donnée la pénurie du Trésor, de déterminer les moyens par lesquels le Makhzen devra s'acquitter de cette nouvelle dette.

2. Protection Anglaise accordée à Raisuli et aux membres de sa famille habitant sous son toit, à la condition toutefois que Raisuli soit astreint à résider désormais à Tanger et prenne l'engagement de ne plus se mêler aux affaires de tribus sous peine de se voir retirer la protection Anglaise.

3. Mise en liberté de quelques-uns de ses partisans encore prisonniers à Tanger.

La maison que Raisuli possédait dans cette ville lui sera rendue. Pour remarquer la bonne volonté du Makhzen et son désir sincère d'en finir avec cette affaire en même temps que pour faciliter votre négociation, Guebbas recevra pour instruction de vous remettre le plus tôt possible, si on parvient à les retrouver les titres de propriété relatifs à cette maison.

La lettre qui vous est destinée et celle qui est adressée à Guebbas partiront en même temps que celle-ci. J'ai d'ailleurs trouvé chez les Ministres Chérifiens un grand souci d'être agréable au Ministre d'Angleterre et au Gouvernement Britannique. Je serais, pour ma part, fort heureux que mon intervention ait eu pour résultat de hâter le moment où votre compatriote retrouvera sa liberté.

[34806] No. 59.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 410.)

Tangier, October 15, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 399 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador, giving news from Morocco city, and describing the situation at Mogador.

You will observe that Mr. Wilkinson is of opinion that the population of Mogador is strongly in favour of Mulai Hafid, whose position at Marakesh appears to be as strong as ever.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 55.)

Mogador, October 6, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on the 2nd instant the German Vice-Consul showed me a letter he had just received from his colleague at Saffi, informing him that the German steamer "Oldenburg" had left the night before direct for Gibraltar, chartered by the two special envoys of Mulai Hafid, who were most anxious to reach Berlin without hindrance or delay. I thought the news of sufficient importance to be telegraphed the same evening, viâ Teneriffe, and I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the telegram I sent to your Excellency on the subject.* I have since heard that one of these envoys is Hadj Omar-ben-Shentouffi, who, it is said, was educated in Germany.

I am again indebted to my Spanish colleague for the following information, conveyed to him in a letter, dated the 2nd instant, written by the Spanish renegade:—

"Mulai Hafid has decided not to leave Marakesh until his brother, Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, makes a move from Rabat. In the meantime he has sent strong reinforcements to Mulai Ershid, whose 'mehalla' is camped at two days' distance from Morocco city. With regard to the reports spread on the coast and in Northern Morocco to the effect that Mulai Hafid's position is very shaky, and that he is losing ground every day, you may rest assured that these reports are totally untrue. The number of his

* Vice-Consul Wilkinson, Telegraphic, October 2, 1907.

partisans is increasing daily, and he has not given up the hope of gaining Kaïd Anfluz to his cause. The only reason which keeps away the latter is that his old foe M'toogi has been appointed Minister of Justice, but Mulai Hafid is prepared to make any possible concessions in order to obtain his assistance. For that purpose he has sent one of his trusty emissaries to Anfluz, and hopes are entertained here that the latter will soon join Mulai Hafid's cause."

The German Vice-Consul has also received letters from Marakesh of the same date, and confirming the foregoing. He is also informed that the position of the Jews is getting worse every day. Ma-el-Ainin's "blue" men are openly persecuting them, not only in the Moorish part of the town, but even in their own quarter, and consequently the emigration increases.

Here at Mogador everything is quiet, but it is an open secret that the native population is all for Mulai Hafid, and that they are waiting for a favourable opportunity to declare for him. On the 2nd instant there was a little scare in town, when it was reported that the new Governor appointed by Mulai Hafid had arrived at a short distance from this port, and was camping there with a strong armed escort. Kaïd Bargash at once had the guards doubled at each gate, and took every measure to prevent an attack, but the next morning it was found out that the supposed Governor was in reality the Mokadem of Ma-el-Ainin's Zawia at Fez, who, with another influential Moor, was coming to Mogador to wait for the first steamer for Rabat. Conjecture is rife as to the mission of these two men, who are said, amongst other things, to be the bearers of despatches from Mulai Hafid to his brother Abd-el-Aziz.

The scribe of this Vice-Consulate received letters from friends residing at Tarudant informing him that Mulai Hafid had been proclaimed there and in several other districts of the Sûz country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

[35315] No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 411.)

Tangier, October 15, 1907.

Sir,

DURING a conversation I had yesterday with the Minister of War, I took the opportunity to refer to the proposed withdrawal of the Moorish troops in the Oojda district reported in my despatch No. 353 of the 6th ultimo.

His Excellency told me that in the first instance he had merely broached the subject in an unofficial manner to the Spanish Minister during a visit he had received from him and the Governor of Melilla, who was at that time in Tangier, and asked how such a step would be viewed by the Spanish Government and the authorities at Melilla.

The Spanish Minister, he informs me, after consulting the Governor of Melilla, answered that if the Melilla district were denuded of Moorish troops difficulties might arise with the tribes in that neighbourhood, but if those troops were left unpaid more danger was to be apprehended from their remaining there than from their departure. The Governor of Melilla suggested, in the event of their withdrawal, that the Spanish authorities should place guard posts at two points on the shores of Mar Chica, with the consent and at the request of the Makhzen. These posts would be capable of being provisioned from the sea.

The Spanish Minister called on the Minister of War a few days after the above reported conversation, and he informed him that he had reported it to his Government, who had now instructed him to reply officially that no objection would be made to the withdrawal of the Moorish troops from that district, and that they would offer every facility for their embarkation from the frontier of Melilla, and would also offer a war-vessel to transport them to Rabat or elsewhere.

The Spanish Minister, to whom I subsequently spoke on the subject, said that there were considerable difficulties in the way of transporting these troops. Besides a large number of men (1,500) there were a large number of animals, including camels, which would be troublesome to embark in the absence of facilities. But the Spanish Government were quite prepared to place the "Numancia" at the disposal of the

Moorish Government, and only awaited their decision. He knew nothing of the intended destination of these troops. For the present the Moorish Government appear to be more disposed to leave them where they are.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[34807] No. 61.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 412.)
Tangier, October 15, 1907.

Sir,

I ASKED my Spanish colleague yesterday what truth there was in the report that had reached me to the effect that a Commission has been named to sit at Casa Blanca to assess the amount of losses suffered by Spanish merchants and traders at Dar-al-Baida, and which I had been told was framed on the lines of the German Commission, the appointment of which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 403 of the 8th instant.

M. Llaberia told me that he had just sent instructions to his Consul at Dar-al-Baida to appoint a Commission of three Spaniards locally with himself as President, and that this Commission would be charged with examining all the evidence in connection with the various claims for compensation, and their duty would be to arrive at a fair estimate, but he did not consider that the figures arrived at by this Commission would be final, but susceptible of modification by the International Commission which, it would appear, will be appointed later on.

This Spanish Commission would rather be of the nature of an assistance to the contemplated International Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[34750] No. 62.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 455.)
Berlin, October 17, 1907.

Sir,

THE two emissaries of Mulai Hafid, who visited London last week, arrived in Berlin on the 15th instant, and, according to an announcement in the semi-official "North German Gazette," sent yesterday to the Imperial Foreign Office to inquire when they could be received there. They were informed on behalf of the Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Imperial Government regretted that they were unable to accord them a reception; and after spending the day motoring round the town to visit the various sights, it is reported that they will leave to-day for Rome.

This embassy is, according to the "Kölnische Zeitung," the second effort on the part of Mulai Hafid to obtain German intercession in his relations with France. From a telegram published in this paper, and dated from Tangier on the 15th October, it appears that Mulai Hafid requested the German Consul at Casa Blanca to act as intermediary between himself and France; but the Consul replied that he was not in a position to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[34753] No. 63.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 458. Confidential.)
Berlin, October 17, 1907.

Sir,

M. JULES CAMBON, who returned to Berlin on the morning of the 15th instant, informs me that during his recent visit to Paris he had an opportunity of seeing a good deal of M. Pichon, who, on the whole, is satisfied with the action of

the German Government in giving their consent to the measures which the French and Spanish Governments were about to take with the view of preventing the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Morocco. Before his departure for Paris, M. Cambon had seen Herr von Tschirschky, and had pointed out that the German proposal for compensating the owners of the arms which might be seized, was one which would not be entertained. The importation of arms into Morocco had been absolutely forbidden by the Act of Algeciras. The Sultan of Morocco had not the means of preventing the importation, and France and Spain had undertaken that their ships should undertake the duty. But the persons who took part in this contraband trade had no more right to compensation than an ordinary smuggler, whose goods were liable to confiscation for non-payment of duty. Herr von Tschirschky had acknowledged the force of this argument, and had said that he would send the necessary instructions to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris. As, however, some considerable time elapsed before the French Government received any communication on the subject from the German Embassy, M. Cambon, at M. Pichon's request, called upon the German Chargé d'Affaires, who had not received any instructions to address the French Government; but it would appear that he shortly afterwards received them, as he wrote a note stating that the German Government agreed, for the present ("pour le moment"), to the proposed action of France and Spain. M. Pichon had been somewhat perplexed by the limitation contained in the German note, but M. Cambon had pointed out that it was the recognized German method to guard themselves by making reserves which somewhat detracted from the gracefulness of their proceedings, even when, as in the present case, they had no wish to create difficulties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[34877] No. 64.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir C. Hardinge.—(*Received October* 21.)

Travellers' Club, Pall Mall, London,
October 18, 1907.

Dear Hardinge,

YOU may be interested to read an extract from a letter which I have just received from my French colleague at Madrid, writing from France. The French are evidently still much dissatisfied with Spain. I can well understand their annoyance. But I think Spain must in the end co-operate with France. She will not risk quarrelling with us by doing anything else. But she will never really throw her heart into it. All the Vatican influence is against a French understanding, and the Spaniards dislike French penetration into Morocco. Révoil knows very well that I do my best, under Sir Edward Grey's instructions, to back him up.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

Inclosure in No. 64.

M. Révoil to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Extrait.)
Mon cher Collègue,
Servanes, le 16 Octobre, 1907.

LES difficultés entre nous et l'Espagne ont fini par s'ébruiter, et il me semble que plus on va plus il apparaît que la ligne de conduite adoptée par M. Maura est non moins préjudiciable aux intérêts bien compris de l'Espagne que fâcheuse pour la politique d'entente établie entre nous par les Accords qui se sont succédé de 1904 à 1907.

Comme nous l'avions prévu, l'opposition va tirer parti de cette situation et les reproches formulés déjà par M. Canalejas démontrent combien M. Maura a eu tort d'espérer désarmer la presse Libérale en écoutant ses conseils, si tant est que cette illusion ait été pour quelque chose dans le parti négatif auquel il s'est arrêté.

Je crois qu'à l'heure actuelle on s'est entendu sur la contrebande des armes—sans en être sûr—mais la tendance générale de méfiance, d'abstention, de désir d'agir à part n'en subsiste pas moins. Vous avez été témoin de nos efforts pour convaincre le Gouvernement Espagnol du caractère loyal, plus qu'amical, presque fraternel, de notre politique. Nos actes ont répondu à nos paroles. Si nos intentions n'étaient pas très fermes, si nous n'entendions pas persister dans cette attitude, la seule conforme aux

Accords intervenus et auxquels l'Angleterre a été constamment mêlée, nous pourrions nous consoler en constatant que c'est à l'Espagne surtout que la politique de son Gouvernement porte préjudice. Mais je reste préoccupé des conséquences que cette politique peut avoir pour l'heureux équilibre que nos Accords respectifs a établi et qui naturellement n'est pas du goût de tout le monde.

M. Paul Cambon aura certainement entretenu Sir Edward Grey de cette situation ; et je suis assuré que les renseignements que vous lui donnerez vous-même, mon cher collègue, le confirmeront dans la nécessité d'y veiller.

Je sais bien que la confiance ne se commande pas ; nous n'avons pas la prétention de l'imposer au Gouvernement Espagnol ; mais des conseils et des avis autorisés comme ceux qui peuvent lui venir du Foreign Office seraient peut-être de nature à l'y amener. S'il y a des griefs, des craintes, des susceptibilités en jeu, on vous les dira peut-être plus aisément qu'à nous.

M. Pichon, avec qui j'ai causé de tout cela lors de son passage à Bordeaux, approuve absolument ma manière de voir et il est bien résolu à ne pas se départir de la conduite qu'il a adoptée vis-à-vis de l'Espagne ; il espère du temps et de l'aide que nous prêtera l'Angleterre l'amendement progressif de la situation actuelle.

[35005] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 414.) *Tangier, October* 17, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, giving an account of the negotiations now in progress between the Shereef of Bujad or Abu-el-Jad and the French, with a view to coming to terms with the Showia.

The information contained in Mr. Madden's despatch is to a great extent confirmed by the French Legation, but it does not appear to be the case that the Shereef is in any way acting on behalf of Mulai Hafid's Khalifa, Ben Raschid.

Amongst the French demands figures one for 2,000,000 fr. for damages done to the railway. This is incorrect. It is the demand made upon the Showia tribe as a punishment for their excesses, and which it is intended to devote to the port works.

I am also given to understand that the French have not given, and do not intend to give, any undertaking not to interfere in the dispute between the tribes and the Sultan.

But the statement that Ben Raschid is preaching a "holy war" is confirmed by the French Legation, as also the statement that they possess documents in support of this.

The statement made by Mr. Madden that during the last few years quantities of arms and ammunition have reached Bujad from the Algerian hinterland must, I think, be accepted with reserve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 283.) *Dar-al-Baida, October* 15, 1907.

Sir,

YESTERDAY the Shereef Hadj Mohammed Sidi-ben-Dowd Sherkawi of Bujad, who has been with the Arabs at Sidi Aissa, and is encamped with, they say, 2,500 foot and horse at Kasbah Mediuna, came to Casa Blanca with 200 armed horsemen, leaving another force farther out. I do not know the exact object of this Shereef's visit to Showia, but in any case he is a Makhzen Notable, and a supporter of Mulai Abd-el-Aziz.

A man living here named Hadj Dris Sherkawi, who is in French secret employ, and said to be a brother of the Shereef aforesaid, has given some information regarding the visit to Casa Blanca, which has been reported to me privately. He stated that the Shereef asked the French Consul to go out and confer with him, which invitation was declined ; and he, Hadj Dris Sherkawi, was sent out instead. As a result of the meeting,

a French force with mitrailleuses, with General Drude, the Consul, and other officials, went out to meet the Shereef to render him military honours, and brought him into camp with some forty of his armed men, and a conference was held between the French and the Shereef. I am informed that the Shereef stated that he represented all Showia as well as the Khalifa Ben Raschid, and that they asked for peace.

The Arab terms are said to be as follows :—

1. Six months' armistice, during which the Arabs are to come freely into town and buy and sell.
2. The Arab mahallas are to be dispersed.
3. After the six months are over, whichever Sultan the country accepts is to be recognized as such.

The French conditions are said to be the following :—

1. Two million francs damage done to the railway.
2. Every tribe to hand over hostages to reside in town under the supervision of the French authorities.
3. Arabs to retain their arms, but not to come into town armed, depositing them at a place to be designated for the purpose.
4. The French undertake not to interfere in the dispute between the tribes and the Sultan.

The Shereef of Bujad was accorded military honours on his departure, and is said to have been given six days to reply.

Some of the Bujad Arabs were afterwards allowed in town armed, which is considered a rather unusual step at the present moment.

The natives allege that the better class of countrymen all desire peace, but there is difficulty made by the ignorant Arabs, who wish to fight. Nevertheless it is thought the recent heavy rains may make for peace, as the Arabs will desire to go and plough their lands.

I must add, however, that, in spite of the foregoing, the situation seems to be more uncertain than the above would lead one to suppose. I am informed by my German colleague that at the French Consulate he was to-day told that Ben Raschid is preaching a "holy war," and that letters of his to this purport are in possession of the French authorities.

Bujad is a Berber tribe living five days' march from here. They are said to be a good business community. I am told that for the last few years quantities of arms and ammunition have reached Bujad by deviating routes from the Algerian hinterland, and have been sold all through Showia and in Dar-al-Baida openly.

This despatch could not be posted to your Excellency to-day, there being no incoming or outgoing mail.

Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney reports to me, under date of the 14th instant, that all the Makhzen ammunition at Mazagan has now been sent up to Marrakesh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[34190] No. 66.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1907.

THE Board of Trade are doubtless aware that certain measures have been proposed by the French and Spanish Governments for the suppression of the contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Moorish waters.

The proposals in question are that the Sultan of Morocco, with a view to realizing the object of Articles 13 to 30 of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, shall authorize the French and Spanish naval authorities to exercise a right of search in Moorish waters over vessels suspected of being engaged in the illicit importation of warlike materials. Vessels carrying on a regular service would be exempted from search, and it is proposed that compensation should be granted in the case of vessels detained without due cause.

Sir E. Grey has informed the French Government that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree to these proposals as far as concerns British ships, provided

no objections are raised by other Governments, and it is understood that the remaining Powers concerned have replied in similar terms.

No date has yet been fixed for the application of the proposed measures, but it is the desire of the French Government that they shall be enforced at the earliest moment possible.

Further information will be placed at the disposal of the Board of Trade as soon as it reaches this Department, and, in the meantime, Sir E. Grey desires me to ask that the Board will consider the question of issuing a notice to British shipping as soon as the necessary details of the measures to be taken have been communicated by the French Government, and that they will acquaint him with their decision in due course.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[35308] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October 25, 1907.*

CAPTURE of Sir H. Maclean. My despatch No. 409 of the 14th instant.

I have now received Raisuli's reply. He is apparently prepared to accept the majority of the conditions, but holds out for the 30,000*l*. While abandoning his demand for imprisonment of some of his enemies, he adds another for the release of fifty prisoners, and one for the extension of protection to all his relatives.

He also insists on choosing his own residence, but Sid Mohammed Guebbas is without authority to accept this, and has again referred the whole case to Court. I explained to his Excellency that, even if Raisuli promised to take up his residence at Tangier, we should have no means of making him keep his engagement.

[35316] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 415.)
Sir, *Tangier, October 19, 1907.*

THE French Minister has been at great pains to keep the negotiations in which he has been engaged at Rabat strictly secret. His discussions with the Sultan have taken place without the presence of any Vizier, and I understand that the result of the conversation will only be submitted to the Viziers when an arrangement has been actually arrived at.

M. Regnault has ample subjects on which to treat with His Majesty.

The most important are, the settlement of the frontier police and the various claims in that district which have been accumulating for the past few years, the punishment of the murderers of M. Charbonnier, and the erection of the monument on the spot near Tangier where he was assassinated, as well as the punishment of the murderers of Dr. Mauchamp at Marrakesh.

The Sultan on his side is most anxious to bring about the evacuation of Oujda and the removal of the French troops from Casa Blanca, and has I believe stated that the presence of these troops in those places render it very difficult for him to come to any arrangement with the French Government.

M. Regnault found on his arrival at Rabat that the penury of the Sultan and his Government was far beyond what he had been led to believe, and if support is to be given to His Majesty a very large sum will be required, and some guarantee that the sums advanced will be devoted to useful objects, and will not, as has been the case hitherto, be squaudered by the Viziers.

M. Regnault was in hopes that the Sultan would before the Minister's arrival anticipate a wish he would feel bound to express, and spontaneously dismiss some of his Viziers who have brought ruin on the country.

M. Regnault will now be obliged to request with insistence that some of these Ministers, notably the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance, should be relieved of their offices, but if His Majesty should agree, the effect produced by the knowledge of the fact that they have been dismissed at the instance of the French Minister

cannot but produce a bad effect in this country, however anxious the majority are that a change should take place.

The Sultan and his Viziers seem quite to realize that the movement of Mulai Hafid presents a serious danger too, and M. Regnault has been able to instil sufficient energy into them to bring about the dispatch against the Pretender of an army of 4,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[35318] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 417.)
Sir, *Tangier, October 19, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 414 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Daralbaida, reporting that the peace negotiations between General Drude and the Showia tribes have been broken off.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I am informed by the French Legation that they do not, however, consider that there has been a final rupture of negotiations with the Bujad Shereef.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 286.)
Sir, *Daralbaida, October 18, 1907.*

I HAVE just time to report to your Excellency before the mail closes that a nephew of the Shereef of Bujad, accompanied by about forty horsemen of Tadla and Wardeegha, have this morning been to see General Drude to inform him in the name of the Shereef that the Showia tribes refuse to come to terms and agree to the French demands.

The Shereef is said to be returning home.

Ould-ben-Rashid is encamped near Mediuna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[35319] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 418.)
Sir, *Tangier, October 20, 1907.*

I HEAR on good authority that Hamed, the son of Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mulai Hafid, who was recently named Governor of Saffi, has made a confidential communication to the French Vice-Consul at that place to the effect that his father's adherence and that of his family to the cause of Mulai Hafid is not serious, that they are still loyal to the reigning Sultan, that "their eyes are always turned towards Rabat," and, indeed, that Kaïd Aissa-ben-Omar has been all along in constant and direct communication with Sultan Abd-el-Aziz.

If this declaration can be relied upon it is of great importance, as Aissa-ben-Omar is, as you are aware, one of the most influential Kaïds of the south, and if his loyalty to Abd-el-Aziz were openly declared it would have a very disastrous effect on the cause of Mulai Hafid.

I have the honour to inclose herewith two letters which have come into my hands addressed by the above-named Aissa-ben-Omar to an influential native personage. The first, as you will see, declares that Mulai Hafid intends to repudiate all loans that may now be contracted by his brother. The other letter apparently is

intended to dispel the idea that the army of Mulai Hafid under Mohammed-ben-Raschid has any intention of proclaiming or carrying on a Holy War.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Letters addressed by Aissa-ben-Omar to an influential Native.

(1.)

(After Compliments.) *Shaaban* 28, 1325 (*October* 7, 1907).

I HEAR that those people (*i.e.*, the Government of Mulai Abd-el-Aziz) have applied to certain foreigners for a loan to meet the expenditure entailed by this expedition to Rabat and other expenses, and I know this money will not be expended upon anything advantageous to the general welfare nor for useful purposes. They have already contracted large loans which have been spent uselessly. But I wish to speak about this proposed loan, which they will only devote to their own personal advantages, which is far removed from the good of the people. Whoever may give them anything must hold them alone responsible, as he (the person who may contract a loan with them) knows in what manner it will be expended. Our Lord (Mulai Hafid) and his people are free from all responsibility in that respect, and cannot be held responsible, either by custom or laws, as regards earlier loans contracted when they were independent; they will be submitted to the Treaty stipulations, and what is obligatory by them will be enforced and *vice versâ*. I therefore wish you to discuss this matter and to report to me on it, that I may inform our Master.

Peace, &c.

(Signed) AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

(2.)

(After Compliments.) *Ramadan* 1, 1325 (*October* 9, 1907).

THE purpose in sending the mehalla (force) to the Dar-al-Baida district under the command of our Lord's nephew, Sidi Mohammed-ben-Raschid, is to restrain all the Showia tribes from fighting, which has occurred between them and those who have occupied Dar-al-Baida, and to prevent the bad characters of those tribes from starting fresh troubles, or from doing what they should not do with them. The object of this force is contrary to that imputed to it by those who do not know, and who state that it has gone to create disturbances; therefore, by instructions from our Shereefian Master, you should speak with those foreign Ministers at Tangier it is necessary to speak with on this matter in this sense, as this has been the intention from the very beginning. Attend to this immediately this reaches you, so that they may hasten to send the information to those who are occupying Dar-al-Baida, in order that they may know what is intended, and so that they may cast out of their minds the impression that may have been made by lying reports.

Reply at once giving the result, so that I may inform His Shereefian Majesty thereof.

Peace, &c.

(Signed) AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

[35320] No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 419.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 21, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 71.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

AS far as is known, little has occurred in the past week to alter the position of the rival Sultans. Preparations and movements of troops are reported in various directions, but the hostile forces have nowhere come in contact. What activity there is appears to be principally on the side of Mulai Hafid. Mr. Wilkinson reported on the 6th instant, on the authority of a Spanish renegade living at Marakesh, that a force had left for Mogador, accompanied by Mulai Abas, a brother of Mulai Hafid. Europeans were said to have nothing to fear from this expedition, which was intended to show that all Southern Morocco was on the side of the pretender. From Safi it was stated that the object of this expedition was to arrest Kaïd Anfloos and Barghash, Kaïd of Mogador. Anfloos was said to have been on his way to Marakesh to make submission to Mulai Hafid when he heard of the expedition, and had thus been forced back into loyalty to Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. As regards Barghash, Mr. Wilkinson reported that he was preparing to leave his post. It was owing to his energy that Mulai Hafid had not yet been proclaimed in Mogador, but, failing reinforcements, it had become impossible for him to remain there. The prospect of losing Mogador seems to have stirred the Makhzen into some activity, and 400 men left Tangier for that destination on the 16th instant, with what result is not known. The only other movement reported on behalf of Abd-el-Aziz has been the dispatch from Rabat of a force of 4,000 men and eight field-guns against Mulai Hafid's Khalifa in Mediuna. It is under the command of El Baghdadi, and is said to be well equipped and paid in advance. Its progress, however, is said to have been stopped by rains.

Marakesh is reported to be full of tribesmen from the surrounding country. Trade is good and food plentiful. It was said that Mulai Hafid would leave himself for the north on the 15th Ramadan (23rd October) with a large force. Meanwhile, a reinforcement of 3,000 men has started to join Ben Rashid, who has himself, says General Drude, joined the Arabs encamped at Sidi Aissa, outside Casa Blanca. Another account says that two further forces in good condition have left Marakesh for the Shouia district, but it is possible that they are identical with others above mentioned. Mr. Wilkinson's informant, the Spanish renegade,* gives the impression that these expeditions are straining all Mulai Hafid's resources.

The British Vice-Consuls at Safi and Mazagan do not underrate Mulai Hafid's chances of success. The former says: "He has a very large and powerful set of followers. He is as strong as it is possible to be." Mr. Spinney wrote on the 12th October: "I think there is no doubt Abd-el-Aziz has no chance against his brother without French help, and it entirely depends on what steps the French take. . . . The more friendly he is with the French the less prestige he will have, but I do not think that, even with funds, he can get the following that Mulai Hafid has.

(Initialled) C. R.

October 20, 1907.

[35328] No. 72.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Rome, October* 22, 1907.

THE Envoys of the Moroccan Pretender Muley Hafid arrived at the Grand Hotel here last week. It was reported in the press that they had made efforts to be received at the Consulta and at the British and German Embassies. This was not the case, but it appears they tried unsuccessfully to be received by Count Gianotti, the Prefect of the Palace.

* The Spanish Consul at Mogador inquired of this renegade if he knew the nature of the mission intrusted to Mulai Hafid's envoys who have left for Berlin. The reply, which was in French, said: "Ils ont été chargés par Sa Majesté de se plaindre formellement à l'Empereur d'Allemagne de l'affollement de la France en ce qui concerne la question du Maroc."

They left Rome the day before yesterday suddenly in consequence apparently of a telegram.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. H. EGERTON.

[35506] No. 73.

Sir F. Lascelles to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 461.)
Sir, *Berlin, October* 19, 1907.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HÜBNER, the author of "Military and Geographical Notes on Morocco" and "Unknown Moorish Territory," last night lectured before the German Colonial Society, of which he is a member, on the subject of Morocco.

The main portion of Colonel Hübner's lecture was devoted to the consideration of the question how the action of France in Morocco affected Germany.

He said that now that the French had seriously undertaken the pacification of Morocco, they would be obliged to go through with it and re-establish order in the country. Germany would profit by the restoration of order in Morocco so long as her interests were in the hands of a wise and capable Minister such as M. Rosen; moreover, the complete subversion of Morocco by the French must take a long time—perhaps from sixty to eighty years—and during that time a war of revenge for Alsace-Lorraine would be impossible.

He asserted that the Germans were very popular with the Moors, and the reason for their popularity was that they were not anxious to acquire concessions and to get hold of property in land; if they were once to begin to seek acquisitions in the country they would forthwith become as detested as the French. He then turned to the criticism of the French operations in Dar-al-Baida, and pointed out that the storms which are common in the Atlantic at this time of year might drive the French ships of war from their anchorage in the roads, and the French would therefore be compelled to undertake the construction of a fortified base on land. He went on to say that the early winter rains which will shortly be due will compel the Moors to retire from Dar-al-Baida, and thus for the present further fighting need not be apprehended. The lecturer said that his travels in Morocco had not led him to form a high opinion of the fighting capabilities of the Moors. Their tactics, weapons, and military qualities were alike of a poor order, but he asserted that, were they to be trained and well led, 5,000 would suffice to keep order in the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

[35649] No. 74.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 164.)
Sir, *Madrid, October* 22, 1907.

ON Monday last Señor Sanchez Roman and others asked questions in the Senate with regard to the situation in Morocco.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied in a lengthy speech. His Excellency briefly reviewed the course of events since the disturbance at Casa Blanca, laying great stress on the fact that the Spanish Government had carefully kept to their engagements under the Algeciras Act and on the cordial nature of the co-operation between France and Spain. Any slight friction that had taken place at Casa Blanca had been between subordinates, and such temporary disagreements were almost inevitable on these occasions.

As regards the police in Morocco, his Excellency said that up to the present, owing to the difficulty of recruiting natives, it had been impossible to proceed with the organization of that body. At the same time, it was necessary to protect the lives of Spanish subjects and other Europeans at Casa Blanca, and it had thus become necessary to dispatch a small contingent of Spanish troops to that port to maintain order pending the organization of the police under the terms of the Algeciras Act.

Señor Allendesalazar, in reply to a further question, stated that the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the Pretender Muley Hafid had been clear from the

beginning. Instructions had been sent to all the Spanish Consuls in Morocco to abstain from intervention in the dispute, and in the event of either of the rival factions obtaining the upper hand in any of the ports or elsewhere, they were to confine themselves to requiring, as far as possible, the maintenance of order, the protection of foreigners, and the freedom of commerce. Spain, in common with all the Powers who had signed the Algeciras Act, regarded Muley Abd-ul-Aziz as the legitimate Sultan of Morocco.

His Excellency added that at an early date the Spanish Minister at Tangier would proceed to Rabat to see the Sultan, and would then discuss with the Moorish Government not only questions in regard to which the Spanish Government were co-operating with that of France, but also those more particularly interesting Spain, such as her relations with the Kabyl tribes in the neighbourhood of Spanish fortresses.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[35651] No. 75.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 420.)
Sir, *Tangier, October* 22, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting an engagement between the French and Arabs which took place on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, October* 20, 1907.

ON account of the disappearance in the country of a Frenchman (as previously reported), a small French force of 300 infantry, supported by cavalry, having orders to deploy "as far ahead as they legitimately could," was sent out early yesterday morning to reconnoitre in the direction of Alvarez' Farm.

The force, led on by sniping, went out beyond Taddert, the infantry driving out thirty Arabs holding the farm of Dris Bu Allam, and occupying it. The cavalry, reconnoitring far ahead, drew an attack of Arabs on to this farm, which was held by the French infantry for three hours without a single casualty.

Meantime the Goumiers to the left and behind the farm became involved, the Arab horsemen who were attacking them being assisted by other Arabs using sticks and stones.

The Spahis, who were also behind Dris Bu Allam's Farm, were ordered off to the assistance of the Goumiers, making brilliant charges and counter-charges, using their sabres on the Arabs. The Arabs broke, some on to Mediuna, others going off in in the direction of Casa Blanca. Eleven Arabs killed by sabre-cuts were counted in one spot, while nine others similarly killed were brought in by the French for identification, and buried here.

General Drude, hearing before mid-day that the force had gone out to Taddert, immediately went out with a strong force of 1,500 men, taking every available cavalryman, eight guns, and two mitrailleuses. This strong movement had the effect of turning back the Arabs, estimated at 3,000, to the hills beyond Mediuna, the field artillery shelling them at 5,500 metres.

The French forces then returned, in order to reach camp before nightfall. The action was a cavalry one, the Légionnaires not taking part in the fighting.

The cruiser "Gloire" fired six shells also.

The French lost one captain and one private of Chasseurs and one Spahi killed, and five Spahis and one Chasseur wounded.

The native losses cannot be estimated, but are described as "considerable" by the French Staff.

The total Arab forces in this district are estimated at 5,500, with the Kasbah Mediuna as their base, and another force of 1,000 to 1,500 at Settat.

Those attacking yesterday are described by the French Staff as belonging to the M'dakra and Oolad Said and part of the Oolad Hariz tribesmen. Others declare that the Shereef of Bujad's men were attacking.

An incident which serves as an index to gauge the feelings of the Arabs has been related to me. While the French General and authorities were recently palavering with the Fakir of Bujad regarding terms of peace, two Arabic-speaking French officers went about among the Bujadi tribesmen, who said to the officers, "If you were men, you would leave your guns behind and come out and fight us on our own ground," meaning, of course, that they (the Arabs) had no guns to use.

As regards the Frenchman who has disappeared, he is said to have been interested in land-purchase, and possibly went out to look at the country. It is thought he must have been attacked and tried to get back, as his mule was shot. No traces of the man himself have been discovered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[35449] No. 76.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *The Hague, October 24, 1907.*

IT is stated in the press that the representatives of Mulai Hafid, brother of the Sultan of Morocco, failed to gain access to any Member of this Court or Government upon the occasion of their recent visit to The Hague. On the day preceding their arrival a statement was published in the papers to the effect that the attitude of the Netherland authorities was based on the fact that the Netherlands still continue on terms of friendship with the legally-acknowledged Sultan of Morocco, and that it would be altogether contrary to diplomatic usage to receive representatives of prince-pretenders.

It is further reported that the envoys of Mulai Hafid proceeded from The Hague back to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ACTON.

[35805] No. 77.

British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

51, *Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, October 28, 1907.*

Sir,

I AM directed by my Committee to inform you that particulars have recently reached them from a correspondent in Mogador of slave-trading in Morocco which they desire to place before you.

The correspondent states that he learned at the end of last July that the Sheikh Ma-el-Ainin, who lives at Wad Smara between Adrar and Cape Juby, was at that time near to Wad Noon on his way to Fez, where his custom is to visit the Sultan once in every two years. This Sheikh, he states, is accompanied by a horde of wild men of the desert, or "blue men" as they are called, and Wad Smara, the Sheikh's home, is simply a depôt of slaves. Every time the Sheikh goes to visit the Morocco Court he takes with him from 100 to 150 slaves, girls and boys, to give as presents and to sell.

On the recent occasion referred to he took with him more than 300, besides 50 children whom he lost *en route* from thirst, his way taking him across the desert, as he was afraid of being attacked himself on the journey. Our correspondent goes on to say that every one of the 500 savages who accompany this official is a slave dealer, carrying with him one or two children to sell between Tiznit and Fez.

It is known that Ma-el-Ainin has a zawia at Fez, Rabat, Marrakesh, and Mogador; every Chief of the zawia is a slave dealer, and it is to them that persons wishing to procure young slaves apply.

My Committee venture to think that this information which they have every reason to believe is correct, as their correspondent is well informed and thoroughly to

be relied upon, should be placed before you with a view to its being transmitted to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, in order that it may be made use of when the time comes again to raise the anti-slavery question in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) TRAVERS BUXTON, *Secretary.*

[36162] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 423.)
Sir, *Tangier, October 24, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 420 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, in which he reports a conversation with M. Malpertuy, the French Consul at that port, respecting the renewal of negotiations with the Shereef of Bujad (see my despatch No. 414 of the 17th instant), after the engagement of the 19th.

I would call your special attention to the statements in the last paragraph of Mr. Madden's despatch, which appear to be particularly interesting as an indication of the French policy in regard to their occupation of Casa Blanca.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 290.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, October 22, 1907.*

THE French Consul, in speaking to me yesterday, remarked that he could not refuse to discuss terms of submission, as the tribesmen had presented themselves before him asking for peace. He said he had been obliged to go out several kilomètres to meet the Shereef of Bujad, who is a friend of his, as the Shereef, after the action of the 19th, feared to approach without the personal guarantee of the French Consul.

M. Malpertuy said he thought the tribesmen were in earnest now about submitting, as they had been very hardly punished in the last fight. They had learnt what a hand-to-hand fight with French troops was like, and the field-guns had placed shells within half-a-mile of the Kasbah Mediuna. He said that in the action the Moors had used two cannons against the French, but evidently they were of little or no effective value to them.

In conversation yesterday with some French officers they said that at least forty Moors were killed by sabre wounds from the French cavalry in Saturday's action.

M. Malpertuy hinted that the General had not attempted to destroy the Arab camps owing to fear of home and international disagreement, were the French troops to do more than police Casa Blanca in a scrupulously strict sense.

He said he had expressed the opinion to the French Government that the troops would be required to remain in occupation for three years, *i.e.*, till the port of Casa Blanca is constructed, unless by that time an accord had been arrived at that the occupation should be a permanent one. In any case the French desired that everybody, irrespective of nationality, should enjoy liberty for trading purposes, concessions, and the like in its widest possible sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[36163] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 424.)

Sir, *Tangier, October 24, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador respecting the situation at that port.

You will observe that the landing of the Moorish troops from the French cruiser "Artois" and the rumours of the approach of Mulai Hafid's mehalla have caused great alarm in the town, and from Mr. Wilkinson's conversation with the French Consul it would appear to be conceivable that the French authorities intend to lend assistance to the cause of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, should the tribesmen of whom Mulai Hafid's mehalla is principally composed enter the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Mogador, October 20, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on the 18th instant the French steamer "Artois" arrived here, having on board 400 Moorish soldiers, said to have been embarked at Tangier. They landed the same day, and the officer in command reported himself immediately to the French Consul.

Late last night the native scribe of this Consulate called on me in a state of great excitement to report that the Moors in the Arab quarter of the town were very frightened, as it was said that French sailors had been landed from the cruiser "Du Chayla" with guns in order to protect the town against an attack by the mehalla from Marakesh, which, according to the latest news, was only at a short distance from Mogador. The Governor had ordered all the garrison to line the walls, and under his personal supervision large quantities of ammunition were being transported from the landing-place to the several gates. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, I called on the French Consul and asked him to let me know what was taking place. M. Kouri said he had had information that the mehalla was advancing rapidly towards Mogador, and he had sent a message to the "Du Chayla" requesting the Captain to sail at once and report the news to the French Minister at Rabat by wireless. He then showed me a letter he had received that same afternoon from Habib Baka, the man appointed by Mulai Hafid to relieve Kaïd Bargash as Governor of this port. Baka, whose letter was written at Marakesh, said: "We leave for Mogador by command of His Majesty, but before proceeding there we shall visit Kaïd Anfluz and settle our differences with him. Your colleagues will receive similar letters from me in due course, informing them of my appointment."

M. Kouri, in commenting on this letter, told me he did not believe that the mehalla was going first to deal with Anfluz, and Baka's object in sending this letter was to arrive unexpectedly before Mogador, as he counted on the support of the townsmen. I asked him if the French ships had orders to interfere should the mehalla attempt to come into the town. His reply was rather vague, and although he admitted that the Europeans had nothing to fear from Mulai Hafid's army, he said that he had orders to assist both the Governor and Anfluz in the protection of Mogador, and that if things got worse he would request all his colleagues to send the Europeans on board the war-ships, in order that they might fire in case of necessity.

I gave no reply to this last suggestion of the French Consul, as I think it will be difficult to induce the Europeans to abandon their homes and take refuge on the French cruisers, considering that they know perfectly well that they are not in the least danger, even if the mehalla should ever reach Mogador. I ought to mention that this is not the first time M. Kouri refers to the advisability of an evacuation of the town by the European colonies, as some six weeks ago he spoke about it to the Spanish Consul, but he failed to convince him. The latter gives me to understand that, not only will he refrain from sending the Spanish subjects away, but he will use

his best endeavours to prevent such an exodus, which, besides being fraught with the danger of the natives opposing the departure of the foreigners, inasmuch as they consider their presence as a guarantee that the town will not have the fate of Casa Blanca, will probably be the ruin of many poor families. The few British subjects whom I have consulted on the subject fully concur with the view expressed by the Spanish Consul, and are not at all prepared to leave, unless, of course, they see real danger in remaining.

I cannot doubt the French Consul's good faith when he told me last night that he had had news that the mehalla was near Mogador, but, strange to say, all the letters received this morning from Morocco city, dated the 17th instant, state that, as Mulai Hafid had decided to take the command personally, the mehalla had postponed its departure and was still at Marakesh. I naturally come to the conclusion that M. Kouri was misinformed, although the idea is taking root in the minds of the natives, and some foreigners also, that he is trying to create an incident which would necessitate active intervention on the part of the French authorities.

I hear on good authority that last night the captain of the "Du Chayla" was requested to land a quick-firing gun, but he evidently did not see his way to comply with the request, and the gun was not landed. The cruiser "Amiral Aube" arrived this morning simultaneously with the French steamer, which had been chartered to convey troops from Rabat to this port, and could not do so owing to the rough weather at that port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

[35967] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 425.)

Sir, *Tangier, October 25, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 409 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that Raisuli has now written to me direct in reply to the letter sent to him by my direction by Mr. Carleton. I inclose a copy of his letter. His attitude cannot be said to be very satisfactory.

He abandons, however, his demand for the imprisonment of certain persons against whom he had charges.

He has furnished the list of prisoners, about fifty in number, whose release he demands, but some of these are at Fez and Rabat, and their transfer here will require some time. Others are well-known murderers, and their names must be struck off the list.

To the demand that he should come and live in Tangier with a guarantee for his security he gives a refusal, and he adheres to his demand for the payment of a ransom of 30,000*l.*

On the receipt of this letter I discussed the matters therein contained with Daudi, Raisuli's representative, but was unable to induce him to modify the demands in any way on Raisuli's behalf. Indeed, he declared that Raisuli expected that the guarantee given to him and his immediate family would be extended to all his relations, who would otherwise be at the mercy of the Makhzen.

I then called upon Sid Mohammed Guebbas, the Minister of War, and asked him whether his instructions admitted of his agreeing to the conditions as now demanded by Raisuli. The Minister at once declared that his instructions did not contemplate the possibility of Raisuli being allowed to live where he pleased and continue to be a danger.

I explained to his Excellency that even if we insisted upon Raisuli coming to Tangier on the release of Kaïd Maclean, that practically we had no power to compel him to remain here, and that if he chose to return to his mountain home all we could do would be to withdraw the guarantee for his safety. Daudi declares that Raisuli's brother intends to settle here, but he himself will live in Arzila, but obviously, even if a promise to that effect were exacted from Raisuli, it would be valueless.

Sid Mohammed Guebbas also appeared to be quite indisposed even to have Raisuli's slaves and the prisoners that are to be liberated brought here until Kaïd Maclean was released, but I insisted that this must be done at once, so that they may be handed over on that occasion.

The Minister eventually agreed to refer again at once to the Makhzen for instructions on all the points, but more especially on that of the residence of Raisuli. He did not appear to anticipate any difficulty about the Makhzen agreeing to the payment of the 30,000*l.*

The difficulties of the Makhzen agreeing to Raisuli's demands regarding residence are very natural, for if he desires to continue his present mode of existence he may with his enhanced exchequer become even a greater terror than he already is.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Raisuli to Sir G. Lowther.

(After compliments.) 15 *Ramadan*, 1325 (*October* 23, 1907).

WE recived your letter, and took note of all you state therein. You say you have used your best efforts in the negotiations; this is what we wanted, and fulfils our good expectations of you, for which you are thanked, and may you be delivered from harm. We have the fullest certainty that your Government wishes us every good, and it is incumbent on us to have consideration for your Government.

You remark that the conditions requested by Sid Mohammed-el-Daudi are still excessive, and you have decided to offer the six conditions you mention, which you are prepared to see are fulfilled, and you are sure we will accept them :—

1. The return of the slaves mentioned in my previous list.—Granted.
2. The return of our house in Tangier.—Granted.
3. The persons whose imprisonment we demanded, as [*sic*] the English law prohibits the imprisonment of any one until proved guilty.—We withdraw this from consideration, but his Excellency the Minister must undertake the settlement of all claims against them and against others.
4. That we send to you a list of the men whose release we desire.—Granted. It will reach you by the hand of my Secretary.
5. That the Makhzen has promised the English Government that neither we nor our family will be harmed or molested by the Makhzen. We have Firmans from all the dynasties (Moorish Sultans) to this effect. We are sending some of them for you to see. You request that we should come to Tangier, so as not to interfere with the tribes.—As regards coming into the town, we have the right to choose; and as regards interfering with the tribes, it is the Makhzen that is doing that. You should not listen to the words of agitators; any word I give you (*i.e.*, promise) I will fulfil, and you will see nothing on my part that will displease you.
6. The Makhzen will pay us 100,000 dollars as compensation.

As regards the fifth condition, we have explained the matter to you, from regard to the trouble taken and out of consideration for your Government, and in view of the good treatment we expect from it in the future—please God, the preservation of neighbourly relations—and in order to release this man to his children and family, and because of his age; but as regards the 100,000 dollars, for what is that a sufficient compensation—for domestic animals or private effects, or violation of domicile? It would appear by this that the Makhzen is putting me off, and putting off does not give satisfaction. We cannot abate anything from the 30,000*l.*, as that sum is small in comparison to my deserts; and I have written to Mr. Carleton, the Consul, in this sense and on other matters, and he will tell you of it. It is the duty of the Makhzen to have consideration for your Government, as we have had consideration for it, and have agreed to what you request of us.

We have sent in our scribe to you to attend to this matter, and what you hear from him is what you would hear from us. May you, &c.

(Seal of Raisuli.)

[36165] No. 81.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 427.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 28, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

LITTLE news has been received from British Consular officers during the past week. The situation as between the two Sultans remains apparently the same. There has been, as far as is known, no important loss or accession of strength on either side. Information is confined to the movements or absence of movements of the respective forces. The British Vice-Consul at Rabat says of Abd-el-Aziz's Commander-in-Chief: "I am much disappointed about Bagdadi's expedition. I quite thought they were going to do something at last." Bagdadi when last heard of was 10 miles from Rabat, and had taken six days to accomplish the distance. The departure of Mulai Hafid's force for Mogador has been delayed pending another effort to win over Kaïd Anfluz by peaceful means, and the Kaïd is said to have made Mulai Hafid an offer of free passage for an army through his territory at a dollar per man. Both sides are making efforts to secure Anfluz's allegiance. Mr. Wilkinson had been informed by Barghash, Governor of Mogador, that Anfluz was to succeed him in office. But his acceptance seems doubtful. On the arrival of reinforcements at Mogador, 100 men had been sent to him to assist him in resisting Mulai Hafid's advance, but the Kaïd, on hearing that they had been accompanied by an Algerian instructor, refused their services. General interest has centred on Mogador, and rumours of its occupation by Mulai Hafid or by the French have been current. Any prospect of the former seems to have passed. There are now 1,200 Makhzen soldiers in the town, and the French Consul and the Governor are concerting measures for its defence.

The Vice-Consul at Mazagan reports that there are no more rifles in the custom-house. Several thousand cartridges remain, but Mulai Hafid is said not to require any more. A report from Marakesh places his departure for Fez on the 26th instant, but it is unlikely that he will leave during Ramadan, if at all. A letter received by the Legation from a British protected native in Marakesh describes the Sultan as being busy with preparations, but makes no mention of his impending departure. The writer takes a very hopeful view of Mulai Hafid's prospects, but this may be attributed to fear of his letter being intercepted.

There has been no fighting at Dar-al-Baida since the 19th, when the engagement appears to have been the accidental consequence of the search for the missing Frenchman, Kunzer, whose decapitated body has since been found about 3 miles from the French lines. The French troops are settling themselves for the winter, and the construction of wooden huts is proceeding rapidly. The force now amounts to about 6,500 men. Some Germans who deserted from the Foreign Legion to the tribes outside Dar-al-Baida have been handed over by the Moorish authorities to the German Vice-Consul at Rabat. Two Frenchmen who deserted at the same time are said to have been killed by the tribesmen.

P.S.—The Governor of Tangier, Belghazi, has left at a few hours notice for Mogador as Governor.

October 28, 1907.

[36714] No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November 6, 1907.*

SIR H. MACLEAN. My telegram No. 128 of the 25th ultimo.

Makhzen refuse to pay Raisuli more than 30,000*l.*, and that on condition that he resides at Tangier. They are prepared to agree to his wishes as regards protection to be given to his relatives, but have not replied about the release of prisoners.

Although Minister of War's instructions do not allow him to go so far, I learn from the French Minister who is at Court that the Makhzen would advance interest to Raisuli on sum total of ransom if he lives in mountains as at present or elsewhere with exception of three towns specially mentioned.

Daudi declares his master will refuse to accept, but I will put the matter to him.

I think if you authorized a strong note to the Makhzen it would serve a good purpose, as they are at present showing an entire lack of energy.

[36714] No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1907.*

CAPTIVITY of Sir H. Maclean: Your telegram No. 129 of the 6th instant.

You should inform the Moorish Government that the position of Sir H. Maclean is causing much concern to His Majesty's Government, who feel convinced that the lack of progress in the negotiations, which is a cause of great dissatisfaction to them, and the prolonged detention of the prisoner, are due in part to lack of energy on the part of the Moorish Government. The latter should be made to understand that His Majesty's Government look to them to hasten the negotiations, and to answer promptly all points raised by Raisuli which you may refer to them. If the Kaïd's health were to be seriously impaired by exposure to the inclement weather prevalent at this season, and by his prolonged captivity caused by the procrastination and indifference of the Makhzen, they will be held responsible.

[36844] No. 84.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 533. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, November 6, 1907.*

I HAD been invited to shoot at Marly to-day with the President of the Republic, and I knew that I should meet the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but, as I did not feel at all sure that he would be able to give me details of the negotiations at Rabat between the French Minister and the Sultan of Morocco, I requested Mr. Lister to endeavour to ascertain them from the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a Memorandum by Mr. Lister of his conversation with M. Louis.

At Marly I inquired of M. Pichon whether the negotiations at Rabat had been satisfactory to the French Government, and, on his replying in the affirmative, I asked him whether he could give me any details. His Excellency said that he would be happy to do so for your confidential information. On the way back to Paris he told me that he would desire M. Louis to give me full particulars, as he himself would be in the country to-morrow shooting.

Mr. Lister's Memorandum supplies that information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Memorandum by Mr. Lister.

IN the course of conversation with the Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day, I inquired whether the French Government were satisfied with the course of the negotiations on which M. Regnault had been engaged with the Sultan of Morocco at Rabat. M. Louis replied in the affirmative. The results, he said, would be published in the Yellow Book on Morocco, but the importance of the points gained would be minimized, in order not to create fresh difficulties for the Sultan with his subjects. He would, however, tell me in confidence that the Sultan had consented to recognize the Agreements of 1901 and 1902 with regard to the frontier, and had solemnly undertaken to enforce their provisions. This was really all that the French Government demanded, and they were consequently very well satisfied. General Lyautey had taken part in the negotiations, and there was no doubt that his knowledge of Moorish mentality had contributed in no small measure to their success.

With regard to the punishment of the murderers of M. Charbonnier and Dr. Mauchamp, M. Louis hoped that the Sultan would continue in his present frame of mind, and eventually give satisfaction to the French demands, but, of course, for the moment nothing could be done at Marakesh.

The position in the south, he said, had improved, to judge by the various reports which reached the Ministry. Kaïd Anflous, a "mauvais garnement," but none the less a dangerous enemy, had deserted Mulai Hafid, and other desertions had followed. He attributed this more satisfactory state of affairs to the presence of Ben Ghazi, one of the few men of vigour round the Sultan, who had been sent to Mogador at the request of M. Regnault.

There was no doubt that it was impossible to exaggerate the penury of the Sultan. A few million francs had been advanced to him indirectly by the French Government through the State Bank, the "Société Algérienne," &c., and precautions had been taken to insure its being spent on the purposes for which it was intended, but this state of affairs could not go on indefinitely, and a loan was absolutely necessary. The pacification around Casa Blanca seemed to be progressing but slowly, the position being complicated by the fact that, on the one hand, the emissaries of Abd-el-Aziz were men of no vigour, and, on the other, many of the neighbouring tribes were in constant contact with Mulai Hafid.

Paris, November 6, 1907.

[36846] No. 85.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 535.)
Sir, *Paris, November 7, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a leading article published in the "Temps" this evening respecting the Yellow Book on Moroccan affairs which was issued this afternoon.*

The article states that the conduct of Moroccan affairs by the Ministry as shown by the Yellow Book merits approval. France and Spain have conscientiously carried out the mandate intrusted to them without giving any one a reason for complaint. The prudence with which the French Government have acted is commendable, but, to judge only from the documents published in the Yellow Book, they seem, if not to excuse themselves for their action, at any rate to explain, perhaps, a little too much. An almost irritating impression of timidity is at times given, as if it were necessary to defend themselves against wrongful suspicions, whereas French policy in Morocco does not need to plead extenuating circumstances. M. Pichon's declarations in answer to the forthcoming interpellation in the Chamber will probably be more satisfactory in this respect.

The article declares that the attitude of Foreign Powers as shown by the Yellow Book is satisfactory. M. de Tschirschky's attitude was courteous and loyal, and any little difficulties which arose at Tangier were easily regulated at Berlin. Austria, as in 1906, was correct and conciliatory, Italy very friendly, Russia faithful in her support of France, while England approved French action without reserve, and even showed that

* Not printed.

she desired it to be more energetic still. Spain has been, as at Algeciras, a loyal partner, ready to carry out the duties which she accepted. The United States and other Powers placed their confidence in the French Government.

I inclose herein copies of the Yellow Book, as well as a Memorandum calling attention to some of the chief matters of interest in it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Memorandum.

THE Yellow Book includes 536 documents, dating from the 13th January, 1906, to the 22nd October, 1907.

The chief matters of interest are the following :—

1. The German point of view concerning French action relative to the organization of the police in the ports. (See No. 472, in which the French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin transmits a translation of the German *aide-mémoire* of the 9th September in reply to the French Memorandum of the 2nd of the same month.) In this document the German Government, after taking note of the French intention to institute a police force, stated that they deduced from it that the anticipated measures would be of a provisional character, and that it would be without prejudice to the terms of the Act of Algeciras. While recognizing France's right to obtain satisfaction for the events of Casa Blanca, the German Government still hoped that no similar serious loss would ensue to the foreign merchants such as had occurred at that port. The institution of a police force at Tangier might, however, bring about an attack by the mountain tribes unless a sufficient force of military were present to support the measure.

On the 2nd October M. Pichon wrote to M. Jules Cambon to the effect that the French Government had fortunately not as yet been forced by circumstances to take the provisional and exceptional measures that they had in view, but that if the situation necessitated such measures they could only revert to their original idea. It was important that there should be no misunderstanding on this subject.

2. Concerning contraband, M. Jules Cambon and M. de Tschirschky agreed on the 3rd October that the period during which French and Spanish ships should have the right of search should not exceed one year. (See No. 512, reporting a conversation between M. de Tschirschky and M. Jules Cambon.) This was accepted by M. Pichon on the 4th October. (See No. 514.)

3. Concerning the result of M. Regnault's mission at Rabat, reference is made to the Sultan's willingness to organize a police force on the frontier under French instructors, but the importance of the results gained are minimized in the Yellow Book. (See Memorandum by Mr. Lister in my despatch No. 533, Confidential, of yesterday.)

4. In a conversation (No. 375) in which M. Jules Cambon informed M. de Tschirschky of the events which occurred at Casa Blanca on the 5th August, the German Foreign Secretary is reported to have expressed his approval of the French note in the following terms: "C'est excellent, soyez assuré que vous avez toutes nos sympathies," and, in another conversation on the 3rd October (No. 510), M. Cambon congratulated himself on the fact that the "apaisement" in Morocco had rendered unnecessary the provisional measures contemplated by France in case of emergency, but that they hoped to be able to await the constitution of the Moorish police instead of having recourse to their own forces. The German Foreign Secretary appeared to approve of these views.

[34885] No. 86.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.**

Foreign Office, November 8, 1907.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government, having given careful consideration to the Memorandum communicated by your Excellency on the 19th ultimo, are prepared to accept the proposals of the French and Spanish Governments with regard to the institution of an International Commission to inquire into the claims for direct losses resulting from the unfortunate occurrences which took place at Casa Blanca in the month of August last, and to determine the amount of those losses.

His Majesty's Government observe that the question of providing funds for the payment of compensation will be reserved for consideration at a later date, together with the general question of the payment of the debts contracted by the Moorish Government. They note, further, that the Commission will not be required to decide upon the reparation to be made by the Moorish Government for the murders of Europeans, nor to fix the indemnities to be paid by the Makhzen to the French and Spanish Governments to cover the cost of their intervention.

His Majesty's Government will be prepared in due course to appoint their Representative on the proposed International Commission, and they duly take note of the fact that, in all matters not defined by its own constitution, this body will be guided as far as possible by the precedent afforded by the Alexandria Commission of 1883–84.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

* Similar letter, *mutatis mutandis*, addressed to Señor Urrutia.

[36955] No. 87.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 429.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 30, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spanish Minister, Señor de Llaberia, left Tangier yesterday afternoon for Rabat, on board the Spanish battle-ship "Pelayo," on a mission to the Sultan, to present his credentials.

General Medina, Governor of Melilla, and the Captain of the "Pelayo" accompany the Spanish Minister, whose staff consists of Señor Vallin, First Secretary, who was attached to the Spanish delegation at the Conference at Algeciras, and several members of the Spanish Legation at Tangier, as well as two Franciscan friars.

Señor de Llaberia takes with him two horses with handsome trappings in the old Spanish style, and some carpets of Madrid manufacture, for presentation to the Sultan on behalf of the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[36957] No. 88.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 9.)

(No. 431.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 1, 1907.

SOON after his arrival at Rabat, M. Regnault was asked by the Sultan to procure for him immediately a loan of 2,000,000 fr., in order to pay for the army and for the palace expenses. The "Banque d'État" having, as I understand, refused to advance the money, the French Government then arranged with the "Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas" for a loan of 1,500,000 fr., the Minister for Foreign Affairs giving that bank a letter stating that the French Government would see that the Moorish Government fulfilled its obligations in the matter. M. Pichon, I understand, also suggested to the Chief Administrator of the "Banque d'État du Maroc" that the bank should at once advance a sum of 600,000 fr. on the jewels in Paris, though more than completing the sum of 2,000,000 fr. required by the Sultan for his immediate uses. Cid Mohammed Tazzi, the Sultan's Delegate, was, however, indisposed to accept so small a sum for the jewels, and I am unaware whether this part of the arrangement has been finally completed.

M. Luret, the bondholders' representative, has proceeded to Rabat to conclude the arrangements regarding the loan of the "Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas," which are to include a provision that the expenditure is to be carefully controlled by French agents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[36958] No. 89.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 432.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 4, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Summary of Events in Morocco for the week ending November 3, 1907.

THERE has been little news from His Majesty's Consuls during the past week. Communication with the coast has been interrupted by bad weather. The Spanish Mission which left Tangier on the 29th was still off Rabat on the 3rd instant, having been so far unable to disembark. The arrival of the new Governor, Belghazi, and the departure of Barghash were reported from Mogador. Further dispositions had been taken for the defence of the place, the garrison of which now amounts to 1,500 men. The French cruisers "Desaix," "Amiral Aube," "Lalande," and the transport "Nive" were off the town, and a French officer was reported to have examined the ground with a view to a possible landing. A force of 400 Tangier troops were to have left Mogador with two mountain guns for a point about 15 miles off with the idea of joining Kaïd Anfluz and checking the advance of Mulai Hafid's force, which is camped at Taftash, about 20 miles from Mogador. Should this movement be carried out, a few miles only will separate the opposing forces. Mulai Hafid's force in question is reported from Marakesh to have left that place about 500 strong, but to have been accompanied by over 100 camel-loads of arms and munitions with the idea of recruiting and arming men on the way. It is not stated how far this hope has been realized. The attitude of many of the tribes is still a matter of doubt and speculation. Kaïd Anfluz has not definitely pronounced himself. The Governor of Mogador and the French Consul are said to be making efforts to secure his allegiance to Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. Mr. Wilkinson believes they will be successful. Mr. Spinney from Saffi sends a report that he has joined Mulai Hafid, and expects that it is true. Anfluz is an important factor, and commands 3,000 rifles. It is now announced that Mulai Hafid's main army will take the field at the end of Ramadan. It will number 12,000 men, including 6,000 horse. It will be commanded by Glawi, Minister of War, and Mulai Hafid will in all probability accompany it. In spite of the Governor's undertaking to Mr. Spinney, 250 more cases of cartridges were taken from the Mazagan custom-house and dispatched to Marakesh.

November 3, 1907.

[37095] No. 90.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 494.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 7, 1907.*

IT appears that the Spanish press has been occupied with the rumour that the occasion of the simultaneous visits to be paid by the German Emperor and the King of Spain to the King will be utilized by their Majesties for the discussion of the affairs of Morocco, with the result of a different line of policy being followed by the Powers in regard to that country.

The "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz," an organ which is not infrequently used by Prince Bülow as a channel for stating his views, publishes in its yesterday's issue a semi-official communication emanating from Berlin to the effect that there is no truth in the rumours in question, that the policy of Germany is unswerving adhesion to the Act of Algeciras, and a firm insistence on her rights and interests as acquired by Treaty. Translation of this communication is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Extract from the "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz" of November 6, 1907.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to rumours in the Spanish press, a discussion of the affairs of Morocco will take place during the visit of the German Emperor to London between that Sovereign and the Kings of Spain and England, which may lead to a change in the policy hitherto pursued by the Powers in regard to Morocco. We would wish at once to check such expectations. Without erecting the Act of Algeciras into an unchangeable law, it must be admitted that its provisions remain in force for the further solution of the difficulties in Morocco. It is a favourite occupation to criticize the contents of the Act from different points of view, but no one has yet put forward a better proposal for a peaceful compromise of the competing interests in Morocco. Without the Act it would have been difficult to confine the importance of the events which have taken place since its signature within local limits. The straight course for Germany is to insist on the full recognition of the rights and interests we have gained by Treaty. To the right of this course lies a renunciation in favour of France for which no adequate compensation offers itself, and to the left active intervention—a chase after a bit of Moroccan territory—a policy which has still its secret admirers in the German press. It is particularly those who are anxious for the gradual improvement of France-German relations who should be sparing in their criticisms of the Act and in their demands for a change of policy. For however precious any budding official or non-official sympathies between France and Germany may be, the sole active bases of the *détente* are the Agreement of Algeciras and the exchange of unequivocal proofs of loyalty to that instrument. Even those who only look upon it as a bridge erected in a case of necessity must wish that the bridge shall not be taken away till sound ground has been found elsewhere.

[37053] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 624.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 11, 1907.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office on the 8th instant, and read to Sir Charles Hardinge the reply of the German Government to the Franco-Spanish proposal for the institution of an International Commission to inquire into the claims arising out of the disturbances at Casa Blanca in August last.

The German note drew attention to the fact that a German Commission had already been appointed to inquire into the losses sustained by German subjects at Casa Blanca, and that certain sums had already been advanced as first assistance to the most needy of the German claimants.

As regards the Franco-Spanish proposal, the German Government agreed to adhere to it on condition—

1. That all claims accepted and fixed by the German Commission should be accepted without question and without revision by the International Commission; and
2. That any ulterior claims which might be presented by German subjects should be presented to, and accepted by, the International Commission on the same basis of evaluation.

M. Cambon said that the French Government considered these conditions quite inadmissible, and that they intended to send him further instructions after consultation with the Spanish Government.

In reply to his Excellency's invitation to express his opinion upon the attitude of the German Government, Sir C. Hardinge said that his own personal view was that German claims had no right to a privileged position, and that he was unable to understand for what reason the British Delegate on the proposed International Commission should be compelled to accept a valuation of German claims made by a German Commission, whilst the German Delegate was permitted to have a voice in

the estimation of British claims. For this reason Sir C. Hardinge said that he regarded the German conditions as impossible of acceptance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[37768] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 329.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1907.

IN the course of my conversation with Herr von Schön at Windsor last night I spoke on the subject of the Casa Blanca claims, and explained that the German condition would turn the International Commission into a mere clerk for registering claims.

We had been bound to accept the proposal of an International Commission, because of the precedent we ourselves had set with regard to the Alexandria claims.

But if German claims were to be admitted without discussion, and yet the German Representative was to have a voice in settling British claims, the position would be one which we could not accept.

Herr von Schön said his difficulty was that the Germans had already established a Commission. He could not dissolve it, or stop its work—in fact, he would be thrown out if he attempted to do so.

I suggested that it might be possible to find some compromise by which the investigations of the German Commission on questions of fact would be accepted by the International Commission, and by which it would be left to the latter Commission to decide on what principles compensation should be fixed and paid. This, however, was a matter to be discussed with the French and Spanish Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[37769] No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 330.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 13, 1907.

IN the course of my conversation with Herr von Schön at Windsor last night I told him, with regard to the general relations between the two countries, that since the Algeciras Conference those relations had been gradually improving.

But, as Herr von Schön knew, we had an agreement with France to give her diplomatic support in Morocco, and when difficulties arose there between France and Germany it made things difficult between Germany and us.

Herr von Schön said, without hesitation, and very decidedly, that Germany did not intend to make difficulties in Morocco. He spoke of this in a friendly and decided tone, as if he wished to dissipate any anxiety on that point, and did not feel any himself.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[37523] No. 94.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 543.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 13, 1907.

THE debate on the policy of France in Morocco began on the 12th instant in the Chamber of Deputies. It was opened by Count Boni de Castellane (Nationalist), who declared that the policy of pacific penetration was clearly shown to be a mistaken one, and that it had led to the present unfortunate state of affairs in which France bore the chief burden of responsibilities, while the other Powers had all the advantages of her action without any expenditure of men and money. He called the attention of the Chamber to the document No. 337 in the recently published Yellow Book, in which

is recorded what M. de Castellane termed the "incomparable réponse" of the British Government on being informed of the measures taken by France for safeguarding the lives of Europeans in Morocco. He read out to the House the portion of the despatch from the French Ambassador in London, in which his Excellency stated that Sir Charles Hardinge had said that His Majesty's Government awaited energetic measures by France. M. de Castellane thus commented on this despatch: "Vous entendez, Messieurs, des mesures énergiques pour nous, et des profits pour les autres." He also quoted a conversation recorded in document No. 448 of the Yellow Book, in which the French Chargé d'Affaires is represented as thanking you for the assurance that the British attitude would not be modified, as you were convinced that France would do all that was necessary to protect the Europeans in Morocco.

M. Trouin, Deputy for Oran, then gave his views of the present situation in Morocco, which he complained was not in process of amelioration. He concluded by stating that two solutions were open to consideration—to continue the joint action with Spain with more energy, or to "internationalize" the Moroccan question as has been done in the case of China.

M. Vaillant, a Socialist Deputy, followed M. Trouin in the Tribune. He declared that capitalist interest had brought on France the present complications, and he advocated the revision of the Act of Algeciras and the internationalization of the question.

M. Paul Deschanel, who was the Reporter of the Budget for Foreign Affairs for 1907, and is a prominent Moderate Republican Deputy on the Opposition side, made a lengthy speech, reviewing the circumstances leading up to the present situation. He alluded to the marked increase of French trade with Morocco, which now amounted to almost half the total trade with that country. He expressed the hope that French policy would neither be one of adventures nor of "internationalization," but that it would aim at the gradual accomplishment of France's civilizing mission undertaken in agreement with the Powers, and that Parliament would treat the Moroccan question as one above party quarrels.

M. Delafosse (Royalist) gave his views on Moroccan affairs, and paid a tribute to the loyalty of England towards France and to M. Delcassé, who had brought about the *entente cordiale*.

The most important speech during this stage of the debate was made by M. Ribot, the leader of the Moderate Republicans in Opposition. He declared that he had no intention of embarrassing the Government in taking part in the debate. He gave a short account of the former and present state of affairs in Morocco. He commented on the *rapprochement* of France with Italy, Spain, and England during the last years of M. Delcassé's tenure of office, reminding the House that he had been an advocate of improved relations with the last-named Power at a time when to do so incurred the risk of being treated as an "Anglomane," and that he had rejoiced at the King's first visit to Paris. At the same time, it must be borne in mind, with regard to the friendships which have lately been made by France, that those were the most durable when each party remembered its own interests and received something for what it gave. He approved the policy which led France to go to the Conference at Algeciras. "Il valait mieux aller devant l'Europe que de rester dans ce tête-à-tête silencieux avec l'Allemagne." The results of the Conference were not to be lightly regarded. There was no longer a danger that any Power would violate the integrity of Morocco, and the special interest of France had been fully recognized. M. Ribot then referred to the necessity for France and Spain to carry out the duties intrusted to them. No faltering must be shown, for it would be taken in the Mussulman world for a sign of weakness. With regard to the disturbances at Casa Blanca, he observed that it was highly regrettable that the Consulate should have been left at a critical time in the charge of a necessarily inexperienced officer. He did not criticize this official personally, but rather the fact that he had been left here alone. Had M. Malpertuy, the Consul, himself been at Casa Blanca, who had been formerly a Dragoman, and knew the country thoroughly, it is possible that the incident on the 5th August would never have occurred. I have the honour to call your special attention to this portion of M. Ribot's speech (pp. 2163–4 of the "Journal Officiel"), in which he examined the events preceding the landing of the sixty men from the French man-of-war "Galilée," and declared his opinion that the landing was, under the circumstances, an unfortunate step. Had it not taken place a bombardment of the town would not have become necessary. If any force had been landed it should have been a much stronger one, which would have rendered opposition useless.

M. Ribot urged, in conclusion, the necessity of organizing the police in the ports, and gave his views as to how this should be done. He expressed the hope that the Chamber could count on a prudent and decided policy on the part of the Government,

and that the latter would be frank with Parliament in regard thereto. If this were their policy he would support it.

M. Pichon spoke after M. Ribot, and began by recapitulating the events at Casa Blanca, which necessitated the dispatch of French troops to that port. He dismissed the idea that the Government had acted on behalf of Stock Exchange brokers and capitalists. The victims of the massacres were workmen and small trades-people—people who had settled in the port on the faith of Treaty rights to laboriously gain an honest livelihood.

M. Pichon then described the circumstances which had rendered the dispatch of troops necessary, and gave a résumé of the instructions given to General Drude and Admiral Philibert, and those given to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, who was instructed to "insist on the execution of the promises of satisfaction that the French had received from the Shereefian Government, and to make them understand that the Government of the Republic claimed the immediate application of all the reforms stipulated by the Act of Algeciras." It was, of course, important to ascertain whether these measures met with the approval of the Powers, and a note was concerted with the Spanish Ambassador in Paris for presentation to the Governments interested. The answers of the Powers Signatory to the Act of Algeciras were all satisfactory. "Devant de tels événements nous sommes tous solidaires" was the remark of the German Foreign Secretary, who added that this circumstance enabled one to judge of the loyalty of German policy. The German Ambassador in Paris told him (M. Pichon) that the measures taken by the French were fully justified. The British Government, asked by a number of British subjects to send a war-ship to Tangier, stated "that they had no intention of intervening, but awaited the energetic measures of the French Government." The Foreign Office further communicated to the German and Italian Governments a denial of the rumour that had been circulated to the effect that an English cruiser was leaving for Casa Blanca.

M. Pichon then entered into an account of the reasons which tended to aggravate still further the situation between the massacres on the 31st July and the disembarkation on the 5th August, and read an extract from the Report of Major Olivier describing the landing. The fact of the landing, he continued, was immediately communicated to the Powers. This communication was well received everywhere: M. Tschirschky saying to the French Ambassador in Berlin, "It is excellent; you have our entire sympathy." While at Tangier the German Chargé d'Affaires thanked the French Chargé d'Affaires for the protection accorded to his compatriots. Prince Bülow himself had remarked to one of his colleagues, after reading the Report sent by Prince Radolin, "No international complication can arise from the measures announced by the French Government, and no difficulty or objection will be raised on the German side."

As regards the organization of the police, to which M. Deschanel had called particular attention, the French Government, M. Pichon declared, had constantly kept in view the necessity for organizing such a body as soon as possible. All their efforts to bring this about had, however, been impeded by the dilatoriness of the Moorish Government. On the 13th August last the Makhzen had still not given a definitive reply—a reply which had only just now reached the French Government. On the 21st August the French Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to obtain the necessary assurance from the Makhzen that the French instructors would not run the risk of being massacred by their men, but El Guebbas had replied that he could not give such an assurance. It was, therefore, incumbent on the French to suggest the formation of a provisional police in the ports. A despatch was sent on the 4th September to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to the effect that the French Government would not land troops in Moroccan ports unless absolutely forced to do so, and that they desired as far as possible not to multiply their interventions, but to solve gradually the problems before them without raising new ones. The same declaration having been made by the French Ambassador in Berlin, the question had been asked whether the German reply had not been of such a nature as to prevent the French from carrying out their original intentions. The answer to this question was in the negative, as the date of the German Memorandum (10th September) showed. This Memorandum, while admitting the serious nature of the projected measures, stated that Germany recognized France's right to obtain satisfaction for the events of Casa Blanca, and added that the German Government had not the intention of making difficulties for France in the action undertaken by her on account of extraordinary circumstances. They hoped, however, that foreign merchants would not have to suffer losses similar to those caused them at Casa Blanca, and mentioned the danger of establishing a foreign police force, unless it were done under the protection of sufficiently strong military forces.

Austria-Hungary also answered in a satisfactory manner, stating that, in view of its provisional character, the measure could not be considered as in contradiction with the Articles of the Algeciras Act.

With regard to the police question, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the fact that the French Government had been able to avoid having recourse to an occupation of the ports was due to the extreme prudence of their policy, the firmness in carrying out the resolutions they had taken, and the perfect harmony between the military and civil authorities. Although, he continued, they had been lucky enough to avoid such a step so far, the French Government might be obliged to proceed to the measures they had originally contemplated, and of which the Powers had been informed.

His Excellency then alluded to the appearance of a rival Sultan, which had caused great difficulty; but the French course of action was clear, namely, to support the reigning Sultan, Abdul Aziz. It was with this object in view that M. Regnault had proceeded to Rabat, as his Spanish colleague had also done. Their mission was to treat of everything that affected the programme and obligations of the two Powers in execution of the mandate they had received at Algeciras. M. Regnault had instructions to negotiate on the subject of the various claims arising from attacks on French citizens, and also as to the Agreements of 1901 and 1902 with Morocco.

M. Pichon also made a reference to the visit of the King of Spain, as showing the harmony between the two countries. Other questions that were still to be solved were, his Excellency continued, that of the contraband of arms and that of the indemnities for the losses at Casa Blanca. In the first case it was necessary to employ exceptional and temporary measures, which, with the approval of the Powers given with certain reserves which did not affect the principle of the question, were about to be put into operation. As regards the second case, that of the indemnities, the procedure adopted after the bombardment of Alexandria would be used as a precedent. The indemnity for military expenses was a question which only concerned France, Spain, and Morocco, and not the other Powers. France only had to come to an arrangement with Spain as to the best method of proceeding in the matter. The question of the indemnities for civil losses involved the whole question of Moroccan finance, and would have to be examined not only with the Makhzen, but with the Powers. The important thing was now to avoid a recurrence of the evils which had occurred, and to this end a Moorish police force had been organized at Tangier with the concurrence of the Notables, and although not by any means perfect it was actually working, and had at any rate the merit of having rendered unnecessary so far a landing in that town. The organization of the frontier police was also occupying the attention of the Government, and the matter had formed the subject of discussion at Rabat.

France had no intention, the Minister continued, of settling herself in Morocco, but she could not admit that any other Power should take the place which belonged to her, and which had been recognized as hers. She did not seek to make of the Empire of the Sultan a protected country, but she could not permit that another Power should obtain a preponderating influence there. France had said at Algeciras that she could never admit, under any pretext whatever, either of police or anything else, the institution at the gates of Algeria of an organization, whether international or not, capable of disturbing the security of her possessions. France's interests were clearly shown by the statistics adduced by M. Deschanel, and she had no temptation to infringe on the economic interests of other Powers. During the past year France had intervened three times in Morocco with all the vigour necessitated by circumstances, to protect her own interests and those of the Powers Signatory to the Act of Algeciras. Surely this could not be called weakness or lack of foresight. He had been asked if he possessed the solution of the Moroccan problem. The answer was "No." It was a problem that could not be solved in a day, but one which required prudence, patience, and time. France's duty was not to substitute herself for the Makhzen, but to fortify it. For this it was necessary to make the native believe in the loyalty of France. By such means he hoped that the Moorish Empire would again enter an era of prosperity and vigour.

The debate was continued this afternoon by several speakers of lesser importance. One or two points raised by them were satisfactorily answered by M. Pichon, and the debate was brought to an end by an order of the day expressing confidence in the policy of the Government, which was carried by 462 votes against 54. The interest shown in the debate seemed to flag after the speeches delivered by M. Ribot and M. Pichon, and throughout the discussion there was little disposition shown in the Chamber to cal

seriously into question the policy pursued by M. Clemenceau's Cabinet with regard to Morocco.

I inclose herein, extracted from the "Journal Officiel," the text of the speeches delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and by M. Ribot.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[37600] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 630. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1907.

THE French Ambassador called at this Office on the 11th instant and read to Sir Charles Hardinge a telegram reporting an interview between his brother, the French Ambassador at Berlin, and the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The telegram stated that Herr von Schön had asked M. Jules Cambon his impression of the recent note of the German Government on the subject of the proposed International Commission to inquire into the Casa Blanca claims.

M. Jules Cambon replied that, although he was unable to speak officially, his personal impression was a bad one. The note was imperative in form and quite inacceptable in substance. He pointed out that, if every Power whose subjects had claims were to follow the example of Germany, and institute a local Commission of Inquiry whose Award was to be accepted without revision, an International Commission would be useless.

Herr von Schön admitted that the note was somewhat wanting in courtesy, and promised to see that this did not happen again. As regards the question itself, it was impossible to ignore the actual fact of the local German Commission having already investigated the German claims, and their decision could not be disregarded. He, however, admitted the reasonableness of M. Cambon's objection, and said that he would wait for an expression of the views of the French Government, with whom he would be quite ready to discuss the question with a view to arriving at an agreement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[37565] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1907.

MY telegram No. 113 of the 7th instant.

You should point out to Moorish Government that His Majesty's Government cannot tolerate that negotiations should be brought to a standstill on the question of Raisuli's residence. Latter could scarcely be expected to promise to live in Tangier, where he would not feel safe.

Suggest that the object of the Moorish Government would be attained if Raisuli were to live wherever he chose, provided he gave an undertaking not to live at Arzila, Alcazar, or Tetuan, and that on this condition the 30,000*l.* should be paid to him in full.

If Raisuli misconducts himself he will forfeit the protection of His Majesty's Government, and this consideration should diminish the apprehensions of the Maghzen as to place of residence.

[38086] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 333.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1907.

HERR VON SCHÖN, in conversation with me to-day, expressed great satisfaction at the Emperor's reception and the result of the visit. He thought every one must feel that the effect was good.

* Not printed.

I said I thought it was extremely good, and that if things went smoothly between Germany and France in Morocco, they would go smoothly with us. We had never intended the Agreement with France to be directed against Germany. But, having undertaken obligations to support France in Morocco, it necessarily followed that difficulties between Germany and France about Morocco made difficulties with us.

Herr von Schön again repeated in the most friendly way that the German Government had most excellent intentions as regards Morocco, and he did not anticipate any difficulties.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[37722] No. 98.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 436.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 7, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 412 of the 15th ultimo, respecting the formation of a Spanish Commission for the estimation of losses at Dar-al-Baida, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, in which Mr. Madden reports a conversation which he has had on this subject with the Spanish Consul at Casa Blanca.

You will observe that the Spanish Consul states that his Government have made no monetary advance, and that the object of the Commission is apparently merely to examine the claims in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 303.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, November* 6, 1907.

THE Spanish Consul informed me last evening that, acting on instructions received from his Government, he had formed a Commission to examine Spanish claims arising out of the French bombardment of Casa Blanca.

This Commission consists of the Consul, assisted by a local Spanish accountant, and three Spanish business men of the town; and sits three afternoons a week.

The Consul said that the Spanish claims are very numerous and difficult of investigation. The total number of the reclamations received is about 150, there being so many Spanish protégés claiming.

I asked Señor Bargiela what the object of appointing this Commission is, and whether the Spanish Government would make any advance to part indemnify Spanish subjects who had suffered losses. He replied that it was intended simply to look into the claims possibly in view of some future international inquiry, but the Spanish Government had made no monetary advance whatever.

I have heard it said that Spaniards are putting in most exaggerated claims, but that, in reality, they have not lost so very much.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[37723] No. 99.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 437. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 7, 1907.

THE French Minister, desirous of bringing about a solution in the matter of the captivity of Kaïd Maclean, has been discussing the question with the Vizier for Foreign Affairs at Rabat, and on the 5th instant I received from him a private letter stating that the Makhzen were prepared to consent to the following terms with regard to the ransom

to be paid to Raisuli. The Makhzen will pay a sum not exceeding 30,000*l.* on the liberation of Kaïd Maclean, on condition that Raisuli agrees to reside in a town where the Sultan still exercises authority. For this reason they had proposed Tangier, but would accept another town with the exception of Arzila, Tetuan, or Alcazar. The probable intrigues of Raisuli with the tribes would in those towns be too dangerous. If Raisuli does not wish to leave his mountain residence, the Makhzen decline to pay the ransom in a lump sum, in order not to increase his influence with the tribes, which might lead to further difficulties, and propose to pay the sum finally decided upon into a bank at Tangier, and this bank would either pay it to Raisuli in annual instalments until it was exhausted—say, over a period of twenty years—or pay him simply the interest of the money, at perhaps 5 per cent., for a period of fifteen to twenty years, after which he would receive the capital.

I took an early opportunity of seeing the Minister of War, who, as you are aware, is supposed to have full powers to arrange this matter, and I asked him whether he had received instructions to settle it on these lines. Cid Mohammed Guebbas replied that his instructions did not correspond with the above, and after some pressing I obtained from him, confidentially, a copy of the instructions he had received, which I inclose herewith. You will observe that these instructions are much more limited than those communicated to me by M. Regnault. Setting aside the question of the immediate payment of the whole sum agreed upon in the event of Raisuli consenting to live here as being outside the bounds of likelihood, the instructions merely authorize the Minister of War to agree to the monthly payment to Raisuli of the interest of the sum agreed upon, the capital remaining in the hands of the Makhzen. This in practice would mean that the Makhzen could seize the first occasion, with or without sufficient reason, to withdraw these monthly payments and decline all responsibility as regards the payment of the capital to Raisuli.

With regard to the question of the guarantee of security to be extended to those members of Raisuli's family not immediately related to him, the solution proposed by the Makhzen would seem to be a fair one, and should prove acceptable to Raisuli.

Cid Mohammed Guebbas, however, has received no instructions whatever as to the release of prisoners, or as to the return to Raisuli of the black wives taken from him.

Under these circumstances I have been unable to make any further definite proposals to Raisuli, and have invited Cid Mohammed Guebbas to obtain clearer and more precise instructions from his superiors.

I also caused a message to be sent to the French Minister by wireless telegraphy, informing him that the instructions received by the Minister of War were incomplete, and did not correspond with the contents of his letter to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Cid-ben-Sliman to Cid Guebbas.

(After compliments.) *20th Ramadan*, 1325 (*October* 28, 1907).

I RECEIVED your letters of the 17th and 18th instant (Ramadan, *i.e.*, 25th and 26th October), informing me of what has passed between you and the English Minister, firstly, regarding the reply of Raisuli in the case of Kaïd Maclean, and the modifications made in his demands; and what had passed, in the second instance, regarding the reply of Raisuli. I attentively studied all you state on this subject in the two letters, and informed His Shereefian Majesty thereof, who took note of it. The matter has been discussed with the French Minister, who stated that the British Minister had written to him on this case, and that he thought, with a view to obtaining the release of Kaïd Maclean, there is no harm in paying the compensation demanded by Raisuli after efforts are made to reduce the amount, on condition that he shall reside at Tangier and have nothing to do with the country. If he does not agree to reside in Tangier, an arrangement shall be made with him that a sum of money be paid to him monthly, as though it were the interest on the sum of money which will be agreed upon, and the amount of money agreed upon shall remain in the Makhzen's charge. It shall not be handed to him to strengthen himself with it. The protection will be given, in any case, to him and his family resident under his roof only, and there will be no harm in the British Minister

speaking about the distant relations of Raisuli as a favour (*i.e.*, extend good offices), but not as protégés. As regards his making his residence at Arzila, no one would consent to that.

The Minister (French?) has promised to write to the British Minister about this, and I inform you so that you may have knowledge thereof in your discussions with the British Minister on these lines.

[37726] No. 100.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 440.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 9, 1907.

A RESPECTABLE Moor, who has just arrived here from Oojdah, has given the following details of the position of affairs in that district to a native employé of this Legation. As it has a certain interest as showing the Moorish idea of the attitude of the French, I think the matter is worth reporting to you, although I have no means of verifying the statements made.

My informant states that considerable friction has occurred between the French authorities at Oojdah and the Beni Snassen tribe, as the French authorities informed that tribe that they would be held responsible for the capture and return of all soldiers deserting from the French forces, and should they fail to bring them in with their rifles and cartridges a fixed fine would be levied on the tribe. This fine was exacted and paid on various occasions, but at last payment was refused, whereupon a small force was sent out from Oojdah to punish a fraction of the Beni Snassen, but had to retire with a loss of one gun. This small success caused the whole tribe to unite and resist the French, and it was decided to send emissaries to the Government troops near Melilla to request them to join them, promising to send 160 mules to transport their impedimenta and recommending the cessation of hostilities against the Pretender, Bou Amara, to allow of united action against the French. Matters were at this stage when my informant passed through that country on his way from Oojdah to Melilla.

From his statements it would also seem that there is a certain amount of feeling which is rapidly growing on the part of the townspeople at Oojdah against the French authorities, who are suspected of getting up groundless charges against the better class of Moorish residents of speaking against the French, or disrespectfully of them, and producing false witnesses to prove those charges. The persons so charged are then confined in the Kasbah, not as prisoners, but are made to sweep up and do other menial work while so confined, and the idea is prevalent amongst all classes there that this is done merely to humiliate them, and is consequently very much resented.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[37727] No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 441.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 12, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Summary of Events in Morocco during the past week.

THE past week has done nothing to develop the situation between the two Sultans. Ramadan came to an end on the 8th instant, and it now remains to be seen whether the new month will bring a more rapid sequence of events. Reports from the interior are to the effect that there is much agitation among the tribes, and that all are anxious for a share in the coming struggle. Mogador is still the principal source of news. Mulai

Hafid's advanced army is now at Meskalla, about 25 miles from the town. It has been twice reinforced, bringing its total strength up to 1,500 men, and the men of five tribes are assembled under their own Kaïds to co-operate with it. They are said to have ten guns under the command of the Spanish renegade before referred to. It is doubted whether these have any serious value. Between this force and the town of Mogador is Kaïd Anfluz with his tribe, now said to number 5,000 men. The 400 regular troops previously reported to have left the town have joined him. His loyalty to Abd-el-Aziz is said by some to be now assured, and his objection to French influence to have been overcome. Against this Mr. Wilkinson mentions a report according to which Anfluz is supposed to have said that if Mulai Hafid would get rid of his Minister of Justice, who is an old enemy of Anfluz, he would be prepared to go over to him with his men, and, further, undertake to bring with him the town of Mogador, the new Governor, and the garrison. Mr. Hunot sends a similar report from Saffi. Mr. Hunot does not believe in the loyalty of Abd-el-Aziz' troops. Rumours from Saffi, however, are probably all on the side of Mulai Hafid. In the presence of the French ships Mogador is safe from attack. The town is walled and the surrounding plain commanded from the sea. The garrison has been again reinforced by the dispatch of 400 men from Tangier. This deficiency is to be made good from elsewhere, so as to maintain the Tangier garrison at 2,500 men.

Mr. Madden mentions a report that Bagdadi has advanced and is threatening Rashid and the Shouia tribes outside Casa Blanca. It had been intended to reinforce him from Rabat, but, the only available troops being required to line the way on the arrival of the Spanish Minister, their departure has been postponed. The Spanish Mission disembarked on the 3rd instant, having been five days off Rabat, unable to land.

The usual reports of Mulai Hafid's departure from Marakesh are current. His horses are said to have been sent into camp outside the town, a sign of an impending move. His destination is variously given as Fez, Mogador, and Rabat. There is a report that his financial difficulties have been relieved by a find of treasure in Marakesh to the amount of 20,000 Spanish doubloons (about 75,000*l.*). This rumour is supported by the assertion of couriers from Marakesh that Mulai Hafid's men are being paid in gold.

Mr. Madden reports that things appear to be quiet around Casa Blanca, and that the general impression is that there will be no more hostilities with the French. Any successful movement by Bagdadi will contribute to this probability. The French Consul claims to have induced the principal Shouia tribes to disperse, and they have now gone to plough their lands. Rashid, however, remains in the field, and continues to interrupt communication with the town. It is the impression of many people in Casa Blanca that the French will not secure a lasting state of peace until the tribesmen have been punished in their own homes. They are not at present conscious that they have suffered any severe defeat at the hands of the French.

Admiral Philibert spoke to Mr. Madden of the action of the Spanish cruiser "Carlos V," which appears to have caused some annoyance to the French. The "Carlos V," after saluting the French Admiral's flag, had proceeded to hoist the Moorish flag, and saluted it with twenty-one guns. The Admiral considered the cruiser's action unnecessary in the circumstances. The Moorish flag is not displayed at Casa Blanca, and, the saluting battery having been destroyed in the bombardment, the Governor was obliged to send off and excuse himself for not returning the salute.

(Initialled) C. R.

November 10, 1907.

[37736] No. 102.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 171. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, November* 13, 1907.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of your despatch No. 166, Confidential, of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit a copy, which I obtained from Señor Allendesalazar, of the Arrangement between the French and Spanish Governments regarding the suppression of the contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Moorish waters.

Both Señor Allendesalazar and the French Chargé d'Affaires have informed me that up to the present no details with respect to the matter have been arranged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Inclosure in No. 102.

Arrangement between France and Spain respecting Contraband in Moorish waters.

LES Représentants Diplomatiques de France et d'Espagne à Tanger solliciteront du Sultan le mandat exprès pour leurs Gouvernements d'exercer en son nom les droits des Articles 24 et 25, 80 et 91 de l'Acte d'Algésiras en vue de réprimer le contrebande de guerre sur les côtes et dans les eaux Marocaines. Cette délégation des pouvoirs du Sultan sera demandée pour une durée d'un an, renouvelable suivant les nécessités. Pour en faciliter l'application, on demandera au Sultan d'embarquer, sur les bâtiments de guerre qui seraient chargés de la surveillance, des agents de la Douane Chérifienne, qui prendront part à toute perquisition et rendront compte au Sultan. Afin de ménager les intérêts du commerce, les mesures de répression ne s'appliqueront pas aux navires de commerce faisant un service régulier; à cet effet chaque Légation à Tanger sera invitée à remettre la liste des navires de sa nationalité remplissant cette condition, au doyen du Corps Diplomatique, qui la communiquera aux Représentants des deux Puissances. Afin d'assurer l'application de ces mesures, chacune des deux Puissances désignera les bâtiments de sa marine qu'elle entend charger de la surveillance et de la répression de cette contrebande et demeurera libre d'apprécier elle-même les points où elle enverra ses navires. Les dispositions nécessaires seront prises de part et d'autre pour que la surveillance et la répression s'exercent dès que le Sultan aura accordé l'autorisation requise.

[37826] No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 16, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 114 of yesterday.

Message communicated to Makhzen through Minister of War.

Moorish Government insist on some guarantee that Raisuli will change his present mode of life, and their point is that there is only one way of obtaining this, *i.e.*, by limiting payment of ransom to annuities, and by confining him to places selected by them.

The fact of their giving him a free choice as to his place of residence together with a large sum of money would, in their opinion, form a constant danger to this country. Moreover, he would not mind losing our protection once he was again in a strong position.

[37883] No. 104.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Vienna, November* 11, 1907.

THE French Yellow Book on the Affairs of Morocco, published last week, forms the subject of a leading article of the semi-official "Fremdenblatt," of which I have the honour to inclose a précis translation. As you will perceive, the writer of the article expresses his admiration of the policy adopted by the French Government, and his appreciation of the straightforward and effective manner in which it was conducted. He also draws attention to the conciliatory rôle played by the Austrian Government before and after the Conference at Algeciras, for which both France and Germany have expressed their gratitude.

The "Neue Freie Presse" reviews the Yellow Book at length, and sums up by remarking that the information at the end in regard to Germany's attitude towards France is the most important. Herr von Tschirschky showed that he was ready to meet

France half-way, and never raised any objections to the measures which she proposed to take in Morocco. The French Government was careful to adhere strictly to the Algeciras Agreement, while the German Government, on the other hand, was always ready to admit the necessity for prompt action on the part of France. The services rendered by Austria at the Conference at Algeciras, which led to such satisfactory results, received due recognition from the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

Inclosure in No. 104.

Extract from the "Fremdenblatt" of November 9, 1907.

(Translation.)

THE rapid course of events which passed before our eyes—now in bright, now in sombre colours—necessitated presence of mind on the part of soldiers and dexterity on that of diplomatists, and if on glancing through the Yellow Book lately laid before the French Deputies one realizes with what sureness the strong has worked with the careful hand, it must be admitted that the web of the Morocco crisis placed on the parliamentary loom might easily have been irremediably torn. The Deputies can perceive that this important national question was intrusted to clear-sighted methodical statesmen, who understood how to obtain favourable results under the existing conditions. It was already a great success to have induced the Sultan Abdul Aziz to come to Rabat and to renew relations with the Representatives of the foreign Powers, and the next greatest was the furnishing of financial support to the needy potentate. Morocco is certainly not yet pacified, and much time will be required before the heavy task can be accomplished.

The Yellow Book also clearly indicates the causes to which the French success in Morocco must be ascribed—a simple cause, loyalty. The statesmen who were intrusted with the Morocco incident enjoyed the inestimable advantage of having their statements and assurances absolutely believed abroad. In order to realize the significance of this general confidence, one has only to mention the events previous to the Algeciras Conference, those serious perturbations and dissensions to the removal of which the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary so much contributed. In the Yellow Book that monarchy is shown to have continued her pacific and conciliatory rôle, for instance, when the formation of the Franco-Spanish police corps in the Moorish parts was notified; she recognized it to be a provisional and necessary measure, and therefore in no way contrary to the Algeciras Act. This is a proof of the correct and conscientious attitude adopted by the Austro-Hungarian Government, for which she earned the thanks of M. Pichon.

The appreciative criticism of Austria's attitude by the French statesmen forms the complement to the recognition of her services from the German side, which found expression in the Emperor William's telegram to Baron d'Aerenthal's predecessor. Another noteworthy feature of the Yellow Book is the portion which refers to the friendly spirit with which Herr von Tschirschky acknowledged all communications on the subject of Morocco from the French Representative at Berlin. The words of the former, "In these circumstances you will be able to judge the loyalty of our policy," contains the "leitmotiv" which animated the German statesmen in their dealings with France. The preservation of good relations between Germany and France was also largely due to the conduct of most of the French statesmen, whose chief merit lies in the fact that, while obtaining advantages for their country, they did not overstep the limits which regard for the general peace prescribed.

[37826] No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 18, 1907.

SIR H. MACLEAN. Your telegram No. 130 of the 16th instant.

Terms suggested by Moorish Government would certainly be preferable if there were any likelihood of Raisuli agreeing to them. It would appear, however, that there is no probability of this occurring, and insistence on them will only endanger the captive's health, and even life, by prolonging the negotiations.

We can scarcely believe that Raisuli could make himself permanently dangerous by the aid of only 18,000*l.* or 20,000*l.* He may be expected to consider it to his interest to remain quiet for a time in order to retain our protection, and it will not take long for the money to be spent. If he should later prove troublesome the position of the Moorish Government would at any rate be no worse than it was before Sir H. Maclean's capture. They have clearly no right to take advantage of the present situation for the purpose of concluding an arrangement more beneficial to themselves than any they could have made if Sir H. Maclean had never lost his liberty.

[38218] No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 655.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1907.

I TOLD M. Cambon on the 14th instant about my conversation with Herr von Schön on the subject of Morocco, and how well it had been received.

M. Cambon subsequently informed me that he had reported what I had said to M. Pichon, who had desired him to express his appreciation of what I had said.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[38824] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 443.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 13, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, in which he reports the withdrawal of the Spanish cavalry force from that town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid.

G. L.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 308.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, November* 10, 1907.

THE Spanish Consul informs me that the Spanish cavalry, consisting of slightly over 100 horse, are being at once withdrawn from Casa Blanca and sent back to Spain; they will not be replaced.

Three hundred infantry under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel have just arrived in the steam-ship "Ciudad de Cadiz" to relieve the Spanish infantry force already here, who number rather over this number.

Major Santa Olalla is, the Consul understands, to retain his place here as Chief of the Spanish police, but he will pay a visit to Tangier at once in order to discuss with the authorities the Budget and questions regarding the police force of Casa Blanca.

The Consul informed me that the cavalry, both officers and men, are glad to return to Spain, as they do not find much pleasure in service here. But the infantry, he said, regret leaving, as their military duties are much light here than in Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[38826] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 445.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 13, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 403 of the 8th ultimo respecting the German Claims Commission, appointed to assess the direct claims of German merchants resident at Casa Blanca, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting that the Commission in question has now concluded its sittings.

You will observe that, although the German Consul has no instructions as yet to refer to the Commission the claims of those who do not actually reside at Dar-al-Baida, but who have suffered losses owing to the recent disturbances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 108.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 307.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, November* 10, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 7th October last, the German Consul informs me that the Claims Commission specially appointed to examine the direct claims of German merchants actually resident in Dar-al-Baida has concluded its sittings, and the conclusions arrived at are to be forwarded at once to Berlin.

The Consul expected, therefore, that the amounts allotted to the claimants from the sum set apart for the purpose by the German Government would be paid in a few weeks' time.

Herr Luderitz has no instructions, up to the present, to refer to the Commission the claims of German merchants at home or on the Morocco coast who have interests in Casa Blanca and have suffered loss owing to the recent disturbances, but I understood from him that he would commence a preliminary investigation of them himself pending further orders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[38828] No. 109.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 447.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 14, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 429 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that owing to the rough weather the Spanish Minister and the members of his mission were not able to land at Rabat until the 5th instant.

The Mission were received by the Sultan in public audience on the 7th instant in the same place and with the same formalities as in the case of the French Mission. M. de Llaberia, when presenting his credentials, handed to the Sultan the insignia of the Grand Cordon of Charles III, and assured His Majesty of the friendship of Alfonso XIII and his Government, and of the interest they take in the Shereefian Empire. He alluded to the necessity of maintaining order throughout Morocco, and more especially in the neighbourhood of the Spanish possessions.

I beg to inclose herewith a cutting from the "Dépêche Marocaine,"* containing the text of M. de Llaberia's speech, to which the Sultan replied, expressing his thanks for the Order which had been conferred upon him, and for the good wishes which had been conveyed to him.

It has not yet been possible to land the horses and some of the other presents destined for His Majesty owing to the bad weather.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

[38831] No. 110.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 450.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 16, 1907.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 437, Confidential, of the 7th instant, to you, I have the honour to report that I have received a further private letter from the French Minister at Rabat, in which he informs me of a conversation with the Vizier for Foreign Affairs with regard to Raisuli's conditions for the release of Sir Harry Maclean.

Ben Sliman appears to have been profuse in his assurances of anxiety to settle the matter, and M. Regnault believes him to be sincere.

The Makhzen adhere to their proposal with regard to the disposal of the ransom, the annuity to be payable to Raisuli for a period of fifteen years—the capital sum being deposited in a bank and becoming Raisuli's property only at the expiration of that time. The return to him of his house at Tangier and the restoration of his black wives will present no difficulties. As regards his future place of residence, Ben Sliman said that they would be prepared to agree, though unwillingly, to Laraiche for that purpose, but it would necessitate placing a garrison there. It appears, however, that the Sultan is now unwilling to release the prisoners—said to number 51—as required by Raisuli. He represents them, with the exception of thirteen, as dangerous malefactors who will be ready under the leadership of Raisuli to make further captures of Europeans and create fresh disturbances in the Tangier district. Given the ransom he may receive for the Kaïd's release and the support of these men, he fears that Raisuli may become an important factor in the situation, and possibly give his support to Mulai Hafid. His Majesty fears that he will be free to act as he pleases under British protection, and in order to allay his anxiety Ben Sliman asks for an assurance that this shall only be accorded him during good behaviour.

M. Regnault is apparently acting as Adviser to the Makhzen in this matter, and I have had no direct communication from Ben Sliman or from Guebbas in the above sense, though it may be taken as representing the present view of the Makhzen. It is obvious that the protection accorded to Raisuli would be withdrawn in the event of serious misbehaviour on his part, and an assurance to that effect seems hardly to be necessary, but it is obvious that His Majesty's Government, and not the Makhzen, must be the judge of the misdemeanour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[38833] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 452.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 18, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events of the week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Summary of Events in Morocco for the past Week.

A WIRELESS telegram received by French ship on the 16th instant from Mogador announced that on the previous day the Sultan's troops, co-operating with Kaïd Anfluz, had repulsed with heavy loss an attack by Mulai Hafid's force under Baka. The report is not confirmed, but it is not improbable that the forces of the rival Sultans have been engaged. Mr. Wilkinson, writing on the 10th instant from Mogador, states that Baka was still encamped at Meskalla. Baka himself was reported to estimate his force at 14,000 foot and nearly 6,000 horse, probably a very exaggerated figure. As previously stated, a Spanish renegade is in command of his artillery, consisting of eight guns, and four more were on their way from Marakesh. Kaïd Anfluz, who had seemed till lately confident of his strength, had become nervous,

and had sent three requests for reinforcements in rapid succession. About 600 men and a gun had been sent him, bringing his force, apart from tribesmen, up to something over 1,000. There had been a rumour on the 7th instant that hostilities had begun, but the Governor had no confirmation of the news. Mr. Wilkinson says that the town is in a state of suspense. Public feeling is strongly on the side of Mulai Hafid, but the Governor is using a strong hand, and no expression of opinion is tolerated.

With regard to other districts, the situation round Casa Blanca is improving. The majority of the tribesmen are reported to have yielded to the persuasion of the French Consul and to have returned to their homes. Bagdadi is advancing, it may be presumed slowly, and another force from Rabat is following the sea-shore, and will co-operate to the south of him.

Reports are too scanty and conflicting to allow any estimate of Mulai Hafid's position in the south. Some of the southern Kaïds are stated to have deserted him and an important tribe in the Mazagan district is now divided in its allegiance There appears to be a disposition to think his cause somewhat on the decline. His continued delay to leave Marakesh is not favourable to his popularity, but he is probably restrained by the consideration that a forward movement may involve him in opposition with the French.

November 17, 1907.

[38932] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 25, 1907.

ONE thousand troops belonging to the reigning Sultan have reoccupied Mazagan.

The townspeople received them well. Three French men-of-war were lying off the town at the time.

[38951] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 455.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 20, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 450 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit a translation of a note I to-day received from Cid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman on the subject of the conditions demanded by Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Maclean.

You will observe that his Excellency does not positively say whether or not it will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to advance the sum decided upon, though it is to be presumed that it will be necessary.

Further, his Excellency does not agree to the payment of the whole sum decided upon on the condition that Raisuli should reside at Tangier or any other town in Morocco with the exception of Tetuan-el-Kasr and Arzila, as I had understood from the French Minister the Makhzen were prepared to do, but only contemplates that the sum should be paid to Raisuli in yearly instalments extending over fifteen years. I will endeavour to go into the matter of the prisoners with Cid Mohammed Guebbas and see how many can properly be released.

It will, I fear, not be an easy matter to obtain from Raisuli any acknowledgment of the authority of the Shereefian Makhzen as Ben Sliman suggests.

I will take the earliest opportunity of ascertaining whether Cid Mohammed Guebbas has received instructions corresponding to the above.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Cid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.

(Translation.)
After compliments. 8 *Showal*, 1325 (*November* 15, 1907).

I RECEIVED your letter referring to the case of Kaïd Maclean, and I note that your exalted Government has agreed to advance 30,000*l.* for the purpose of providing from that sum the amount which will have to be paid to obtain the release of the said Kaïd, and that the Makhzen must give a written undertaking to repay whatever sum is given (for that purpose). I took note of this and informed His Majesty of it, and he has instructed me to reply to you, firstly, conveying suitable thanks to the British Government for its so kindly facilitating the matter of the money, as I also thank your Excellency for your good efforts in that direction. Further, it is not hidden that the negotiations followed by the Makhzen with your Excellency in this affair and with the Makhzen Representative there have not been fruitless, as their object was to arrange a basis on which the conclusion of the matter, in such a way as would remove all causes of fear and alarm, give perfect security and tranquillize the minds of our subjects and foreigners, might be effected. The Makhzen is most anxious to obtain the release of Kaïd Maclean, as is shown by the measures it has taken, which are not hidden, and the large expenditure it incurred on the force sent in connection with his capture; still, in view of the responsibility of the Makhzen to safeguard Europeans and insure general security, it finds it difficult to accept proposals which would strengthen Raisuli, as it is not hidden what harm arose from conceding to him terms less (onerous) than these in the case of Harris and in that of Perdicaris, and it is not hidden that the liberation of all the prisoners whose release Raisuli demands will have the effect of strengthening the corrupt and further emboldening them to commit the most grave acts, as most of these prisoners are in prison for serious crimes, and to leave Raisuli in the mountains or elsewhere in the country would constitute a grave danger to the Makhzen, as it is not hidden, as tranquillity of mind will only be secured by his undertaking to reside in one of the towns in which the Makhzen authority is exercised, with the exception of Tetuan, Alcazar, and Arzila.

And because of the present condition of affairs and the state of unrest prevailing amongst the mountain tribes, it is necessary (indispensable) that the Makhzen shall place further forces in Alcazar and Laraiche as a measure of protection to foreigners and as a prevention of possible acts of the corrupt. This will cause considerable expense to the Makhzen, caused by Raisuli and his followers; but notwithstanding all this, the intentions of the Makhzen are fixed on taking all possible measures to settle this case and effect the release of Kaïd Maclean. In the first place, it appears to the Makhzen that the thirteen of the prisoners against whom there are no serious crimes should be released immediately an agreement is arrived at with Raisuli, and his female servants and house at Tangier be returned to him on the release of Kaïd Maclean, and in exchange for him, one against the other. Then as regards the remaining prisoners, those whose release you may clearly state will not be a danger will be released after the liberation of Kaïd Maclean from Raisuli's hands is effected, and after he shall have taken up his residence in the town he may select, always excepting the three towns above mentioned; and such prisoners as then remain will be released when possible gradually and later on. The sum of money decided upon as a settlement shall be placed in a Tangier bank on deposit, to be paid him in fifteen annual instalments whilst assuring Raisuli's residence in one of the towns in the manner stated, and not in the mountains nor in any district in the country near them, and his undertaking not to mix in the affairs of the tribes and his acknowledging the authority of the Shereefian Makhzen, and this shall be strengthened by a statement on the part of your Excellency to the effect that if Raisuli thereafter further interferes in the tribes, or returns to such acts as would harm the Government, your exalted Government will withdraw its protection from him and from all his interests. In fact, the desire of the Makhzen is to remove Raisuli from all those parts which are at present in a state of unrest, as it also wishes that he should not reside at Laraiche; still, if he persists in wishing to live there, the Makhzen would consent to this from its desire to effect the release of Kaïd Maclean. In all this there is the strongest proof of the desire of the Makhzen to bring the matter to a conclusion and close it; and, in short, His Majesty is sure that your Excellency desires only to strengthen His

Majesty's authority and to extinguish all traces of what is opposed to him and disorder, and to restore tranquillity to his subjects and foreigners, as is known to be the desire of your exalted Government.

(Signed) ABDELKRIM-BEN-SLIMAN.

[38951] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1907.

NEGOTIATIONS for the release of Sir H. Maclean.

The question as to where Raisuli shall reside, and the manner in which the ransom is to be paid, are we understand the only points likely to imperil the success of the negotiations.

Have the prisoners designated to be released been brought to Tangier? If not, we might insist upon their immediate removal there, as, if it is clear that their further detention is caused by Raisuli's attitude, the tribes may bring pressure to bear upon him.

If the representations we are making to the French Government prove abortive, do you think, if you went to Rabat, that you could induce the Sultan to accept the conditions we desire him to agree to?

[39228] No. 115.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 566.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 28, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 561 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two official communications published in the press this morning,* relative to further movements of Moroccan tribes on the Morocco-Algerian frontier. The first gives the substance of a telegram from the Governor-General of Algeria, reporting the advance of 2,000 Moorish horsemen who crossed the frontier and destroyed some gardens and strawricks. They then retired to Aghbat.

The other communication states that a telegram has been received from the Mayor of Nemours, an Algerian port near the Moroccan frontier, reporting the advance on that town of a strong column of Moors, and that troops have been dispatched to assist in its repulse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[39307] No. 116.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, November* 29, 1907.

YOUR telegram No. 116 of yesterday.

Negotiations have, I think, taken a more favourable turn.

Yesterday I sent to Rabat terms agreed to by Raisuli. They include a delay for three years in payment of two-thirds of ransom, Raisuli to receive interest meanwhile. This should afford sufficient guarantee for good behaviour. Yesterday, by "wireless" through French Minister in reply to "wireless" from me, Moorish Government agreed that all prisoners designated by me should be released, but Minister of War has not yet received instructions to bring them here, Sultan's orders being necessary. Most of the other conditions were also accepted, but message not clear as regards residence. Full report went to you by post this morning.

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* Not printed.

[38951] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1907.

NEGOTIATIONS for the release of Sir H. Maclean.

Your despatches Nos. 450 and 455 of the 16th and 20th November.

Unless you see some objection, we propose to ask the French Government to support us by instructions to their Minister at Rabat, explaining to them that, whilst we are grateful for the assistance rendered us by the French Minister, we consider that his position will be stronger if the Moorish Government know that he has received direct instructions from his Government.

[39450] No. 118.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November* 30, 1907.

SIR H. MACLEAN.

Your telegram No. 117 of the 29th instant.

I suggest that, as I hope to receive a favourable reply in writing from the Moorish Government at any moment, it would be better to postpone for the present the proposed application to the French Government for support.

[39518] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 456.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 22, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 455 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that I had a long interview yesterday with Cid Mohammed Guebbas, and discussed at length with him Ben Sliman's note which formed the inclosure to my above-mentioned despatch. In spite of the statement conveyed to me by the French Minister, to the effect that fresh instructions had been sent to Guebbas, that official informed me that he has received none. I explained to him at length the various points which I have made in the note which I am to-day addressing to Ben Sliman, and of which I inclose herewith a copy. With regard to the question of the prisoners, Guebbas agreed, somewhat reluctantly, to furnish me with a list of the prisoners, together with the offences for which they were imprisoned, as far as he was able to ascertain them; but he declared that no proper register was kept, and he begged that I should if possible ascertain their crimes, which I agreed to do. I may be able to assist in the matter, and in any case, if they are unknown, it may be presumed that they are not very serious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Ben Sliman.

(After compliments.) *November* 22, 1907.

I HAVE duly received your Excellency's note dated the 15th instant, on the subject of the conditions demanded by Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Maclean, and I now beg your Excellency to allow me to offer some remarks on that note.

Your Excellency in the early part of the note refers to the offer of His Majesty's Government to advance to the Makhzen a sum not exceeding 30,000*l.* for the ransom demanded by Raisuli, but your Excellency does not state whether the Makhzen is desirous or not of accepting the offer. Nor do you refer to the conditions laid down by me on the instructions of my Government in my note of the 20th October. I venture to remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, in advancing the sum decided upon, require that the Makhzen should give its formal consent to the amount to be

paid, and also give a formal acknowledgment for the sum paid, and that it should engage to repay it as soon as funds are available.

Your Excellency recently informed Cid Mohammed Guebbas that the Makhzen had been in communication with the French Minister on the subject. One of the results of these conversations I understood to be that the Makhzen consented to grant to Raisuli the entire sum agreed upon, on the condition that he undertook to reside in Tangier, or in any place other than the towns of Alcazar, Tetuan, and Arzila, or, as was proposed by Cid Mohammed Guebbas, that he should leave the country for a time; but that if Raisuli selected his own residence, the sum decided upon should only be paid to him in yearly instalments, extending over fifteen years.

Judging by the terms of your Excellency's note, this proposal appears to have been lost sight of, and another proposal has been substituted, namely, that in any case the sum agreed upon should only be paid to Raisuli in instalments, and on condition of his living in some town where Makhzen authority is exercised.

But your Excellency is ere now in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on this point, as I communicated them to Cid Mohammed Guebbas, namely, that they cannot tolerate that the negotiations for the release of Kaïd Maclean should fail on the question of the residence of Raisuli, nor do they consider that it can be insisted upon that he should reside in Tangier where he would not feel safe, and that they did not consider that the possession of a sum not exceeding 30,000*l.* would enable Raisuli to become a permanent danger, and also that, enjoying British protection, he would not be likely to become troublesome.

I note with satisfaction that the Makhzen is prepared to agree to the liberation of thirteen of the prisoners at once on an arrangement being come to with Raisuli, but your Excellency states that those of the others who I may declare will not be a danger will be released after the liberation of Kaïd Maclean, and after Raisuli shall have taken up his residence in the town he may select. I will lose no time in going into this matter with Cid Mohammed Guebbas, and decide which prisoners can properly be released without grave danger to the State, but your Excellency must clearly understand that the prisoners will be exchanged at the moment of the liberation of Kaïd Maclean, as is the custom in these unfortunate cases, and not after the liberation of Kaïd Maclean has been effected. I note also that the Makhzen agree to the return to Raisuli of his female servants and of his house in Tangier. With regard to the former I trust orders have already been given that they may be sent here from Fez, or, if not, that these may be sent without delay.

It is understood that if after the termination of this case Raisuli is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, guilty of acts harmful to the Moorish Government, His Majesty's Government will no longer insist on the guarantee for his safety which the Makhzen has given to His Majesty's Government.

In conclusion, I would desire, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to observe that they do not consider that the Moorish Government is justified in taking advantage of the unfortunate position in which Kaïd Maclean finds himself to obtain from Raisuli terms which are more favourable to the Makhzen than those which they were prepared to grant in June, when Kaïd Maclean was intrusted with his mission.

[39519] No. 120.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 457.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 22, 1907.*

IN his despatch No. 533 of the 6th instant Sir F. Bertie communicated to you a statement made by M. Louis regarding the negotiations in which M. Regnault had been engaged at Rabat. From information which has reached me it appears that several other subjects have engaged the French Minister's attention with the Makhzen.

It is intended to endeavour to reorganize, in all the ports of Morocco, the lighter service, which is very defective, and place it under the control of one of the French experts who are attached to the custom-house.

M. Guiot has been specially sent out from Paris to prepare a report on the subject and draw up the necessary regulations.

The lighter service is at present a Government monopoly.

The question of the exercise by French and Spanish ships of a certain control in order to check the contraband introduction of arms and ammunition has also been

discussed, but as it is considered that any permanent control by those Powers would be too costly, M. Regnault has, I understand, suggested that one of the Moorish vessels should be supplied with some light armament sufficient for the object, and that a French employé of the Debt should be installed on board the vessel. It has also been proposed that the Moorish Government should purchase some obsolete man-of-war for this purpose.

Another matter which has been put forward by the French Minister concerns the "Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie." Thanks to His Majesty the Sultan having neglected for three years to make the payment of the contribution which he undertook to give that institution, its financial condition has been reduced to one of penury, with the result that nothing can be done towards the repair and maintenance of drains, streets, &c. M. Regnault is endeavouring either to obtain a payment of the amount owing to the Commission or to persuade the Sultan to order that certain taxes should in future be earmarked for the Commission.

Some conversation with His Majesty has, I understand, also taken place with regard to a loan for the payment of the liabilities of this country. For this purpose 80,000,000 fr. at least would be required. France is, I believe, ready to give this loan with a State guarantee of 3 per cent., but in view of the possible opposition of Germany there seems to be some hesitation, and should the latter demand an international guarantee for the loan 5 per cent. would be required.

The security for such a loan would be the 40 per cent. of the customs not required for the service of the French Loan of 1904, all the lands belonging to the Makhzen in the ports, the proposed tobacco, kief, and snuff monopolies, some of the gate and market taxes, and any sum that might be saved on the lighterage service, which it is proposed to reorganize.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[39520] No. 121.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 458.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 25, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, reporting on the state of that town since its occupation by the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 314.)

Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, November 18, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to report that many of the shops in town ruined during the bombardment and damaged houses are being repaired or rebuilt by their owners. Some shops have already been reopened, principally by French and Spanish tenants; they are mostly wine-bars, cafés, provision stores, hairdressers' shops, and depôts of cheap European articles. Though slightly improved, perhaps, the shops are being rebuilt on the same sites and in much the same style as before. The French are encouraging people to rebuild, in order, no doubt, to efface the traces of the bombardment.

Outside the town, too, cheap French restaurants are doing a good trade with the soldiers.

I may, perhaps, state here that, as far as I am aware, all town properties in British hands previous to the siege have been fully safeguarded, and are in their owners' hands to-day.

The French are gradually effecting improvements in the public thoroughfares; a number of good roads are being made, and the remains of the huts in the town are being razed. My French colleague told me recently that the hut quarter would in future be located in the new inclosure.

A public garden, intersected with walks, is being made by the French in the inclosure called "Tenakker," near the new town wall. The trees already planted there seem rather sickly at present, due, I am told, to the salt in the soil; but no doubt with time this difficulty will be overcome. "Tenakker" was formerly an open space used for drying skins and for strangers to camp in within the walls.

The inside approach to the principal gate has been widened by the demolition of a burnt building near by, and also at the new gate near Sidi Billiott an inner archway has been completely removed, thus facilitating locomotion.

Some of the streets have French names painted up, such as "Rue du Commandant Provost," "Rue Farfadet," "Rue du Kadi," "Rue des Fantômes," "Place Nelson"—near the British Consulate—but I am unaware if these names are to be permanent.

One of the Makhzen inclosures is marked "Direction du Port," and the French sailors employed at the waterport for semaphore and other duties bear the words "Port de Casa Blanca" on their caps. This inclosure was formerly the old Askri Barracks, and a French flag now flies over the entrance, as at the Dar Makhzen.

Outside the town in the old market-place a dry-stone walled inclosure has been established for driving in cattle and sheep, and an abattoir shed has been erected on the site of the usual slaughtering place. A market inclosure has also been made with paths in it just outside the main entrance of the town. Unfortunately this "soko" is generally empty, as so few Arabs are coming in from the country.

In fact, in this connection, a French merchant assures me that for a radius of 30 kilom. no ploughing is being done, which, he considers, will mean disaster for Casa Blanca next year. This will be especially hard on traders, since the recent troubles have interrupted one of the best grain years within memory, with prices ruling firm abroad.

Many large wooden huts, with sloping corrugated iron roofs, are being erected for the troops in the French camps; the floors of all these buildings have been raised several feet above the ground for better sanitation.

The port works Manager informs me that the wooden railway viaduct built across the waterport creek has been so severely damaged by the recent heavy seas that it must be taken down; the railway will be carried instead on a stone foundation close up to the town walls, where it will be less exposed to sea damage. I am told that all the surveys and plans for the works have been lost in the recent disturbances. The French port works train runs daily to the quarries, but a strong picket is kept there for its protection.

Beyond the French military lines complete insecurity still exists, and the sentries stop Europeans at the outposts. There is no improvement to report in this respect since the bombardment, now more than three months ago. Indeed, it is thought that it may be two or three years before Europeans living in Casa Blanca will be able to go into the country as they did before the recent events.

There seem to be comparatively few Moors in town, while there are many newly arrived Europeans to be seen in the streets, French principally, Spaniards, and others. This influx of foreigners has enormously enhanced the rents of all properties in town, and the demand for houses to live in is very great. New hotels also have been opened.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[39521] No. 122.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 459.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 24, 1907.

A CHANGE is about to take place in the post of Sultan's Commissioner here. Sid Mohammed Guebbas, until now Minister of War, has been appointed to assist Sid Mohammed Torres in consequence of the increased work and responsibility of the latter's office. This manner of appointing Sid Mohammed Guebbas to the post of Commissioner offers to Torres the means of a dignified retreat after having occupied the post for twenty-five years, and he will now retire to live in Tetuan entirely free from all accusations of venality.

Sid Guebbas has not the fanatical sentiments of his predecessor, and though not marked by any special ability, he is not as obstructive as most Moorish officials, and, while wanting in character and firmness, is disposed to be conciliatory. He was for

some time at Woolwich, but has retained but very few words of the English language. Later he represented the Sultan for the conclusion of the frontier arrangements with France, and is always regarded as very amenable to French influence, and is even, in the event of his falling into disfavour with his Sovereign, said to be able to rely on French protection.

Only a temporary appointment has been made for the Ministry of War, and it is anticipated that other changes may be imminent among the Viziers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[39522] No. 123.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 460.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 25, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on information received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure No. 123.

Summary of News received during past Week.

THE rumour reported last week of the defeat of Mulai Hafid's force outside Mogador has been briefly confirmed. His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca is informed that the tribesmen, under Kaïd Anflus, supported by the regular troops, attacked Baka's force on the night of the 14th instant, and put it to flight with a loss of fifty killed and many prisoners. A quantity of arms and ammunition and some horses and mules were captured. The victor's loss was stated to be five killed and three wounded. No report on the subject has been received from Mogador, there having been no communication between that place and Tangier during the past week.

Mr. Madden states that there have been some further desertions from Mulai Hafid's cause among the Showia tribes. The Emdakra and Oulad Hariz have left Ben Rashid and joined Bagdadi's camp. The French Consul at Casa Blanca attributes this change of feeling to his persuasions. Ben Rashid is still at Sidi Aissa, a day's march from Bagdadi, but no fighting appears to have taken place between them. Rashid's men continue to be a cause of unrest round Casa Blanca and prevent native traders and caravans from entering the town. It is thought he will not be able to remain where he is much longer in the presence of the Sultan's forces coming from Rabat.

Consul MacLeod, who is in Tangier, received a letter from a native correspondent in Fez saying that there has recently been much lawlessness round the city and that travellers had been arriving stripped of their clothes and baggage. Communication with Tangier and Laraiche has been interrupted for fifteen days owing to the disturbed state of the country as a result of inter-tribal fighting. The tribes in question were reported to have now made a truce of four months. This information was confirmed from a French source at Laraiche. Mr. MacLeod's correspondent said that a seditious placard had been affixed to a Government building in Fez stating that the Government of Morocco was now French. The use of anonymous placards is a new element in Moorish political agitation.

In the absence of communication with the southern ports and Marakesh, there is no news of the state of Mulai Hafid's cause in the south.

A further force of 500 men left Tangier on the 23rd instant. It is believed they will be disembarked at Mazagan.

November 24, 1907.

[39470] No. 124.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 522. Confidential.)
Berlin, November 29, 1907.

Sir,

THE despatch addressed by M. Pichon on the 11th ultimo to various Representatives of the French Republic respecting the formation of an International Commission to assess the indemnities to be paid by the Moroccan Government for losses suffered by Europeans at Casa Blanca, and which is reproduced in the French recent Yellow Book on Morocco, was communicated to the German Government by the French Ambassador. A similar communication appears to have been also made by the Spanish Ambassador at the same time.

In the course of conversation the other day, M. Cambon told me that the German Government, though they had at first accepted the French proposals in principle, had subsequently laid down such conditions with regard to the acceptance of the views of a German Commission, which had been inquiring into German claims, that further discussion of the matter had for the moment been rendered impossible. A more conciliatory interpretation seems to have been given to their reply since Herr von Schoen returned from England, and M. Cambon left for Paris last Sunday in order, I understand, to see if a basis of agreement could be found.

The Spanish Ambassador left here a few days ago; up to the time of his departure no reply at all had, I believe, been returned to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

[39657] No. 125.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, December 2, 1907.*

SIR H. MACLEAN.

Raisuli will, I am sure, insist that protection, which it is contemplated shall be given to him and his family, shall be such in full sense of the word, and not limited as explained in your telegram No. 66. Moorish Government will apparently raise no objection (see inclosure in my despatch No. 437 of 7th November). We shall avoid future difficulties by granting it, and being thus under British jurisdiction he would be more under our control.

[39681] No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 135.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 2, 1907.*

NEGOTIATIONS for the release of Sir H. Maclean.

I have just received a satisfactory note from the Moorish Government. They appear prepared to agree to all our demands. No engagement to return the money to be advanced is expressed, but the note implies that a Shereefian Firman on the subject will follow.

[39685] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 2, 1907.*

SIR H. MACLEAN.

My immediately preceding telegram of to-day's date.

I have received a Firman in satisfactory terms.

[39657] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December 2, 1907.*

NEGOTIATIONS for the release of Sir H. Maclean. Your telegram No. 134 of the 2nd instant.

You are authorized to grant Raisuli protection as the word is understood in Morocco (see my telegram No. 67 of the 14th August) if he refuses to agree to limited protection of nature explained in my telegram No. 66 of the 13th August, or if you consider former course preferable.

[38831] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 205.)
Foreign Office, December 2, 1907.

Sir,

I OBSERVE from your despatch No. 450 of the 16th ultimo that the Moorish Government do not yet appear clearly to understand the nature of the protection which His Majesty's Government propose to grant to Raisuli and his family.

The protection in question, as explained in my telegram No. 66 of the 13th August last, is intended to take the form of an undertaking to be given to His Majesty's Government by the Moorish Government that Raisuli and his family shall not be molested during good behaviour. The duty of deciding in what circumstances Raisuli shall forfeit this privilege will appertain obviously to His Majesty's Government.

You should take an opportunity of making this quite clear to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs should you consider it advisable to do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[39820] No. 130.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 461.)
Tangier, November 25, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador respecting the engagement which is reported to have taken place in the vicinity of that town between the forces of the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz and those of Mulai Hafid.

Mr. Wilkinson incloses in his despatch a translation of a letter received by him from Mulai Hafid's Vizier Aissa-ben-Omar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

Vice-Consul Wilkinson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 67.)
Mogador, November 18, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on the 16th instant news that fighting had taken place between Abd-el-Aziz' troops and the mehalla under Baka reached here. The first reports, and indeed the subsequent ones, are so conflicting that it is difficult, if not impossible, to report with accuracy on the result of the fight. Whilst Mulai Hafid's partisans declare that the "great battle" amounted simply to a raid on some isolated "douars," and that the result was some cattle-lifting on both sides, Anfluz' supporters insist that he has dealt a severe blow to his opponents. I applied to the French Consul, and he was good enough to let me have the following information, which is the gist of his own report to the French Minister, and which, I understand, he obtained from the Algerian Lieutenant, who followed the troops

dispatched from the north, and is now acting as Paymaster to the Sultan's troops in this district :—

A force under Kaïds Baka and Kourimi, consisting of 700 horsemen and 900 infantry, advanced on the 15th instant and camped at a place 8 kilom. distant from Anfluz' camp. The latter, who knew beforehand that this move was contemplated, dispatched during the night 250 soldiers, who, on coming to close quarters, opened a brisk fire on the enemy. A panic ensued in Baka's camp, which was followed by a general stampede, during which Anfluz' men inflicted severe losses to the mehalla, and carried away a fair amount of loot. The losses on Baka's side are 67 killed and 37 wounded, and the casualties on Anfluz' side amount to 7 killed, 6 wounded, and 2 prisoners; 200 rifles of all models, horses, camels, mules, &c., fell into the hands of Anfluz, and it is also said that Baka's horse was killed under him while he was flying in his night-dress. The day after the fight seven camel-loads of ammunition were sent from here to Anfluz, and my French colleague tells me that he is strong enough to hold on for the present.

This morning a special courier came from Marakesh to the firm of W. Marx and Co., and brought an identical letter from Si Aissa-ben-Omar to the Consuls at Mogador. I have caused a literal translation to be made of the one addressed to me, and I have the honour to transmit it herewith, together with the original in Arabic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. WILKINSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

Aissa-ben-Omar to Vice-Consul Wilkinson.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

THE army which our master (God bless him!) sent to the neighbourhood of Mogador was to punish those people who are against him, and the foreign nations who live in Mogador will be quite safe from what is going to happen to those people.

We inform you of this by order of the Shereef, to remind you of what has been said previously, in case your Minister in Tangier hears of the army being made stronger or of our master leaving Marakesh and thinks something is going to happen. This will only mean to establish rule and improve the country.

(Signed) AISSA-BEN-OMAR.

[39821] No. 131.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 462.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 28, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 455 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that Cid Mohammed Guebbas duly received instructions framed in the sense of Ben Sliman's letter to me of the 15th instant, and declared that the Makhzen adhered to the conditions of a residence for Raisuli in a town other than those indicated. This is a point on which I fear it will be impossible to move Raisuli, but I have obtained from him adherence to a fresh proposal which, in my opinion, should offer sufficient guarantees for the Moorish Government. It is suggested that he should receive a sum of 5,000*l.* down, and that 15,000*l.* should be deposited in a bank in Tangier and the interest on the money be paid to him monthly for a term of three years, after which he should receive the capital. He requires a large sum of money down to satisfy his tribal confederates and pay debts he has recently incurred. It would be understood, as he will enjoy a certain measure of British protection, that if he misbehaves he will forfeit the monthly payments and the capital. He asks for 60*l.* a-month, but I can only obtain 50*l.* a-month interest for the money.

He also undertakes to make himself responsible for the good behaviour of the prisoners who shall be released. The fact that the capital would be in the bank to the order of this Legation should also furnish a guarantee for Raisuli to carry out this promise.

Conceiving that these proposals offered the best guarantee I was likely to obtain from Raisuli, I proposed them to Cid Mohammed Guebbas in the form in which I

considered they should be eventually signed by myself and Raisuli, and copy of which I inclose herewith.

Guebbas went very carefully through them with me, and appeared satisfied that the Makhzen would accept them, but declared that he was utterly unable to agree to them without direct instructions from the Court, and could not even have the prisoners brought here to avoid further delay.

Unfortunately, communications with Rabat are very difficult, and these proposals only go to-day. To prepare the Makhzen, however, for this new suggestion, I requested the French Chargé d'Affaires to send a wireless message giving the substance of Condition 2, but he tells me that he did not in the message make any mention of the amount to be granted.

The reply which I received yesterday by wireless is satisfactory to a certain extent. I inclose it herein. Although the message does not say so, I think the Makhzen desire to adhere to the condition that Raisuli should reside in a town, a condition to which he will not agree.

I trust, however, that when the Makhzen receive in writing the proposals to which Raisuli has agreed that they may consider them acceptable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 131.

Conditions for Release of Kaïd Maclean.

THE Makhzen undertake, through a promise given to the British Government, that Raisuli and his two wives, four children, and twelve members of his family living under his roof, for whom he makes himself responsible, shall not be interfered with in their affairs, and the British Government undertake to see that this protection is accorded to these persons.

2. Raisuli will receive 5,000*l.* down on the day of the release of Kaïd Maclean; 15,000*l.* will be deposited in a bank in Tangier in the name of the British Legation for a term of three years. At the end of this period, if Raisuli has kept his word and done nothing to forfeit it, this sum shall be given to him. During the three years a sum of 50*l.* [?] shall be paid to him monthly, which is the profit accruing from that sum.

3. His female servants at Fez shall be returned on the release of Kaïd Maclean.

4. His house at Tangier shall be returned to him.

5. The prisoners on the list furnished by him shall be released. Raisuli holds himself responsible for their good behaviour.

6. The British Legation will afford Raisuli their good offices in prosecuting all legitimate claims he may have against private individuals.

Inclosure 2 in No. 131.

Message received from Rabat, for communication to Sir G. Lowther, November 27, 1907.

A LA suite d'instantes démarches, Makhzen écrit à Ministre d'Angleterre pour accepter négociations avec Raisuli sur les bases suivantes :—

Paiement d'une rançon de 30,000*l.*; Ministre d'Angleterre désignera prisonniers à livrer et conditions dans lesquelles s'effectuera. Raisuli choisira sa résidence sauf Tétouan, Arzila, et El Kasr. Ce choix devra être approuvé par le Ministre d'Angleterre. Restitution de négresses et de la maison de Tanger, retrait de la protection Anglaise à Raisuli et à sa famille en cas mauvaise conduite de Raisuli. Prière faire connaître résidence choisie par Raisuli pour que ordres soient donnés de ne pas l'inquiéter; faire connaître également les noms des prisonniers pour que des ordres soient donnés dans les différentes villes de les mettre en liberté. Il est entendu que Raisuli sera responsable des prisonniers libérés et que les trois quarts de la rançon lui seront payés dans trois ans. Dans une seconde lettre Ministre d'Angleterre est prié de demander au Gouvernement Anglais de prêter les 30,000*l.*

Communiquer ce qui précède au Ministre d'Angleterre.

[40054] No. 132.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 6, 1907.*

IT has been announced by the French Minister that the first day vessels can pass the bar he will return from Rabat.

It would appear that he has been unsuccessful in securing an undertaking that in the event of France granting a loan financial control will be permitted over its application.

[40126] No. 133.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 464.)
Sir, *Tangier, December 2, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 133.

Summary of News respecting Morocco during the past Week.

THE past week has been eventful but without materially altering the situation. Mr. Wilkinson's despatch of the 18th November (sent separately) gave some details of the attack by Kaïd Anfluz on Baka's force near Mogador, which was briefly reported in last week's summary. Mr. Wilkinson appears to have been right in his opinion that it would be safer not to accept as accurate the accounts received; subsequent reports show that Anfluz' victory was far from decisive. On the 28th Mr. Wilkinson reported by telegraph from Teneriffe that Baka had taken the offensive, and that fighting had extended over two days and was still in progress. Artillery was being employed on both sides. No particulars were obtainable, but according to the French Consul's information the advantage was with Anfluz.

The Makhzen have shown unexpected activity in the occupation of Mazagan, which was effected on the 24th November. Over 1,000 men conveyed from Tangier in two steamers chartered for the purpose were landed without opposition, and Abd-el-Aziz was re-proclaimed Sultan. The British Vice-Consul had been previously officially notified by the French Consul that troops were expected that day with a new Governor, and that if any resistance were offered, a force would be landed from two French cruisers present to protect Europeans. Mr. Spinney when he wrote considered it too soon to judge what effect the event would have on the surrounding tribes. Mazagan had been in the jurisdiction of Mulai Hafid since August last.

Whatever Sultan Abd-el-Aziz may have gained by successes at Mogador and Mazagan has been more than discounted by the defeat of Bagdadi's force which was advancing from Rabat against Mulai Hafid's men and the tribes in the Shouia district. The force had reached a point about half-way between Rabat and Casa Blanca, a few miles from the sea, when they were attacked and obliged to retire to within a day's march of Rabat. The British Vice-Consul at Rabat had lately reported the despatch of every available man, including the Sultan's personal bodyguard, to join Bagdadi, and the three mehallas which had at various times left Rabat had joined forces prior to the attack, so that the defeat affects the entire force. It should have numbered about 5,000 men. The defeat is attributed, probably with truth, to the treachery and desertion usual in Moorish warfare. There is no positive ground for ascribing the success to Mulai Hafid, as it is not unlikely that the attack was made by tribes for reasons quite independent of his cause; but any blow to the prestige of Abd-el-Aziz must be counted a substantial gain to his rival.

With regard to the situation in Marakesh, Mr. Wilkinson had heard through private letters that there was a lull for the moment but that a strong force was being organized and would leave shortly for the Mogador district. The news from Fez was

said to be satisfactory for Mulai Hafid; his cause was making progress and the majority were ready to accept his proclamation.

A wireless telegram received to-day by French ship reported that Mulai Hafid had left Marakesh. He is believed by the inhabitants of Mogador, Mazagan, and Saffi respectively, to be marching on their town, and all are asking for reinforcements. With the exception of a small garrison in Tangier, the regular troops of the Makhzen are now all actively employed.

Reports of fighting between the French and native tribes on the Algerian frontier have been received during the week. The district in question is one in which the Makhzen do not pretend to exercise control, and with which there is no regular communication. News of the fighting in question is received in Tangier through Paris or Algiers.

December 1, 1907.

[40245] No. 134.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, December 8, 1907.*

CASA BLANCA indemnities.

I have been informed "à titre personnel" and confidentially by the French Ambassador that he and his Spanish colleague made a verbal communication yesterday to Herr von Schön to the following effect:—

In view of the fact that the two Governments considered that the work of the German Commission "offered considerable guarantees," they were ready to propose to take this work into serious consideration, provided that they found that it was in harmony with the object at which the two Governments were aiming.

The two Ambassadors therefore asked the German Government to inform them by what rules the German Commission had been guided.

[40377] No. 135.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 465.)
Sir, *Tangier, December 2, 1907.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 462 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit translation of a note that I have to-day received from Cid Abd-el-Krim-ben-Sliman in reply to my representations on the subject of the conditions demanded by Raisuli for the release of Kaïd Maclean.

The Makhzen agree in principle to all the demands made.

You will observe that his Excellency states that the Shereefian Firman about the money will be sent to me, and is in conformity with the indications given by me, but this Firman has not yet reached me.

All the other demands are complied with, though the responsibility is thrown upon me of selecting the prisoners who are to be released. As regards this point I am endeavouring to persuade Raisuli to consent to liberate Kaïd Maclean on the condition that the greater portion of the prisoners shall be set free at once, with a promise that the greater offenders shall be set free at a later date, and the guarantee which Raisuli is prepared to give for their good behaviour should be an inducement to the Makhzen to agree to the liberation of all.

In order to profit by an opportunity which offers to send immediately to Rabat, I have replied to Ben Sliman with great brevity, merely calling his attention to the fact that the Firman regarding the money has not reached me, and requesting him to obtain from His Majesty the Sultan orders for the immediate dispatch to Tangier of all the prisoners that are not here.

A copy of this note is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 135.

Cid Abd-el-Krim-ben-Sliman to Sir G. Lowther.

(After compliments.) 20 *Showal*, 1325 (*November* 27, 1907).

I HAVE previously replied to you informing you of the solicitude of His Shereefian Majesty to effect the release of Kaïd Maclean, and that he has supported the heavy burdens of the demands of Raisuli to that end, after having exposed to you the harm that will result to the Makhzen from his demands, and that His Majesty thanked your exalted Government and your Excellency for the facilitation of which you sent information with regard to the money, agreeing to hand over Raisuli's black women to him, to free his house at Tangier, to release those prisoners whose crimes are not proved, and to leave to you the decision regarding the other prisoners whose release you state clearly will not cause harm, and that the money asked for shall be paid to him in instalments over fifteen years, it being placed on deposit at a bank, and that Raisuli shall reside in one of the towns with the exception of Tetuan, Alcazar, and Arzila, and his acknowledging the authority of the Makhzen, and his not meddling with the tribes, &c.

His Majesty was still considering the means of bringing this matter to a conclusion, and obtain the release of Kaïd Maclean with all speed and by what means are possible, when our friend the Minister, M. Regnault, informed me of the telegram he had received from your Excellency, stating that Raisuli had agreed that the money asked for should be paid to him, one-quarter of the sum in cash and three-quarters in three years, and had undertaken to be guarantee for the prisoners who would be released, so that the responsibility for any offences they may commit will fall on him. The contents of this telegram were of great assistance in this affair, and I informed His Shereefian Majesty of it.

His Majesty has instructed me to send your Excellency this letter, with his thanks, in the first place, for the attention and care given by you to this matter, and the Shereefian Dabir ("Firman") about the money will reach you in conformity with indications given by you, and His Shereefian Majesty has issued orders to have the black women brought from Fez and delivered to him at Tangier, as he has also issued instructions to free his house at Tangier, and that the house and black women are to be delivered to him in the manner you will decide upon. As regards the prisoners, my master has left the manner of their release, either all of them or a portion, to your decision, and I await your notification of those you suggest are to be released so that order may be issued to give effect thereto. As also His Majesty agrees to Raisuli residing in the place he wishes of those (places), you will agree to excepting Tetuan, Alcazar, and Arzila. Still it is not hidden what will result from the strengthening of Raisuli with money and men, and the danger to foreigners and others that is to be feared from him. However, the Makhzen has consented to all the foregoing in order to obtain the release of Kaïd Maclean, and to carry out your request.

It is understood that if Raisuli does not behave well in the future, and does not mind his own business, it will be necessary to withdraw from him British protection immediately there appear signs of his not being of good conduct.

Inclosure 2 in No. 135.

Sir G. Lowther to Cid Abd-el-Krim-ben-Sliman.

(After compliments.) *December* 2, 1907.

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the conditions to be arranged for the release of Kaïd Maclean.

I note with satisfaction that the Makhzen agrees to all the conditions.

The Shereefian Dabir regarding the money has, however, not yet reached me.

The matter of the prisoners has occupied my serious attention, and your Excellency may rest assured that no effort will be spared to safeguard the interests of the Makhzen in the matter. But a clause will be inserted into the Agreement with Raisuli that he is responsible for their good behaviour, and the fact that the money will be in the hands of the British Legation will furnish a guarantee.

It is consequently absolutely necessary that all the prisoners without exception be sent to Tangier without further delay, and I trust that His Majesty's orders to this effect may be given, and that definite instructions may be sent to Cid Mohammed Guebbas to free those whom I may indicate to him.

[40378] No. 136.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 466.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 3, 1907.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 112 of the 19th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a Shereefian Firman, recognizing the obligation of the Moorish Government in respect of the sum to be advanced by His Majesty's Government for the ransom of Sir H. Maclean.

I am not yet in a position to say the exact amount which will be required for the purpose, but it will, in any case, fall short of the sum mentioned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 136.

Shereefian Firman.

Praise to God alone.

Seal of Abd-el-Aziz ben Hassan.

(Translation.)

BE it known from this our letter, may God exalt it and cause its command to be respected, that we have authorized the intelligent Gerard Lowther, Minister of the respected British Government at Tangier, to obtain from his exalted Government a loan of 30,000*l.* as an obligation on the Shereefian Makhzen for the purpose of paying it through him on account of obtaining the release of the Englishman Maclean from the hands of Raisuli, until such time as the Makhzen shall have the money from which to repay that sum. Peace.

20 *Showal*, 1325 (*November* 27, 1907).

[40375] No. 137.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 4, 1907.

ON the 2nd instant, during the continuation in the Senate of the debate on the Budget, Señor Gullon took the opportunity of referring to the continued silence of the Government in regard to Spanish policy in Morocco, to the studied vagueness of such information as had been given, and especially to the passive and secondary part played by the Spanish contingent stationed at Casa Blanca. France appeared to him to make war or peace in Morocco at her good-will and pleasure, while Spain stood by as a spectator. He implied that recently the policy of the Government in Morocco had undergone a change.

The Prime Minister, Señor Maura, in replying to Señor Gullon's observations, entirely denied that there had been any change of policy. No Spanish military contingent had ever been dispatched to Casa Blanca. The small force stationed in that port was doing duty in the place of the native police commanded by Spanish officers contemplated by the terms of the Algeciras Act. This fact was so well known and evident that the Government had not deemed it necessary to make any special declaration with respect to the matter. His Excellency went on to say that the Spanish Government were united with that of France to carry out a policy quite distinct from the military measures in which the French troops at Casa Blanca were engaged. This should clearly explain the abstention of Spain from all part in the fighting which had taken place, and from intervention in the negotiations with the various Arab tribes.

He considered that the cordial nature of their relations with France were sufficient to prove the correct attitude they had throughout maintained.

As regards Morocco, his Excellency pointed out that from a Spanish point of view that country was divided into two distinct portions. On the northern coast, as far as the Straits, Spain occupied a unique position; in the rest of the country she was merely one of several interested Powers.

The Government had been accused of making no preparation for possible eventualities. Far from this being the case, since the occurrences at Casa Blanca a Spanish army corps had been held in readiness at Algeciras, whence it could be landed on the northern coast of Morocco in eight hours.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

[40270] No. 138.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 537.) *Berlin, December 6, 1907.*

Sir,

IN the course of its general survey of the events of the past week (such as Berlin newspapers are in the habit of publishing every Sunday morning) the "Norddeutsche" reproduced some remarks made by the Paris correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" in a communication published in his paper. After alluding to the incursion made by the Beni Snassen across the frontier between Algeria and Morocco the article went on to say that the "turn of events is by no means sudden, but rather the inevitable consequence of a policy which aimed at establishing a so-called police control in that region by the occupation of Udja and by the repeated invasions by French troops, ostensibly for the purpose of the reconnaissance of the territory of the neighbouring Moroccan tribes." I have the honour to inclose translation of an extract from the review in question.

A sharply worded commentary on this review was published in the first column of the "Temps" on the 3rd December, the full text of which has doubtless already reached you. "Nous constatons avec regret que l'Allemagne reste fidèle à ses vieilles méthodes; qu'elle s'obstine à 'souffler le chaud et le froid,' qu'elle ne peut pas deux jours de suite garder une attitude de réserve et de modération. C'est, comme bien on pense, la note publiée par la 'Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord' qui nous inspire ces réflexions . . . . L'incorrection de cette note est manifeste. Son insertion dans la 'Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord' lui donne la valeur d'un document officiel; c'est la Chancellerie qui parle, &c."

This article is quoted in the "Times" of Tuesday, the 3rd December. The "Times" had not, I presume, received it before publishing the leading article of Monday, the 2nd December, which commented rather severely on the extreme "reserve and frigidity" of Prince Bülow's references in the Reichstag to French policy in Morocco.

I made inquiry at the French Embassy with a view to ascertain the cause of this rather unexpected outbreak of the "Temps," which hardly seemed to be called for in the circumstances. The explanation confidentially given to me was that M. Roel, the Berlin correspondent of the "Temps," had misunderstood the scope of the article, and had failed to see that, so far from being an inspired communication, it was a mere quotation—though by no means a happy one—from the foreign correspondent of another paper. A correction had accordingly been published in the edition of the "Temps" of the 4th December.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

Inclosure in No. 138.

Extracts from the "North German Gazette" of December 1 and 5, 1907.

Weekly Review, Berlin, November 30, 1907.

EVENTS have occurred in Morocco during the past week, the consequences of which, as regards the development of affairs there, it is at present impossible to foresee. In addition to the apparent total defeat of the Sultan's troops by those of the Pretender, an inroad has been made by the Beni Snassen tribe on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier, which has produced a deep impression in France. The Paris correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" states that the turn of events is by no means sudden, but rather the inevitable consequence of a policy which aimed at establishing a so-called police control in that region by the occupation of Udja, and by the repeated invasions by French troops ostensibly for the purpose of reconnaissance of the territory of the neighbouring Moroccan tribes. With a tribe like the Beni Snassen, which the "Temps" itself describes as practically independent, as hardly recognizing the Sultan's authority, and therefore as being completely disinclined to submit to French dominion, it was inevitable that the French troops must sooner or later come into contact, in proportion as French influence advanced in the country; and for such a contingency the French military and civil authorities must have been prepared. And, although in September Clemenceau bade the Governor-General Jonnart delay any military operations against this formidable tribe, in view of the "complications of a military and political nature which it is very desirable to have settled at once," one cannot believe that he and the French diplomats who have such excellent information regarding the state of affairs in Morocco, were so short-sighted as not to see that the Beni Snassen themselves would soon give France an opportunity to draw the reins of their "police measures" tighter along the frontier regions. In October some followers of one of the fanatical Marabouts of this tribe attacked a small French troop, and the tribe was fined by the Governor of Udja; failed to pay, and an expedition was sent against them, which received bullets instead of money; and on the retirement of the French, the tribe made an inroad into Algerian territory. This was the signal for General Liautey's punitive expedition.

December 5, 1907.

Foreign Survey.

The "Cologne Gazette" observes, in an article entitled "Exaggerated Sensitiveness," that the French press have been showing considerable annoyance at the reproduction of their Paris correspondent's article on Moroccan affairs in the columns of the "North German Gazette's" weekly survey, which is essentially of a neutral character. The article read as a whole should well be taken as a compliment to M. Clemenceau's wise moderation and restraint; and it is hard, in any case, to see how it can be interpreted as a new sign that Germany is holding back her support and adopting a double tone. Probably, says the writer, the impression produced in France was due to an incorrect abridged telegraphic report of this article, for only very exaggerated sensitiveness could find anything to object to in the article as it stands.

We confirm this statement that the passages referred to in our weekly survey are taken from the Paris letter to the "Cologne Gazette," as is clearly evident from a perusal of the article; and the "Temps" is speaking in its last leading article of a note of the "North German Gazette" drawn up or influenced by the German Government is stating a pure falsehood. The other remarks of the "Temps" on the subject are answered by this explanation.

[40238] No. 139.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 694.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1907.*

I REQUEST that you will bring to the knowledge of the French Government that, upon the proposition of His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, His Majesty's Govern-

ment are considering the desirability of instituting a preliminary inquiry into the claims of British subjects arising out of the events at Casa Blanca in August last.

The proposed inquiry would be conducted by Mr. Consul Madden, assisted by such merchant assessors as he might desire to call in to advise him, and its object would be to investigate the claims of British subjects and to prepare them for submission to the projected International Commission whose ultimate rights of revision would in no manner be restricted.

His Majesty's Government trust that the work of the International Commission would be facilitated by the British claims being placed before them with the stamp of a previous investigation at His Majesty's Consulate, and they are of opinion that the task of laying the claims before that body would be rendered easier for His Majesty's Consul by the fact of his having had an opportunity beforehand of inquiring into them and converting them into a suitable form for presentation. It is possible that if the claims of British and Spanish subjects are presented to the International Commission for revision after a preliminary inquiry has been held, the German Government will find it easier to modify the attitude they have at present adopted in regard to German claims.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[40238] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 209 A.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1907.

MR. LANGLEY has laid before me the suggestion made by you privately in your letter of the 24th ultimo as to the desirability of a preliminary investigation into the claims of British subjects arising out of the events at Casa Blanca so as to prepare them for submission to the projected International Commission.

The suggestion appears to me to be one which His Majesty's Government would do well to follow, for it is plainly desirable that the British claims should be converted into a form suitable for presentation to the International Commission, both in order to facilitate the task of that body and to insure that the claims shall be brought before it supported by the strongest evidence procurable.

I request, therefore, that you will instruct Mr. Consul Madden to proceed to organize an inquiry of this nature, calling in the assistance of such merchant-assessors as he may deem advisable. The object of the inquiry would be to assess the amount of the various claims and to put them into a suitable shape for presentation to the International Commission on the clear understanding that that body is entitled to revise any decision arrived at.

I am addressing a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris directing his Excellency to acquaint the French Government with the intentions of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[40576] No. 141.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 467.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 5, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca in which he confirms the departure of Mulai Hafid from Marrakesh and reports on the situation created by his advance in Mazagan and the Showia district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 141.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 321.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, December* 4, 1907.

MR. VICE-CONSUL SPINNEY informs me under yesterday's date that nothing can be definitely stated regarding Mulai Hafid's intentions and movements, but that there is no doubt he has left Marrakesh in the direction of Mazagan, and is thought to be half way.

Mr. Spinney says that the townspeople of Mazagan are in such a nervous state that they would at once re-proclaim Mulai Hafid. The Governor is making a show of energy and has taken out the soldiers to dig trenches, while he himself has taken up his residence in the farthest corner of the town from the gate. I learn also that a Maxim has been placed on the minaret of the outer mosque.

Mr. Spinney, however, believes the Azizi soldiers will not fight, and if Mulai Hafid sends emissaries they will either run away or go over to him.

The Christian cemetery at Marrakesh has been attacked by soldiers, who broke down the door and damaged the walls. Mr. Nairn, a missionary in Mazagan, states that he has received information that the Pasha has punished the culprits and offers to put up new doors.

Mr. Consular Agent Lennox, now at Mazagan, states that in his opinion on the first appearance of danger the Governor will plead with the French to land; the soldiers are deserting, and as the reports of Hafid's power and approach increase will desert even more.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 141.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 323.)
Sir, *Dar-al-Baida, December* 4, 1907.

I CALLED on the French Consul this morning, and he confirmed the news of Mulai Hafid's advance on Mazagan. He stated that Mulai Hafid would later come to Showia and would ask the French not to attack him but allow him to pass on to Rabat.

M. Malpertuy said that Mulai Hafid's popularity with the tribes rests entirely on his promises to come and fight the French, and that he will soon find himself in a very difficult position. Either he must attack the French or lose his prestige in a moment by not doing so. Should, however, Mulai Hafid decide to or be forced to attack the French, the Consul said this would amount to a pure and simple declaration of war by Morocco against the French made by a man calling himself the Sultan, and if necessary further reinforcements would be brought here to deal with the situation thus created.

M. Malpertuy laid the blame for the present state of affairs on Germany, which nation, he said, had tied the hands of the French instead of allowing them full liberty of action to deal with the state of affairs in a comprehensive way.

I inquired if Mulai Hafid's mahalla in the Showia district is of much importance numerically. The Consul said it numbered about 500; he minimized its value, adding that many of the individuals composing it are mere youths. Numbers of the so-called soldiers had already come into town starving, and had been glad to obtain work here. Anti-French instigators amongst the tribes, however, are keeping the cause of Mulai Hafid in the Showia going.

M. Malpertuy told me the whole of Showia and even the troops of El Baghdadi desire only to fight the French.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[40678] No. 142.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 590.)

Paris, December 11, 1907.

Sir,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 694 of the 9th instant, I to-day handed to M. Pichon a Memorandum setting forth the reasons for which His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be desirable to institute a preliminary inquiry into the claims of British subjects arising out of the events at Casa Blanca in August last.

M. Pichon said that he fully agreed with the views of His Majesty's Government. He was, however, of opinion that it would be desirable that these preliminary inquiries, to be instituted by the various Powers concerned, should be carried out according to the same rules. He had, during his negotiations with the German Government on the subject, inquired of them what rules they had followed in their investigations, and had just received a reply. He had not had time to study it properly, but he proposed to suggest rules, based more or less on those followed by His Majesty's Government after the bombardment of Alexandria, which might be followed by all the Powers. He asked me to submit this view to you, and promised to communicate with me again on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[40778] No. 143.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 206.)

The Hague, December 12, 1907.

Sir,

IT will be remembered that by Article 120 of the Act of Algeciras the Signatory Powers are required to adapt their legislation, if necessary, to the engagements entered into under the said Act.

The Netherland Government have accordingly submitted a Bill to the States-General in virtue of which the offences punishable under the Act and which are within the competence of the Consular Courts are to be considered not as crimes, but as misdemeanours, punishable by imprisonment.

Appeals from sentences of the Consular Court will lie with the Tribunal at Amsterdam.

Copies and translation of the Bill are herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ACTON.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Bill respecting the application of the General Act of Algeciras.

(Translation.)

WE, Wilhelmina, by the grace of God Queen of the Netherlands, Princess of Orange Nassau, &c.;

To all who shall see or hear this, greeting!

Know:

Whereas we have taken into consideration that it is desirable to enact provisions for the application of the General Act of Algeciras ("Staatsblad," 1907, No. 15) and of other Regulations in Morocco;

Therefore we, having heard the Council of State, and with the common deliberation of the States-General, have approved and understood, as we do hereby approve and understand:

Article 1. The first and third chapters of the Law of the 25th July, 1871 ("Staatsblad," No. 91), to regulate the competency of Consular officers to draw up civil Acts and to regulate the Consular judicial power, last amended by the Law of

the 7th June, 1905 ("Staatsblad," No. 203), and the provisions of the Netherland penal law, shall apply to offences committed by persons who are subject to the Netherland judicial power, and which offences are punishable under the General Act of Algeciras ("Staatsblad," No. 15, 1907) or under Regulations which have been or shall be made in virtue of this Act, as well as under Regulations for Morocco which have been or shall be made in other legal manner, for so far as such application shall be possible in view of the provisions of the said Act and Regulations and of this Law.

Art. 2. The punishable offences mentioned in the preceding Article shall be considered as misdemeanours ("overtredingen"), without prejudice to the provisions laid down in the final part of the preceding Article.

Art. 3. The imprisonment to which the offender, mentioned in Article 1, can be sentenced is the punishment of detention.

Art. 4. The punishments, detention, and fine shall not be imposed together in respect of one and the same punishable offence mentioned in Article 1.

Art. 5. Article 26 of the Law mentioned in Article 1 shall not apply in respect of the punishable offences mentioned in Article 1, for so far as Treaty or Regulations themselves regulate the punishment.

Art. 6. The sentences in respect of punishable offences mentioned in Article 1 pronounced by the Consular Court shall, in deviation from the provisions of Article 43 of the Law mentioned in Article 1, be subject to appeal if the punishment imposed is heavier than six days' detention or a fine of sixty florins.

The act of taking cognizance thereof appertains to the Tribunal at Amsterdam.

Art. 7. Contraventions of Article 27 of the General Act of Algeciras by persons who are subject to the Netherland judicial power shall be punishable with the punishment mentioned in Article 20 of that Act.

Art. 8. In respect of the Netherland judicial power, the competent Judge mentioned in Article 119 of the General Act of Algeciras is the Consular Court at Tangier.

Art. 9. This Law shall enter into operation fourteen days after the date of its announcement.

Charge and command that this be inserted in the "Staatsblad," and that all Ministerial Departments, authorities, Boards, and officials see to the careful carrying out thereof.

[40914] No. 144.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 469.)

Tangier, December 4, 1907.

Sir,

FRENCH troops have now been at Casa Blanca for four months and French men-of-war at all ports of Morocco, and it is not unreasonable to ask what has been the result of all this expenditure, and, if a negative one, wherein lie the reasons and what is the remedy for the situation.

A study of the Yellow Book published last month will undoubtedly bring home to the reader the conviction that recent French policy in Morocco, with the exception, perhaps, of the precipitate landing of the insufficient force at Casa Blanca, has been marked by a certain timidity and prudence carried almost to excess. There has hardly been a corner of the Empire in which France has not had just grievances. The action of the tribes on the Algero-Moroccan frontier; the openly-declared anti-French attitude of Ma-el-Ainin in Mauritania, with scarcely veiled threats of a holy war on the Senegal frontier; the murder here of Charbonnier and that of Dr. Mauchamp at Marakesh: the attempted assassination of De Gironcourt at Fez; and finally the brutal murders of the French workmen at Casa Blanca—all these grievances have remained without any satisfaction being accorded. France has had to content herself with promises alone, and these given with a very bad grace. Indeed, to these provocations might be added the suspicion that some of the crimes occurred with the support, or at least the silent acquiescence, of the Makhzen authorities.

The apparent long-suffering attitude displayed by France, which by the people of this country is freely construed into one of timidity, has not failed to give the Arabs encouragement. It cannot truly be said that there is any strong fanatical feeling among the people of Morocco, but a fanatical cry has been raised to incite the lukewarm to join in resisting what all believe to be an intention on the part of the French to secure, slowly, perhaps, but surely, their country. To these must be added a large

number whose only desire is to see disorder rife under a weak Makhzen, and consequently immunity from all taxation and a free hand to plunder. To nearly all it is immaterial who their Sultan may be. No feeling that can be construed into loyalty exists for the reigning Sultan or his brother on the part of their respective adherents.

Little support has been given by foreigners living in Morocco to French penetration. Firms long established here having time-worn relations with the native traders have adapted themselves to their special systems of doing business, and see with distrust and doubt the advent of a new organization which will inevitably run counter to that which commends itself to their conservative ideas. They fear and they judge by reports of experiences of others elsewhere that with a French control of the custom-houses, instead of having to deal with pliable Moorish officials, they would come into contact with French Controllers, who might be apt to discriminate in favour of citizens of their own nationality to the disadvantage of other foreign merchants.

The result of all this is that anarchy, which has been for some years dormant with occasional explosions, is now general throughout the Empire, and that the number of tribes over which the Sultan had some semblance of authority has dwindled almost to vanishing point. Endless are the reasons which have produced this distressing state of affairs. Indecision and a marked antipathy for warfare on the part of the present Sultan, incapacity and dishonesty on the part of his Viziers and Governors, have gradually encouraged the tribes to resist authority and to refuse to contribute to the Exchequer.

Whether the Sultan Abdul Aziz succeeds in maintaining himself on the throne or whether his brother Mulai Hafid is successful in deposing him, there appears to be no remedy for the present disorder but intervention of some kind. The period of "pacific penetration" so glibly spoken of as a panacea seems to have passed and to have proved a failure. To continue providing the Sultan with doles of money which are wasted on armies whose men desert and sell their arms at the first sound of battle to the nearest tribesmen will not restore the country to order. To land a few men at different ports and endeavour to strike terror into the people by the presence of battle-ships will affect no one living outside the walls of the threatened towns. Of this we have had ample evidence at Casa Blanca, where, after four months, it may be said that the effect produced on the tribes has been merely one of a necessity for caution in attack, and the conviction has been borne in upon them that the French are unable to leave their base. Casa Blanca has momentarily been ruined, the neighbouring tribes will lose this year's crops, but no fear or respect has been instilled into them, and Casa Blanca threatens to drift into a position analogous to one of the Spanish "Presidios" on the Mediterranean coast.

That there should be a marked hesitation on the part of France to embark on a policy which might entail a military expedition into the interior on a large scale is comprehensible, but I am inclined to the belief that this would not be necessary. France might adopt the system followed with success by previous Sultans, namely, by severely punishing those tribes which, having acquired wealth, show signs of too great an independence; but the lesson should be a severe one, and the punishment, once inflicted on the tribes in the immediate hinterland of the coast ports, should prove so salutary that a frequent repetition would hardly be required.

To this it may be objected that such action would hardly be in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Algeciras, but, in face of the repeated grievances suffered by France, some efforts in obtaining redress could hardly meet with general objection. But it is outside my province to examine into the nature and strength of the opposition that might be raised.

Sultan Abdul Aziz has, it may be said, proved himself incapable of restoring order in his country, in spite of the gold furnished to him with the assistance of France, and the fact that even His Majesty's jewels have been engaged would indicate that there are no other resources available. Consequently a more vigorous assistance is absolutely indispensable if Abdul Aziz is to be seriously supported, and it is questionable whether the apparent hesitation of France will eventually prove of advantage either to herself or to this country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[40915] No. 145.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 470.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 8, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 185 of the 14th June, relative to the composition of the Special Tribunal to decide actions brought against the State Bank of Morocco, provided for by Article XLVI of the Act of Algeciras, I have the honour to report that the Tribunal held its first sitting yesterday. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium are the countries supplying the magistrates for this year. Baron Langworth, First Secretary of the German Legation, was selected as President of the Tribunal.

The present composition of the Tribunal only holds good until the 31st December, when Great Britain, France, and Spain will be called upon to furnish the magistrates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[40917] No. 146.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 472.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 8, 1907.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 465 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that on the 3rd instant I communicated with Raisuli, suggesting that he should come down to a spot nearer Tangier in order to complete the details regarding the liberation of Kaïd Sir H. Maclean, and that he should be satisfied with an engagement that the prisoners should be released, and not insist upon their being actually produced, as they would have to be brought from Fez. I also approached him with a view to a reduction of his demand for the protection of so many members of his family, and told him that Alcazar, Tetuan, and Arzila must be excluded from the places where he could reside. Raisuli has now replied declining to come nearer Tangier, as he declares he is unable to do so until all the Khama's prisoners are in Tangier. As this is the tribe which suffered on his account, and which gave him hospitality, this is probably true. I am doing all that is possible to get the prisoners sent down from Fez, where they are imprisoned.

Raisuli undertakes not to reside in any of the towns above mentioned, but adheres to his demand for protection for all the members of his family, as he fears the vengeance of the Makhzen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[40918] No. 147.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 473.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 8, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news, based on reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 147.

Summary of News respecting Morocco during the past week.

EXPECTATIONS of any rapid development of the situation consequent on the departure of Mulai Hafid from Marakesh have been disappointed. Mulai Hafid marched on the 28th November—presumably on receiving the news of Bagdadi's

defeat. His destination has been variously given as Mogador and Mazagan, and letters from the latter place, dated the 2nd instant, even reported him to be within thirty miles of the town. The truth appears to be that he has not proceeded far enough from Marakesh to give any definite idea of his objective. On the 2nd instant he was still only about ten miles on his way. To-day there is a rumour, given in the local press with all reserve, that he has received news of treachery in his rear, and in Marakesh itself, and that he has been obliged to return there.

As regards the rest of the country, Mulai Hafid's cause does not show signs of decline. The fighting outside Mogador appears to have been entirely favourable to him. Kaïd Anfluz has been compelled to fall back on his Kasbah, and is being hard pressed. The despatch of 400 men from Mogador to reoccupy Saffi was abandoned after the men had been embarked, in response to urgent requests from Anfluz for reinforcements. There is said to be great enthusiasm among Baka's men, and they have been lately reinforced. Details received concerning Bagdadi's defeat show that it was complete. Three regiments deserted on the first attack. Their rifles, if not the men, will be a valuable acquisition to the enemy. The aggressors were tribesmen of the Showia. When it is considered that they are the same men who have lately been opposing the French, it is not surprising that they should have made short work of the Makhzen forces. What was left of the mehalla retired in disorder to within five miles of Rabat, and remains there. Mr. Neroutsos reports that the newly appointed Minister of War was preparing to go out and take stock of it. Abd-el-Aziz' position in Rabat, in the face of active measures on the part of Mulai Hafid, should be a very precarious one. Bagdadi's force had comprised every available man and animal, and the town is without means of resistance.

Mr. Neroutsos mentions a conversation with a man of the Ziaida tribe which took part in the attack on Bagdadi, in which he was reproached with his desertion of Abd-el-Aziz. The man explained his conduct by saying that they had news from Rabat that the Sultan and his affairs were entirely in French hands, and that they would not submit to French domination. The tribes believed that resistance to the French had so far averted invasion and conquest, and they meant to continue to oppose them. Mulai Hafid's best chance of gaining adherents seems to be as an opponent of French influence, but the danger to him of such a policy is obvious.

There has been no recent news from the south. Mr. Spinney in Saffi, and Mr. Lennox in Mazagan, writing at the end of last month, had both revised their original opinions, and considered Mulai Hafid's cause on its last legs. Recent events may, by now, have given the situation a new appearance.

Mr. Madden reported that Admiral Philibert had transferred his flag from the "Gloire" to the "Desaix." The "Gloire" left for Brest, and is said to require docking after six months' service on the coast.

December 8, 1907.

[41151] No. 148.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 16.)

(No. 474. Confidential.)

Tangier, December 10, 1907.

Sir,

THE Memorandum communicated to the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador on the 19th October on the subject of the proposals for the constitution of an International Commission to examine into the claims arising out of the events at Casa Blanca contained a clause (paragraph 10) suggesting that, as regards the murders committed, the Commission should have no power to deal with them, but that they should form the subject of direct negotiation between the Governments interested and the Makhzen.

Dr. Nerazzini, the Italian Minister, to-day told me that he had called the serious attention of his Government to this clause, which, in his opinion, was very much to the disadvantage of Italy. Some of the workmen murdered at Casa Blanca were Italians, but he was convinced that no representations that he could make to the Makhzen would ever produce any result. The French and Spanish Governments, having troops landed and vessels at the ports of Morocco, were in a far more

advantageous position to see that their demands were carried out and compensation paid. He had consequently strongly advised the Italian Government not to accept that part of the proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[41238] No. 149.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 476.)

Tangier, December 11, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida respecting the movements of Mulai Hafid.

The report of his return to Morocco city is still unconfirmed. Such a step would be contrary to every tradition of Moorish policy, and the news, should it appear to be true, cannot fail to have a widespread effect very detrimental to his cause.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 149.

Consul Madden to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 325.)

Dar-al-Baida, December 9, 1907.

Sir,

I AM informed by the French Consul that, according to news received yesterday evening from Mazagan, Mulai Hafid had returned to Morocco city on account of the revolt of the Seraghna tribes against his authority, they having proclaimed Mulai Abdel Aziz. Mulai Hafid had reached Zawia-ben-Sassi near the city, and had left his mehalla at a spot some five or six hours from Mazagan, where it remains inactive. Near Mogador, too, Anflus is holding his own against the partisans of Hafid.

M. Malpertuy states that the situation in the south seems generally quiet, and at present he considers that things have become rather more favourable to the cause of Mulai Abdel Aziz.

The state of affairs in Shawia remains as previously reported.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. M. MADDEN.

[41354] No. 150.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 597.)

Paris, December 17, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 590 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a Memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the question of a preliminary inquiry into the claims of British subjects arising out of the events at Casa Blanca in August last.

It states that the French Government have no objection to the procedure proposed by His Majesty's Government, which has, as a matter of fact, already been put into practice by the Spanish Government, and they consider that an agreement of the Powers respecting the International Commission will thereby be facilitated. This, in M. Pichon's opinion, would be especially the case if the work of the preliminary Commissions were carried out on the lines proposed for the International Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 150

M. Pichon to Mr. Lister.

PAR une note en date du 11 de ce mois, le Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu faire connaître au Département que son Gouvernement se proposait de faire examiner les réclamations de ses ressortissants à Casa Blanca par une Commission, composée du Consul d'Angleterre et d'Assesseurs choisis parmi les Notables Anglais de ce port. Cette enquête préliminaire faciliterait les travaux de la Commission Internationale qui aurait à en apprécier les résultats.

En réponse, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de confirmer à Mr. Lister qu'il ne voit aucun inconvénient à l'adoption de cette procédure, déjà mise en pratique par le Gouvernement Espagnol. Il estime que la mesure qui serait ainsi prise faciliterait en effet l'accord des Puissances sur la question de la Commission Internationale, surtout s'il était entendu que les travaux des Commissions préparatoires seraient conduits d'après des règles conformes aux principes qui ont été proposés pour le fonctionnement de cette Commission Internationale.

Paris, le 14 *Décembre*, 1907.

[41355] No. 151.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 598.) *Paris, December* 17, 1907.

Sir,

THE French press to-day contains details of the fighting on the 15th instant in the south of the Beni-Snassen country on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. The column under Colonel Felineau, which had orders to operate in the Plain of Angad (see my despatch No. 582 of the 5th instant), succeeded on the 15th in seizing the gorges of Ain-Sfa and the three villages dominating them. It is stated that Ain-Sfa is a market of considerable importance about 30 kilom. west of Oujda, possessing numerous wells, and being a junction of several important routes.

The French casualties are reported as thirteen wounded, two of whom were officers. The engagement, which, it is understood, was brilliantly carried out, is expected to create a great impression on the minds of the Beni-Snassen tribe.

A second column under Colonel Branlière, operating in the neighbourhood of the Moulouia River, is stated to have met with little opposition. M. Hubert Jacques, correspondent of the "Matin," who is with the column, telegraphed to his paper on the 15th instant an account of the arrival of the French troops at this river, which he declares to be the natural frontier between Algeria and Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

[40678] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 709.) *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1907.

Sir,

IN your despatch No. 590 of the 11th instant you state that the French Government are desirous of suggesting rules, based on those followed by the Alexandria Claims Commission, for the guidance of such preliminary inquiries into the claims of their nationals arising out of the events at Casa Blanca as may be instituted in the future by any of the Powers interested.

I request that you will inform M. Pichon that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the suggestions of the French Government, so far as the conduct of the preliminary inquiry into the British claims is concerned. You should at the same time express the hope that these suggestions may be communicated at the earliest date possible, and state that in the meantime a British Commission, under

the presidency of His Majesty's Consul, is examining the British claims for presentation to the International Commission, on the strict understanding that its conclusions are in no sense binding.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[41653] No. 153.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 22. Commercial. Confidential.) *Tangier, December* 13, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 24, Commercial, of the 30th ultimo, transmitting a letter from Messrs. Forwood Brothers, complaining of the defective lighterage service to the ports of Morocco. Messrs. Forwood's complaints are, I am bound to admit, justified.

The present condition of affairs is no doubt in a large measure due to the impoverished condition of the Sultan's exchequer. The subject has been engaging the attention of the Diplomatic Corps for some time past, and a note has been, or is just about to be, sent to the Makhzen on the subject. Some delay has occurred owing to the difficulties of arriving at an agreement as to what reforms were most urgent. As I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 457, Confidential, of the 22nd ultimo, the French Minister had been disposed to undertake the reorganization of the service, and M. Guiot came out to make a careful study of it. This examination led him to the conclusion that, owing to various reasons, and notably the absence of any real port in Morocco, the lighterage service, so far from producing any benefit to the State, as shippers declare it does, constituted a serious charge. M. Guiot had consequently advised the French Minister to have nothing to do with it. M. Guiot also told me confidentially that, in his opinion, the idea put forward by some shipping agents that their Companies should institute their own service was quite impracticable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[41651] No. 154.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 479.) *Tangier, December* 15, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 431 of the 1st ultimo, I have the honour to report that I learn from M. Regnault that His Majesty the Sultan has obtained in Paris a loan of 1,200,000 fr. on the jewels which for some time were deposited at Messrs. Coutts and Co. in London.

M. Regnault is of opinion that this loan will enable the Makhzen to meet their most pressing expenses until the end of January or middle of February.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LOWTHER.

[41652] No. 155.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 480.) *Tangier, December* 16, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news based on Reports received during the past week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Summary of News respecting Morocco received during the past week.

ABSENCE of reliable news continues to give the situation a stationary appearance, which is probably justified by facts. The report of Mulai Hafid's return to Marakesh has not been confirmed, and the local belief in Tangier is that he is on his way to Mekinez. According to news received from Mazagan he had interrupted his march shortly after leaving Marakesh, owing to the action of a rebellious tribe whom he proposed to punish. A later report from Mr. Spinney gave a rumour that the consequent operations had turned out badly, and that Mulai Hafid had been compelled to take sanctuary at a place some miles east of Marakesh. Mr. Spinney was disposed to believe that there had been some fighting with the tribe in question, and that the result had been unfavourable to Mulai Hafid. Accounts as to his movements are too conflicting to make any conclusion possible. In Mazagan everything is quiet. From Mogador Mr. Wilkinson reports that, as elsewhere, rumours of every description have been current, but his conclusion is that, as regards his district, no change of importance has taken place in the situation. The present state of things is paralyzing trade at Mogador, and no produce is being brought into the market. The reported interruption of Mulai Hafid's advance was not known at Rabat when Mr. Neroutsos wrote on the 8th instant. He said that great anxiety prevailed at the Makhzen. There had been some question of the Sultan returning to Fez, but it was doubtful if the tribes of the intervening country would allow him to. The remains of Bagdadi's Mehalla had not moved, and it was recognized that they would join Mulai Hafid if he entered the district. Efforts to recruit men at a dollar a-day had failed. The situation, however, has not induced the Sultan to lay aside his accustomed lethargy. Mr. Neroutsos' conclusion is that he had better abdicate.

A report from a native correspondent in Fez shows that public opinion realizes the straits in which the Government finds itself. He mentions a rumour that the Sultan has addressed an inquiry to the Ulema as to the legality of accepting the assistance of French troops to repress the present disorders. The story is, he says, generally believed, and is creating much excitement. It is regarded by some as a ruse to frighten the tribes into submission; others ask whether France would really support Mulai Abd-el-Aziz against the whole of Morocco, and if not, whether it would not be better for Fez to proclaim Mulai Hafid and so unite the country.

Mr. Madden says that the French are sending out strong reconnaissances daily from Casa Blanca in the hope of encouraging traders to enter the town. Mulai Reshid continues to intercept anyone trying to come in, and he lately seized a large caravan which was leaving Casa Blanca for the interior.

The port works at Casa Blanca are said to be making very slow progress. The railway in front of the waterport has been twice lately washed away by the sea. Local opinion is very doubtful whether the present sub-contractors of the Compagnie Marocaine will ever succeed in their undertaking. Their plant is second-hand, and their engineers are said to be inexperienced.

The French Minister and his staff returned to Tangier from Rabat on the 15th instant.

C. R.

December 16, 1907.

[41752] No. 156.

Messrs. Forwood Brothers and Co. to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

Morocco House, St. Mary Axe, London,
December 20, 1907.

Dear Sir,

WE have had several communications from British residents in Morocco, especially from those resident at Casa Blanca, expressing a fear, that owing to the tone of the Yellow Book recently published, in which there is a Circular, No. 519, dated the 11th October, from M. Pichon to all the Powers, in which he proposes to exclude all indirect claims for damage due to the bombardment, that British merchants at Casa Blanca may fare badly, and possibly be ruined.

We are asked to do what we can to help these merchants, and we therefore most

respectfully bring these facts to your notice, trusting that you will see your way to safeguard the interests of those British merchants whose commercial positions appear to be threatened.

Apologising for troubling you,

We have, &c.
(Signed) FORWOOD BROS. AND Co.

[41950] No. 157.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 23.)

(No. 481.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 15, 1907.

THE French Minister arrived this morning from Rabat, and leaves for Paris to-morrow morning. He was good enough to call upon me, and spoke at some length regarding his Mission, expressing himself as being, on the whole, well satisfied with the results obtained. He regards the Sultan as an honest man, though weak. Of none of the Viziers did he carry away a good opinion, but the most dangerous opponent of all reform appeared to him to be Sid Fedoul Gharnit, the Grand Vizier. Not one of the Viziers seemed to be disposed to assume the responsibilities of his office. Every matter, however unimportant, was discussed in Council, and every new suggestion was always referred to the Sultan, thus necessitating great delay in the settlement of all questions. M. Regnault found that on his insisting for the application of the Act of Algeciras, all the ground that had been gone over at Algeciras had to be retraversed, and the Makhzen invariably appeared to lose sight of the fact that the Act had been definitely accepted by the Sultan.

M. Regnault hopes that it may be possible to bring about some changes amongst the Viziers, and I understood him to say that His Majesty had given him assurances on this point, but considered it unwise that they should be carried out at this moment. He hoped that the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance would be retired, and in the place of the latter would be installed Hadj Omar Tazzi, whom, though unreliable, M. Regnault regarded as a man who did not fear to tell the Sultan the truth regarding his Empire. By his side would be named Hadj Dris Benjeloun, the Moorish Director of the Bank, who enjoyed a reputation for honesty, and who would be in a position to exercise a certain control over the expenditure of the Empire.

M. Regnault hoped that the Algeciras police would now be immediately established, if not in all the ports, in most of them. The scheme for the checking of the soldiers' pay by French officers was working fairly satisfactorily, and M. Regnault had concluded with the Makhzen the scheme for controlling contraband, and had received very definite promises regarding the acquisition of real property by foreigners (Article 60). The imposition of the 2½ per cent. (Article 66) might also now come into force.

In reply to my inquiries as to M. Regnault's views regarding the present position of the Sultan, and that of his brother, his Excellency said he thought that the Sultan had passed through the most critical moment. The defeat of Bagdadi's army, which had fled before about 100 tribesmen, had struck terror into the Makhzen, and although it might appear wasteful to continue to pay soldiers who fled and deserted at the first opportunity, it was necessary to keep up some show of force. Bagdadi's reformed army amounted to about 3,000 men, and M. Regnault's information led him to believe that the cause of Mulay Hafid would gradually dwindle, and however much the country appeared now to be opposed to Abdul Aziz, he thought that it would rally round him as soon as the weakness of Mulay Hafid became more apparent.

M. Regnault was now proceeding to Paris, and he would be accompanied by Hadj Mohammed Mokri, and negotiations would be immediately opened with a view to obtaining a considerable loan in order to enable the financial position of the Makhzen to be placed on a firmer basis. M. Regnault did not make any mention of a guarantee, but he said that there must be a provision for some sort of control if the loan were to be obtained.

I asked M. Regnault if he knew what negotiations his Spanish colleague had been engaged upon, and, in reply, he said that proposals had been put forward by the Spanish Government to undertake the suppression of the Pretender, whose doings in the neighbourhood of Melilla had caused so much disturbance to Spanish trade,

but he gathered that the Sultan was very averse to giving to Spain any such mandate which would naturally entail the occupation of Moorish territory by Spanish troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. LOWTHER.

[41951] No. 158.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 482. Confidential.)

Tangier, December 16, 1907.

Sir,

I YESTERDAY asked the French Minister if he could tell me anything regarding the Marquis de Segonzac's recent so-called mission to Mulai Hafid. M. Regnault said that the Marquis had visited him at Rabat, and appeared to be very favourably disposed to Mulai Hafid. M. Regnault explained to him at great length the reasons for which it was impossible for France to give any countenance to Mulai Hafid, who had openly declared that he would not recognize the Act of Algeciras, and whose only hope lay in assuming a very anti-French attitude, whereas the reigning Sultan was committed to reform. M. de Segonzac left Rabat appearing to be duly impressed with M. Regnault's views, and promising not to visit Mulai Hafid, as M. Regnault regarded it as a hazardous journey. At the same time the Marquis de Segonzac added that in order to justify his position in the eyes of the newspaper for which he was travelling (the "Echo de Paris") he would go to Mogador and report from there what he could learn as to Mulai Hafid's movements and chances of success. While at Mogador he had assured the French Consul that he would not join Mulai Hafid, but he had nevertheless done so, and was now sending very optimistic reports as to the strength of the Pretender, but to these reports M. Regnault did not give much importance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERALD LOWTHER.

[41952] No. 159.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 483.)

Tangier, December 17, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of news from the Fez district, drawn up by Mr. Consul Macleod, from information recently received by him.

Lawlessness appears to increase unchecked in the district in question, and in the towns distrust and dislike of the Makhzen are growing accentuated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 159.

Summary of News from Fez District between the 1st and 10th December, 1907.

AT Mequinez a breach in the wall of the Jewish quarter was made, and some donkeys were carried off. The guards were asleep. At Fez an attempt was made to break through the wall of the Jewish quarter (which adjoins the Palace), but was repelled by the guards. In firing which ensued, two of the guards were shot dead. All round Fez numerous robberies of ploughing animals and cattle have occurred. In two instances the drover of the stolen cattle was shot dead.

Amongst the outside robberies is one of some servants of the Grand Vizier Gharnit, journeying from Rabat, who reached Fez stripped of all their belongings.

At Fez, on the 9th instant, a breach was made in the city wall (south-east side), and some animals were stolen.

The popular discontent in regard to the copper coinage still continues, notwithstanding that the subscription of merchants (to take up a fourth of the new issue of copper) has been effected.

At Mequinez—according to all news from Fez, but of which I have not yet heard directly from Mequinez—the people in the markets smashed the boxes in which the market taxes are collected, and the Basha has ordered that these taxes be dropped for the present.

Prices of European commodities have risen considerably in consequence of the lawless state of the roads. At Mequinez wheat has risen from 2 pesetas to 4 pesetas per measure, *i.e.*, it has doubled in value.

Several Shereefian letters have been read at Fez and Mequinez, giving accounts of successes of the Makhzen, but which obtain no credence. One letter, read at Mequinez on the 5th instant, gave the impression (whatever its exact text may have been) that the Sultan had obtained repossession of Oujdah from the French, and excited special ridicule.

From the 7th instant onwards there has been growing excitement over a private communication which, it is currently believed, the Ulema received from the Sultan on that date, asking whether it would or would not be lawful for him to accept the assistance of French troops to repress present disorders. It is said no reply has yet been sent to this communication.

The idea of such a step is, of course, very repugnant to popular feeling. All natives see in it a confession of the impotence into which the Makhzen has fallen. The best-affected persons argue that it is probably only a ruse of the Sultan, or a threat, made with the view of frightening the tribes into better conduct. The general feeling, however, is of anger and bewilderment, people mostly asking each other whether the French will really lend troops to Mulai Abdalaziz against the whole country (in effect making Morocco a French Protectorate), and whether it would not be well for Fez to recognize Mulai Hafid, and thus (as natives suppose), avert necessity for French intervention.

At Mequinez it is reported that the Sultan has sent Mulai Taib, the well-known Wazzan Shereef, to Zimmur, to engage that tribe and other Berbers, for high rates of pay, to furnish contingents for a campaign against the Casa Blanca tribes and Mulai Hafid, but, so far, Mulai Taib had failed entirely. Latterly, indeed, warnings had been sent round that any Berber joining the Sultan would have his dwelling burned and his belongings plundered.

(Signed) J. M. MACLEOD.

[42064] No. 160.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 605.)

Paris, December 21, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have this day addressed a Memorandum to the French Government in the sense of your despatch No. 709 of the 18th instant in regard to the proposed Claims Commissions for losses at Casa Blanca. I inclose herein a copy of my Memorandum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Memorandum.

HIS Majesty's Minister, in informing Sir Edward Grey that he had handed to his Excellency M. Pichon on the 11th instant a Memorandum respecting the preliminary inquiry into the claims of British subjects for losses at Casa Blanca, reported that M. Pichon had stated that he fully agreed with the views of His Majesty's Government. His Excellency was, however, of opinion that it would be desirable that these preliminary inquiries to be instituted by the various Powers concerned should be carried out according to the same rules; that he had during his negotiations with the German Government on the subject inquired of them what rules they had followed in their investigations, and that he had just received a reply which, however, he had not had time to study properly. Mr. Lister further reported that his Excellency added that he proposed to suggest rules, based more or less on those followed by His Majesty's Government after the bombardment of Alexandria, which might be adopted by all

the Powers, and that he asked that this view should be submitted to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir Francis Bertie has received Sir Edward Grey's instructions to inform M. Pichon that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the suggestion of the French Government that the various preliminary inquiries should be conducted in accordance with identical rules, and at the same time to express the hope that they may be informed as soon as possible of the details of the rules proposed by the French Government. In the meantime, a British Commission under the presidency of His Majesty's Consul is examining the British claims for presentation to the International Commission, on the strict understanding that its conclusions are in no sense binding.

The copy of the note from M. Pichon, dated the 14th instant, received at His Majesty's Embassy on the 17th instant, in reply to the Memorandum handed by Mr. Lister to his Excellency on the 11th instant, crossed the despatch to Sir Francis Bertie, instructing him to make the communication in the above-mentioned terms.

British Embassy, Paris,
December 21, 1907.

[42218] No. 161.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 191. Confidential.)
Madrid, December 21, 1907.

Sir,

SINCE my return to Madrid on the 15th instant I have had several conversations with the French Ambassador on the progress of events in Morocco. M. Révoil is, on the whole, better satisfied with the general attitude of the Spanish Government than he was when I last saw him in the beginning of October. At that time the friendly professions of Señor Allendesalazar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stood in marked contrast with the disposition of Señor Maura, President of the Council of Ministers, who sought to restrain the action of this country within a strict and narrow interpretation of the terms of the General Act of Algeciras. The result was constant friction at Casa Blanca and an absolute failure to arrive at any understanding, in view of the possibility that troops might have to be landed at Tangier. Señor Maura also objected strongly to the French proposals concerning joint action to put down the illicit traffic in munitions of war along the Morocco coast.

My last step before leaving Spain was to represent as earnestly as I could to the Foreign Minister, by means of an unofficial letter, and also to the King of Spain at a personal interview at La Cranja, the necessity of a more cordial co-operation with France, and the danger which Spain would run of losing the benefits eventually secured to her under her Secret Convention with France of October 1904, if she continued to thwart the action of France in Morocco, thus turning into an enemy the Power on whose good-will so much would depend at the time of the final execution of that Convention. I reported these representations in my despatch No. 148 of the 29th September, and in my telegram No. 61 of the 2nd October. Señor Allendesalazar now informs me that, together with the simultaneous representations of the French Ambassador, they led him to lay the whole subject once more before Señor Maura, who has since given him a much freer hand in conducting negotiations with France.

It thus became possible to conclude an Agreement for the repression of contraband in arms, and the situation has been further relieved by the withdrawal of Major Santa Olalla, whose temper seemed to unfit him for the duties assigned to him at Casa Blanca, and by the appointment of a better qualified Spanish Commander in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Bernal.

M. Regnault, French Minister at Tangier, had the goodness to call on me on his way from Tangier to Paris on the 19th instant. He informed me that the demands which both he and his Spanish colleague, Señor Llaberia, had been engaged in pressing on the Sultan at Rabat had been favourably received by the latter, who had concurred in their joint proposals concerning the immediate recruiting of the native police force for service under French and Spanish officers in the various coast towns, except at Saffi, Mazagan, and Mogador, where the Sultan counselled some further delay in setting the police force on foot in view of the number of adherents of the rival Sultan living in those towns. The Sultan had also accepted the proposed naval operations to put down contraband in munitions of war. On this latter point I have already reported in my telegram No. 70 of yesterday that the French Ambassador has communicated to this Government the instructions which have been issued to the French naval commanders—that he expects the Spanish Government will shortly send similar instructions to their own naval officers, and that he assumes a communication will then be made to the Powers explaining the nature of the proposed joint operations.

Notwithstanding these indications of a better harmony between the French and Spanish Governments, both M. Révoil and M. Regnault state that local friction between Frenchmen and Spaniards is far from having disappeared, and that the arrival of the new Spanish Commander at Casa Blanca has not yet led to a satisfactory delimitation of the zones to be occupied respectively by the forces of the two countries. On my mentioning, however, that I had heard of these difficulties, Señor Allendesalazar assured me yesterday that General Drude had himself admitted that his relations with Lieutenant-Colonel Bernal were quite satisfactory.

It is perhaps hardly to be expected that complete concord will prevail, but while the two Governments continued to be agreed on general questions of principle, it may be hoped that local disputes will prove capable of adjustment.

I should mention that Señor Allendesalazar, as well as M. Révoil, has prepared me for the impending discussion of the Morocco loan question. I gather from an informal conversation with the Minister of Finance that Spain is, as usual, rather nervous lest Germany should take offence, but is otherwise not opposed to the idea of issuing the loan together with France if that course should also meet with your approval. She would prefer that her contribution should be paid in Spanish coin directly into the Maghzen Treasury, fearing that the exchange might suffer if payment had to be made in Paris in the French currency.

M. Révoil states that the King of Spain is now completely won over to the policy of close and united action with France. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the language His Majesty has recently held both to M. Révoil and to the President of the French Republic. M. Révoil hopes this friendly disposition on His Majesty's part may not be lost on Señor Maura, who is still out of sympathy with the above policy, though he no longer actively opposes it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[42168] No. 162.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 608.)
Paris, December 26, 1907.

Sir,

THE "Temps" of to-night publishes a communiqué from the Agence Havas on the subject of Morocco, in which it is stated that M. Regnault has studied, in consultation with the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz, the conditions on which the town of Casa Blanca could be restored to the Moorish Government. In order to render this possible, instructions have been sent to General Drude to capture the Kasbah of the Mediouna, which, being in the hands of rebel bands, endangers communication with Casa Blanca. It is further stated that the French Government will place at the disposal of General Drude the extra forces that will be necessary for this object.

A copy of the communiqué in question is inclosed herein.*

The "Journal des Débats" adds that this action is the outcome of a conference held between M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, and General Picquart, Minister for War, the result of which was immediately communicated to the President of the Republic.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[42324] No. 163.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 28.)

(No. 485.)
Tangier, December 17, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 474 of the 10th instant on the subject of the contemplated Commission for the examination of the claims arising out of the incidents at Casa Blanca in August last, I have the honour to state that at present fifty-seven

* Not printed.

separate British claims have been put forward, but the claims of the large merchants have not yet been presented, as they require an immense amount of work and time to compile. The total French claims so far number 83 (including those of the port-work people), the Germans between 40 and 50, and the Spanish claims over 100.

The French Consulate in Casa Blanca is refusing to consider the claims of "Mokhalats" (but accepting those of protégés), except in the case where the "Mokhalats" had French property in their possession.

My instructions to Mr. Madden have been to receive the claims of "Mokhalats," leaving it to the Commission to consider them or to throw them out, and I venture to request you to instruct me as to whether this is a proper view, or whether Mr. Madden should be directed to refuse to take note of the claims of "Mokhalats."

I have, &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[42325] No. 164.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 486.)
Tangier, December 22, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum of news received during the past week.

I have &c.
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 164.

Memorandum.

THE doubt which has prevailed for some time past as to the whereabouts of Mulai Hafid seems now to be dispelled. He is encamped at a spot four or five hours' march south-east of Marakesh, and has been fighting a tribe which resisted his authority. Nothing is known of his strength or intentions. His inactivity has sufficed to restore some confidence in Rabat. The recent state of anxiety is relaxed. A Shereefian letter has been read in the Mosque announcing the subsidence of the rebellion, and, as a second piece of good news, the proximate evacuation of Casa Blanca by the French, which place the Sultan declares his intention of shortly sending a garrison to and visiting. Fighting near Mogador between Kaïd Anfluz and Mulai Hafid's force opposed to him has been renewed and continued during the week. According to the last report, the enemy had succeeded in getting in between Anfluz and the town, and were thus able to control the entry of supplies into it. From the accounts of native correspondents in Fez, the condition of lawlessness and disorder in that town and its neighbourhood, described in Consul Macleod's last Memorandum, continues to grow worse, and the peaceable inhabitants express great anxiety. The districts between Fez and Mequinez and Mequinez and Rabat are now made almost impassable by robbers, and Government caravans have not escaped pillage.

December 22, 1907.

[42338] No. 165.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 614.)
Paris, December 27, 1907.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a note published in the "Temps" this evening relative to the retirement of General Drude from the command of the French forces in Morocco and the appointment of General d'Amade as his successor.*

I also inclose a leading article from the same paper commenting on General Drude's retirement.*

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[42496] No. 166.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 555 A. Confidential.)
Berlin, December 23, 1907.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 45 of the 8th instant on the subject of the Casa Blanca indemnities, I have the honour to report that I received a visit to-day from the French Ambassador, who gave me the following confidential information :—

The German Government have informed M. Cambon that they are prepared to revise the indemnities fixed by the German Commission in so far as these are in excess of the compensation which can be granted under the rules by which the International Commission will be guided. On the other hand, the Imperial Government reserve the right of German subjects to benefit in any respect in which the International Commission may be more favourable to them than the German has been. The German Government inquired whether the French Government would accept this proposal.

M. Cambon thinks that an understanding can be arrived at on this basis, but he pointed out to Herr von Schön that the ultimate decision did not rest with the French Government but with the International Commission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. DE SALIS.

[42628] No. 167.

*Note communicated by M. Geoffray, December 30, 1907.**

LES Gouvernements Français et Espagnol ont fait connaitre aux Puissances Signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras qu'ils se proposaient d'offrir au Gouvernement Marocain le concours de leurs forces navales pour la surveillance de la contrebande des armes et l'application des Articles 24, 25, 80, et 91 de l'Acte Général.

Cette suggestion a recueilli l'assentiment de tous les États intéressés. Le Sultan, saisi par les Représentants de la France et de l'Espagne des propositions qui avaient été communiquées aux Puissances, vient de les approuver. Par une récente décision il a donné mandat aux deux Gouvernements d'exercer la surveillance de la contrebande dans ces conditions mêmes et conformément aux Articles précités de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

En portant ce fait à la connaissance des Cabinets étrangers, la France et l'Espagne rappellent que la procédure spéciale et provisoire qui va être mise en vigueur dès maintenant et pendant une année comporte les dispositions suivantes :—

Les navires de guerre Français et Espagnol chargés de la surveillance et ayant à bord des agents du service douanier Marocain pourront faire l'enquête du pavillon à l'égard de tout bâtiment de commerce rencontré dans les eaux Marocaines et qu'ils jugeront suspect de contrebande des armes, à l'exception des bâtiments appartenant à des lignes régulières et dont la liste aura été donnée par les diverses Légations.

Cette enquête ne portera que sur la nationalité du bâtiment, sur sa provenance, et sur sa destination. Les pièces relatives au chargement ne seront examinées et la cargaison ne sera visitée que si le capitaine du bâtiment arrêté le propose spontanément. L'agent de la Douane Chérifienne prendra part à ces constatations, dont il sera dressé procès-verbal.

Les bâtiments arrêtés et jugés suspects pourront être conduits au port Marocain le plus proche pour y subir, en présence d'un officier du navire de guerre, d'un représentant de la Légation ou du Consulat intéressé, et de l'agent de la Douane Chérifienne, la visite prévue aux Articles 24, 25, 80, et 91 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

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* A similar communication received from the Spanish Embassy, December 30, 1907.

[41628]

No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 724.) *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1907.

Sir,

THE French Minister called at this Office on the 19th instant, and made a communication to the following effect:—

During the stay at Rabat of the French Minister at Tangier the Sultan's Ministers brought to M. Regnault's notice the deplorable condition of Moorish finance, and expressed the opinion that the best means of remedying it would be to intrust a Financial Controller with the re-establishment of order in the Moorish budget and administration.

In a letter dated the 27th November last the Sherifian Minister for Foreign Affairs approached the French Minister with a request that his Government should designate a French citizen to fill the office of Financial Controller. The duration of the control would be fixed at twenty years. The Controller would lend his assistance to the Makhzen in drawing up the budget, would receive a copy of the latter as soon as it was settled, and would deal with financial matters in conjunction with the Ministers and the Amins charged with the accounts, receipts, and expenditure. His opinion would be asked in the event of the Moorish Government wishing to contract a loan or to embark on expenditure not provided for in the budget.

The French Government, after ascertaining that this request was not inconsistent with the stipulations of the Algeciras Act, had, M. Geoffray stated, expressed their readiness to comply with it, and Commandant Farian, who had already been intrusted by the Makhzen with the reorganization of the military forces, had been provisionally appointed to act as Financial Controller. He would eventually be replaced by a civil official.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[41440]

No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 726.) *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1907.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador informed me on the 17th instant that his Government had chosen M. Herbaux, Conseiller à la Cour de Cassation, as French Delegate on the International Commission to investigate the Casa Blanca claims.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.